Celebrating the History & Future of Human Relations Research: DEOMI 8th Biennial Research Symposium

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Celebrating the History & Future of Human Relations Research: DEOMI 8th Biennial Equal Opportunity, Diversity, and Culture Research Symposium
Patrick AFB, FL, December 6–8, 2011, Proceedings

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Forword

The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute's biennial research symposia serve as a forum for researchers to share their investigations of social science issues with other researchers and military policy makers. This publication provides a culmination of the research presented at the DEOMI 8th Biennial EO, Diversity, and Culture Research Symposium held December 6–8, 2011 at the Institute on Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. DEOMI’s 8th Biennial Symposium also coincided with DEOMI’s 40th Anniversary, celebrating 40 years of race relations, equal opportunity, equal employment opportunity, culture, diversity education, and research for all military Services.

The symposium consisted of four structured activities:

1. **Paper Sessions:** The presenters provided research papers which were submitted in response to the 2010 Call for Papers. In addition to traditional military equal opportunity issues, this year’s topics were expanded to include culture and diversity subject matter. Some of the papers are also provided in a PowerPoint format.

2. **Poster Session:** This session was designed to display research, which allowed face-to-face conversation between authors and viewers.

3. **Panel Sessions:** These sessions were designed to bring researchers together to discuss a common topic. A Presider was employed to lead the discussion and assist in defining various viewpoints.

4. **Technology Demonstration:** These exhibits provided us with a view of the state of the art technology.

The next research symposium (9th Biennial) is scheduled for February 2014.
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Paper Sessions

Fifteen presenters provided research papers, which were submitted in response to the 2010 Call for Papers. In addition to traditional military equal opportunity issues, this year’s topics were expanded to include culture and diversity subject matter. Some papers were also presented in a PowerPoint format.
Navy Results from the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) Survey:
Importance of the Contact Hypothesis

David L. Alderton, Paul Rosenfeld, and LCDR Tatana Olson

Abstract

In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense established the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG) to assess the implications of repealing the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) law (10 USC §654). As part of the review, surveys were conducted with nearly 400,000 service members and over 150,000 spouses. In October 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs directed each Service Chief to independently assess the impacts of repeal. The authors were asked to analyze the Navy results of the service member and spouse surveys for the Chief of Naval Operations to inform his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on December 3, 2010. The following summarizes the key Navy survey results. Navy responses were more moderate about the potential impacts of repeal of DADT compared to overall Service-wide averages. Most Navy service members and their spouses thought that repeal of DADT would be neutral. A small, consistent minority thought the effects would be negative and might impact their retention, likelihood to recommend Navy service, choice of housing, and attendance at Navy sponsored functions. However, a small minority also thought that repeal would have positive impacts on many Navy outcomes. Females, spouses, younger age, good leadership, and good unit cohesion were associated with more positive and less negative views about the repeal of DADT. Active and Reserve member expectations were generally similar. There were few systematic differences between major communities (e.g., Surface Warfare, Aviation Warfare). Nevertheless, at the level of specific occupational groups (e.g., Special Operations, Medical Corpsmen, Pilots) there were notable differences in overall measures of negativity (endorsing negative or very negative expected effects from repeal) and retention (expected percent loss from repeal). Consistent with Allport’s (1954/1979) “contact hypothesis,” which states that prejudice against a social group is reduced by contact with that group, serving with a gay or lesbian Sailor was associated with less negative responses throughout the survey. Across all 16 Enlisted and 17 Officer occupational groups, the correlation between the retention index (expected percent loss) and the percent currently serving with a gay or lesbian Sailor was -.43; the correlation between negativity and percent serving with a gay or lesbian member was -.57. Thus, serving with a gay or lesbian Sailor reduced the expected negative effects from a repeal of DADT. This is consistent with meta-analytic studies that support the efficacy of the contact hypothesis in general, but also reveal that the effect is more pronounced for heterosexual-homosexual groups than for others (such as racial majority-minority groups) (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2005; Smith, Axelton, & Saucier, 2009).

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Introduction

We are grateful for the opportunity to present these results to this audience, which has long focused on critical social issues within the military. This is particularly salient since Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) has been the most important recent social challenge for the military. At the outset, let me be clear that the views expressed today are those of my co-authors and myself and do not represent the views of the Navy or the Department of Defense.

Background

On March 2, 2010, the Secretary of Defense created the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG) to investigate the impacts of a repeal of §654 of Title 10 of the United States Code, commonly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law. Secretary Gates appointed Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson and U.S. Army General Carter F. Ham to co-chair the CRWG. As part of the review, they commissioned the largest scientific survey of military members ever conducted; the sample included 399,856 service members (active and reserve) and 150,186 military spouses. The CRWG, assisted by WESTAT and the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), conducted overall survey analyses. In October of 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, directed each Service Chief to independently assess the potential impacts of a repeal of DADT. We – David Alderton, Paul Rosenfeld, and Lieutenant Commander Tatana Olson – were nominated by the Chief of Naval Personnel to analyze the Navy survey results and report them to the Chief of Naval Operations. While the reports and results from the CRWG analyses of the survey are in the public domain, little is known about service specific analyses. The results of the Navy service member survey are the focus of this paper.

High Level Results

The services’ principle concerns regarding a repeal of DADT were the potential impact on retention given the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the generally high operational tempo across services, as well as the effect of repeal on morale, job satisfaction, unit cohesion, unit effectiveness, and unit readiness. As a general structure, questions on the survey formed a pattern. For example, take questions on morale. In the early part of the survey, the question would be about morale in their current unit. Later in the survey, a second question would be asked about morale in a unit they served in where they believed there was a gay or lesbian service member. Toward the end of the survey, a third hypothetical or “prediction” question would be asked about what they thought the effect on morale would be should DADT be repealed and there was an openly gay or lesbian member in the unit. This pattern – current unit, past unit with homosexual member, and future effect with homosexual openly serving – was repeated for the major areas of concern.

Since retention was a primary concern, let us begin by looking at the “retention index” developed by the authors to examine potential impacts on retention in the Navy. This is the
expected effect on retention, based on survey question 81, which asked: “If Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is repealed, how, if at all, will your military career plans be affected?” The retention index was calculated by taking the percentage who said they would “leave sooner than planned” (losses) and subtracting the percentage who said they would “stay longer than planned” (saves). The logic is simple - the difference between those who would leave sooner and those who would stay longer is a reasonable approximation of the expected retention impact. Across the services (see Table 1 below), the expected effect was lowered retention by between six and 21 percentage points. Overall, repeal was expected to lower retention by 11%, however, the Marine Corps expected the largest retention loss (21%), whereas the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard each expected a more modest 6% retention loss, with Army in the middle with an expected loss of 12%. While this question was a prediction of what would happen if DADT were to be repealed, the potentially high loss rate for the Marine Corps was concerning, whereas the other values (6% to 12%) were more or less within the boundaries of normal retention effects following up-swings in the economy and could likely be mediated through recruiting efforts.

Table 1. Retention Intentions with Repeal of DADT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 81</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leave sooner than planned</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think about leaving sooner</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career plans will not change</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think about staying longer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay longer than planned</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retention Index</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to retention, the CRWG and the service analysts were also concerned with effects from repeal of DADT on morale, performance, unit cohesion, effectiveness, and readiness. These topics (among others) were asked in a series of questions, late in the survey, that were all prefaced with: “If Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is repealed and you are working with a Service member in your immediate unit who has said he or she is gay or lesbian, how, if at all, would…” Most of the items used a standard five-point Likert scale with these anchors: very positive, positive, neither positive nor negative, negative, very negative, and unsure. In Table 2 below, the cell numbers are the sum of the percentage of negative and very negative endorsements. Relative to the other services, the Navy expected relatively less disruption if DADT was repealed. The Navy responses were more moderate than the overall response and often, the most moderate of the services. The Marine Corps was the most negative of all services across all measures, with the Army typically being the second most negative. The Air Force was generally less negative than the Army, but more so than the Navy and Coast Guard. While the focus is on the negative percentages, it is important to note that excluding the Marine Corps,
roughly 80% of service members thought there would be either a positive or neutral effect to the repeal of DADT in most of the areas addressed in the survey. Even within the Marine Corps, roughly 65% of respondents felt there would be positive or neutral effects from repealing DADT.

Table 2. Service Specific Negativity for Major Areas of Concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morale</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job performance (personal)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Cohesion</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Effectiveness</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness (unit)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sum of negative and very negative endorsements.

Now, we want to look more carefully at the Navy specific data that we worked on. A total of 21,527 Sailors (12,603 AC and 8,924 RC) completed the survey with a response rate of approximately 30%, which is typical of Navy response rates on DoD surveys. Data quality, in terms of response rate, missing values, errant data ranges, etc. was very good. The sample size for the Navy survey was substantial, considerably larger than typical Navy surveys, which means that the margins of error are very small and the statistical power robust.

To make comparisons within the Navy and the other services easier, a “negativity index” was created by WESTAT. This negativity index is the percentage of respondents who answered negatively or very negatively to the 21 survey items asking how the repeal of DADT would impact unit cohesion, unit effectiveness, readiness, leadership, recruiting, and retention; some of those questions were the same as reported above for all the services. Overall, across the Navy, 20.2% of Sailors predicted negative impacts should DADT be repealed. Table 3 below includes a sample of negativity indices across various groups. Each cell represents the percent of the group expressing negative or very negative expected effects from the repeal of DADT.

Table 3. Navy Demographic Group Results for Negativity Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>21.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1-E3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5-E6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7-E9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O1-O3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O4 +</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sum of Negative and Very Negative Endorsements

Generally speaking, lower negativity scores were associated with being younger, minority, female, single, and without children. Being officer or enlisted, active or reserve, or a member of the major warfare communities (surface, aviation, and submarine) was not associated with different levels of negativity.

Navy Occupational Groups

While broad community groupings of Sailors (e.g., officer, surface warfare) revealed few differences in the expected impact of a repeal of DADT, there was concern about differences across more specific occupational groups. While working as the Navy analysts, we were in the same location as the analysts from the other services. Early on, it became clear that resistance to the repeal of DADT was higher in the combat arms specialties of the Army and Marine Corps. We were asked specifically to determine if this pattern occurred in Navy Special Operations and other combat specialties (e.g., aviation aircrew) within the Navy as well. To investigate this, we grouped officers and enlisted personnel into meaningful occupational groups under the constraint that the number of individuals be sufficiently large to ensure anonymity and provide some statistical validity. All Navy survey respondents were classified into occupational groups except for 589 (2.7%) of the 21,527 Sailors. Table 4 below shows the results of these analyses. The first column is the occupational group descriptor (e.g., Special Operations Officer, Intelligence Enlisted); officers are the first 17 groups and enlisted comprise the remaining 16 groups (shaded light blue). The unweighted sample sizes vary from 81 for Special Operations Officers to 2,658 for Aviation Maintenance Enlisted. The third column contains the retention index as described above (i.e., the expected retention loss from a repeal of DADT). Within officer and enlisted, occupational groups are sorted by the retention index (high to low). For officers, the retention index varied across a wide range of scores, from a high of 20.6% expected losses for Special Operations to a low of 1.9% for Judge Advocate General. For enlisted, the expected retention losses varied from 16.7% for Special Operations to a low of -0.8% (actually a retention gain) for culinary specialists. The final column contains the negativity index described above, which for officers varied from 50.8% for Chaplains to a low of 10.5% for Nurses. Among enlisted personnel, the negativity index varied from 51.7% for Special Operations to a low of 12.7% for culinary specialists. Thus, while the high-level grouping of personnel (e.g., officer-enlisted, warfare community, active-reserve) revealed few distinctions, there were larger differences in attitudes and predicted effects from a repeal of DADT across specific occupational groups.

Table 4. Navy Occupational Groups and Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Retention Index</th>
<th>Negativity Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Duty Officers</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer Officer</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Officer</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain Officer</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and Dental Officer</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Duty Officers</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Officer</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Officer</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Officer</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Trainee Officer</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General URL Officer</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses Officer</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate General Officer</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Enlisted</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Enlisted</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Aircrew Enlisted</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic SN-AN-FN Enlisted</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabee-Construction Enlisted</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Enlisted</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Enlisted</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Maintenance Enlisted</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Engineering Enlisted</td>
<td>1,070</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Enlisted</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combat Systems Enlisted</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Enlisted</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Enlisted</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Enlisted</td>
<td>1,662</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptologic Enlisted</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culinary Enlisted</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals or Overall</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,938</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Contact Hypothesis**

While these occupational differences reflect many factors, among them internal culture, working conditions, and deployment living conditions, might there also be an overarching reason why certain combat specialties responded more negatively than did others? We think the answer might lie in the Contact Hypothesis, Gordon Allport’s seminal analysis of prejudice that has been
included in many of DEOMI’s courses over the years. For over 50 years, a leading proposal for how to understand and reduce in-group versus out-group prejudice has been the “Contact Hypothesis.” The contact hypothesis was formalized and explained in Gordon Allport’s (1954/1979) book, *The Nature of Prejudice*. The original focus was racial/ethnic prejudice; however, this has been expanded to include prejudice toward the mentally challenged, physically and medically handicapped individuals, old age, and sexual orientation. The essence of the theory is that prejudice between groups can be reduced by contact between the groups. Allport believed that simple contact may be insufficient, so he defined conditions, which would facilitate the reduction of prejudice. Specifically, he claimed that four conditions were necessary. The two groups should have equal status during contact; they should have common goals; there should be some acquaintance potential, that is, the opportunity of group members to get to know each other as friends; and there must be authority support that sanctions the contact.

The DADT service member survey provides an opportunity to indirectly evaluate the contact hypothesis through several questions that were asked of respondents about military service with a gay or lesbian member. Specifically, respondents were asked if they currently serve with a homosexual member and if they ever had a homosexual leader, coworker, or subordinate. Table 5 summarizes the results of these questions. Across services, 36% of members believed they were currently serving with a homosexual and nearly 70% had served at some time with a coworker they believed to be homosexual; 49.1% had a homosexual subordinate at some point in their career; and 38.5% had a homosexual leader in their career. Focusing on those currently serving with a gay or lesbian service member, the Navy had the highest percentage and the Marine Corps the lowest. It is notable that the Navy also had the lowest negativity and expected retention loss, whereas the Marine Corps had the highest negativity and expected retention loss. Focusing on the row including the percentage of members who ever had a homosexual coworker, since the contact hypothesis includes equal status as a necessary condition, the rank ordering of the services mimics the rank ordering for retention losses and negativity. This suggests that the contact hypothesis may have some validity, although the Army results are inconsistent in several areas (higher contact and more expected negative effects).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Marines</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Currently serve with a</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Until 20 September 2011, service members were very unlikely to reveal if they actually were homosexual since this could have resulted in dismissal. Therefore, in most cases where service members said they were working with or had worked with a homosexual service member, the identification was likely based mostly on beliefs, tacit knowledge, and subtle cues.
To examine the contact hypothesis in more detail, we return to the results for the Navy occupational groups, which revealed a broad range of expected retention and negativity effects. Table 4 provided earlier in the paper is reproduced below as Table 6 with the addition of a column for the percentage of each group who are currently serving with a gay or lesbian member (the sample size column was dropped for simplicity). Among officers, Special Operations had the lowest percentage (13.0%), who were currently serving with a homosexual member and Nurses had the highest percentage (49.1%). For enlisted personnel, Special Operations had the lowest percentage (10.1%), who were serving with a homosexual and new Sailors (Basic SN-AN-FN) had the highest percentage (61.9%). For both officer and enlisted, the percentage serving with a gay or lesbian closely corresponds to the groups with the highest and lowest expected negative effects from a repeal of DADT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>44.3</th>
<th>30.8</th>
<th>40.4</th>
<th>33.4</th>
<th>40.9</th>
<th>38.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ever had homosexual leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever had homosexual coworker</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ever had homosexual subordinate</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To explore this more closely, we looked at correlations across the columns (and across officer and enlisted). The correlation between negativity and the expected retention loss was 0.80 (p<.001); if there was a high degree of negativity, there was a high expected retention effect. The correlation between the percent currently serving with a homosexual and the retention index was -0.43 (p<.01); generally, if the expected retention loss was low, then the percent serving with a homosexual was high, but there were some notable exceptions, such as Chaplain Officers and Basic SN-AN-FN, that moderated the correlation. The correlation between the percent currently serving with a homosexual and the negativity index was stronger, -0.60 (p<.001); generally, if the expected negativity was low, then the percent serving with a homosexual was high. To simplify things, the negativity and retention indices were regressed on the percent currently serving with a homosexual member which produced an adjusted $R^2 = 0.66$ ($F(2,30) = 18.4, p < .001$). These results indicate that two-thirds of the variance between the measures was predicted by the percentage of the group who were currently serving with a gay or lesbian member. If you were serving in the Navy with a homosexual member, you tended to predict fewer negative effects from a repeal of DADT and were less likely to believe you would leave service early (retention loss).
Table 6. Navy Occupational Groups and Percent Currently Serving with Gay or Lesbian Member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>Retention Index</th>
<th>Negativity Index</th>
<th>% Serving with Gay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Officer</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officers</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Duty Officers</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Engineer Officer</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Officer</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain Officer</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service Corps Officer</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical and Dental Officer</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Duty Officers</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Officer</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Officer</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Officer</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Flight Officer</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Trainee Officer</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General URL Officer</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses Officer</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge Advocate General Officer</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Enlisted</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Enlisted</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Aircrew Enlisted</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic SN-AN-FN Enlisted</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>61.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabee-Construction Enlisted</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine Enlisted</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Enlisted</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Maintenance Enlisted</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Engineering Enlisted</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Enlisted</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Combat Systems Enlisted</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Enlisted</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Enlisted</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Enlisted</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptologic Enlisted</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culinary Enlisted</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These results support the contact hypothesis and are consistent with past civilian-based research. For example, Herek and Glunt (1993) conducted a national level survey of interpersonal contact and heterosexuals' attitudes toward gay men. They found that increased contact "predicted attitudes toward gay men better than did any other demographic or social psychological variable" (p. 239); such variables included gender, race, age, education, geographic residence, marital status, number of children, religion, and political ideology.

Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a large meta-analysis of 515 studies with over 250,000 individuals. The studies covered racial, ethnic, handicapped, old age, and sexual orientation as the source of prejudice. The results clearly show that the contact hypothesis is valid. Moreover, “the largest effects emerge for samples involving contact between heterosexuals and gay men and lesbians (mean r = 0.271)” (p. 763). This was confirmed and extended in the research of Smith, Axelton, and Saucier (2009), which was a meta-analysis of studies on the contact hypothesis and sexual orientation prejudice; they uniformly found strong reductions in prejudice toward gay and lesbian individuals following contact, and the better structured and controlled the contact was, the greater the reduction in prejudice.

**Limitations of Findings**

There are several limitations to these findings. First, the focus was on large groups or smaller occupational groups, so the results represent average expectations and effects and may not hold for all individuals. Secondly, respondents were answering questions hypothetically. When asked, “If Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell is repealed and you are working with a Service member in your immediate unit who has said he or she is gay or lesbian, how, if at all, would…” there was no experiential or autobiographical information to directly interrogate. That is, few had served in the military without DADT, there was no guidance or instruction concerning behavior or benefits following the repeal of DADT, thus the linkage between attitudes and behavior are tenuous. Moreover, under DADT, service members were not revealing their sexual orientation, so estimates by those who said they were or were not serving, or had ever served, with a gay or lesbian service member are based on beliefs and not (in most cases) factual knowledge. It is possible that contact with an assumed homosexual may be different than the reality of contact with an actual homosexual.

**Conclusions**

Despite these shortcomings, the survey data indicate that increased contact with homosexuals moderated predicted negative effects. Across time, as more Sailors serve with gay or lesbian members, negative attitudes and actual effects are likely to moderate as well; this is strongly supported by civilian research. Moreover, the pre-repeal training for service members and DoD civilians, strong and consistent communication, and strong leadership support should facilitate the transition and minimize incidents. However, there are certainly occupational groups who may face greater challenges than others, suggesting that additional attention be provided to these groups to ensure a smooth transition.
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WESTAT Volume 1: Findings From the Surveys (November 2010)
WESTAT Volume 2: Findings from the Qualitative Research Tasks (November 2010)


Inevitable Progress or Gendered Organization: Women’s Service in the Modern Military

Joseph R. Bongiovi

Abstract

Contradictory views on women’s achievement in the workplace and society depict progress towards equality as inevitable (Jackson, 1998) or inhibited by social and institutional barriers (Lorber, 1994; MacKinnon, 1989). Few institutions have historically presented more defined gender boundaries than the military. Nonetheless, women have made substantial progress over the past forty years, providing support for the likelihood of advances towards greater equality, even in the most traditionally masculine environments. On the other hand, evidence suggests that substantial progress has slowed in recent years. The continued formal exclusion of women from branches most likely to lead to career advancement, as well as continued exposure to sexual harassment and assault, are mechanisms that inhibit further progress. Pervasive masculine hegemony (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005) and the highly gendered nature of the military organization (Britton, 2000; Acker, 1990; Silva, 2008) may provide an explanation for institutional resistance to profound change. Using Department of Defense surveys, promotion, harassment and assault data, as well as a literature review of current events, explores how forces enabling and inhibiting progress co-exist in modern organizations. This paper provides a more complete and nuanced accounting of the likelihood of equality of opportunity and inclusion in traditionally gendered organizations.

Keywords: gender, women, military, equality, opportunity, integration

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Increased Importance of Women in the Military

Women currently represent a larger proportion of the United States Military in history. They are also more directly involved in operations, as demonstrated by the roles they play and the combat related casualties that they have endured. From roughly 200 female soldiers participating in the invasion of Grenada in 1983, approximately 800 female service members took part in the invasion of Panama in 1989, more than 1,000 served in Somalia and 40,780 deployed to the first Gulf War (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). More than 255,000 women have participated in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by the beginning of 2011, suffering at least 130 fatalities and 700 injuries (Alvarez, August 16, 2009; Jelinek, January 15, 2011; McSally, 2011; Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010).

Women have done nearly everything possible in current wars, even when technically in violation of policy. Although women are not legally allowed into ground combat units, they are doing it informally (Bumiller, March 6, 2010; Bumiller, May 29, 2010; Bumiller, October 2, 2010; Holmstedt, 2007; Holmstedt, 2009; Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). Female combat in Iraq and Afghanistan is well documented, where they serve in aviation, air defense, military police, engineering, logistics, transport, and medical roles (Holmstedt, 2007; Holmstedt, 2009, Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). They are in engagement, engineering, explosive disposal medical and military police teams with front line Marine Corps and Army infantry units (Bumiller, March 6, 2010; Bumiller, May 29, 2010; Bumiller, October 2, 2010; Holmstedt, 2007; Holmstedt, 2009; Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). They have been fighter, ground attack, surveillance and transport pilots in virtually all helicopter and fixed wing aircraft platforms in all branches (Holmstedt, 2007; Holmstedt, 2009). At least one woman was a CIA paramilitary field commander, killed along with analyst Elizabeth Hanson in an attack by a Taliban double agent in Khost, Afghanistan (Stolberg & Mazzetti, January 7, 2010). Women serve in all roles on U.S. Navy surface warfare ships and aircraft and have now been authorized to serve on submarines, with former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stating: “I believe that we should continue to broaden opportunities for women.” (Rutgers, September 27, 2009).

With 1.43 million active duty members, another 1.2 million in the Reserves and National Guard and 1 million civil service employees, the Military is one of the nation’s largest employers, accounting for roughly one percent of the nation’s workforce (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008). With over 24 million veterans, it has a large extended network (Cleland, November 7, 2009). Civilian employers see former service members as quality candidates and in a recent Gallup poll the military had an 82% approval rating, significantly higher than nearly all other institutions (O’Keefe, March 22, 2010). Its organization and employment model is widely studied and replicated by other armed forces (Sasson-Levy, 2010). Military action on integration is highly visible and has influences beyond the institution (Moskos & Butler, 1996). It is the largest discretionary public spending category in the U.S. Federal Budget (Bumiller, November 5, 2009; Tiron, October 22, 2009). And it has been involved in the two longest wars in U. S. history over the past decade. While it is an important social institution, the military has been a highly masculine gendered organization (Goldstein, 2001; Herbert, 1998; Higate, 2003) and the effectiveness of integration of women in the military has an important demonstration effect for gender and work in other organizations.
This paper assesses whether women have career opportunities similar to men in the U.S. Military today. It also identifies factors favoring integration of women, as well as those that work against gender equality. In conclusion, I will summarize the interaction of these factors, while also highlighting the limitations of data and methods used in this paper, as well as suggestions for next steps in this research. In the next section I discuss theory informing the research in this paper. I then briefly outline the historical context of women in the military, before moving to a discussion of data, methods and findings.

**Gendered Organizations and Equality of Opportunity**

The expanded role of women in the military is parallel to similar changes in broader society. One perspective is that progress towards equality is all but inevitable, with markets forcing efficiency and rationalization to do away with discriminatory practices. The success of women builds on itself, while institutional forces affected by these change processes also reinforce them. Change in civilian society influences the military and vice versa (Jackson, 1994).

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outline the institutional mechanisms of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. This helps explain how progress for women in the civilian workplace and society carry over into other important institutions, such as the military. Coercive mechanisms require the adoption of practices and approaches, often through regulation. Mimetic mechanisms are more prevalent in times of technological disruption, significant change and uncertainty, as occurred in the military with the end of conscription in 1973. Absent institutional knowledge and experience, organizations turn to each other for examples, such as when the military embraced market practices for recruitment and retention. Normative mechanisms result in the sharing of knowledge and standards between occupations, professions, schools and universities, as well as interaction between members and leaders across organizations. Military professionals move in and out of civilian educational institutions, benchmarking public and private organizations, as required by Congress (Stanger, 2009) and are influenced by societal norms. All of these are factors that lead the military to be influenced by the growing public role of women in civil society.

Another view is that uneven progress towards gender equality is marked by “…gender as an institution that establishes patterns of expectations for individuals, orders the social processes of everyday life, is built into the major social organizations of society, such as the economy, ideology, the family, and politics, and is also an entity in and of itself.” (Lorber, 1994:1) Subordination of women is tied up in a male centered epistemology and jurisprudence that allows pornography (free speech); rape, sexual assault and harassment (burden of proof), discrimination (proof of intent) and prostitution (in practice) (MacKinnon, 1989).

“Hegemonic masculinity” suggests a complex and multifaceted mode of male domination, including of men by other men, particularly those who do not conform to the ideal vision noted above (Connell, 1987; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Women experience sexual harassment (Welsh, 1991) and assaults at work (Schneider, 1991) in disproportionately large numbers. It is estimated that almost half of all women will experience rape or attempted rape
during their lifetime (MacKinnon, 1989). Even in highly institutionalized environments it is not uncommon for half of all women to experience sexual coercion (Adams, Curtis & Forbes, 2004).

In *Framed by Gender* (2011), Cecilia Ridgeway attempts a synthesis of these views. She outlines institutional and other modernizing social forces that enhance women’s progress. At the same time she recognizes multigenerational patterns of gender framing that act as a break to full inequality. It is this nuanced argument, of contradictory forces propelling and resisting progress towards equality simultaneously, that informs my approach in this paper.

**Historical context of women in military service**

Formal female military service in the U.S. began during the First World War, with roughly 350,000 women serving during the Second World War (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). While this laid the groundwork for greater female participation, the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 restricted them to two percent of the armed forces and limited their highest permanent rank to Lieutenant Colonel/Navy Commander (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010; Sandhoff, Segal & Segal, 2010). They could not serve on Navy ships, fly combat aircraft or have direct command over men. In spite of that, women served in Korea and Vietnam, though primarily in nursing and other female gendered capacities. (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010).

Bolder experiments took place in the Soviet Union, with more than 66,000 women serving in the Red Army during the Russian Revolution and Civil War (Noggle, 1994), with nearly one million more serving in air defense, combat aviation, sniper, partisan and tank units during the “Great Patriotic War” (Glantz, 2005; Krylova, 2010; Slepyan, 2006). At least 92 earned Hero of the Soviet Union, others were fighter aces and two all-female combat aviation regiments were awarded the Guards honorific for heroism and achievement in combat (Glantz, 2005; Noggle, 1994). Women commanded men in combat, with roughly 80,000 serving as officers (Glantz, 2005) and at least one becoming a combat aviation regimental commander, and another the deputy commander of a ground forces combat regiment in male units (Krylova, 2010). In Israel, women comprised nearly twenty percent of Jewish combat organizations during the war for independence (IMFA March 2009) and in 1948 the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) began drafting (unmarried) women, accounting for half of all conscripts and one third of the IDF (Sasson-Levy, 2010).

The military has traditionally been a bastion of masculinity (Goldstein, 2001; Grossman, 2009; Herbert, 1998; Higate, 2003; Sasson-Levy, 2010; Silva, 2008). Women have made progress in the U.S Military over the last forty years, increasing their representation and expanding their roles and promotion to higher ranks. Nevertheless, they are 14.5% of the total force, just 7.3% of generals and admirals and many military occupations are still not available to them, including combat branches most likely to lead to future promotion (Alvarez, August 16, 2009). Furthermore, arguments for the primacy of “male bonding” have challenged gender blind meritocracy (Frank, 2009; McPeak March 5, 2010; McSally, 2011; Shilts, 2005). It is in this context that I will next examine data on progress towards gender equality in the U.S. Military.
Research questions, data and methods

This paper has two primary research questions. The first is whether women have similar career opportunities to men in the current all volunteer military. The second research question is to identify what mechanisms enhance or inhibit equality of opportunity for women. To do this, I use “Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel & Military Casualty Statistics” publically available on the DoD website. This data reports the number of men in women in all military ranks in four U.S. Military branches: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines from 1994- 2011. I supplemented this data with the United States Census Bureau’s “The 2012 Statistical Abstract National Security & Veterans Affairs: Military Personnel and Expenditures” which contains gender composition these branches since 1950. Where possible, I have supplemented this data with other DoD surveys and data, such as reporting on sexual harassment and assault, as well as service member interviews and testimonials from both published and unpublished sources.

The personnel data examines gender equality in the military. As a result, I was able to conduct a basic comparative and historical descriptive data analysis of gender composition of by rank over time, comparing the gender composition of men and women in each rank. Because I did not have actual promotion data, I was not able to make a claim of promotion rates for women to men. I was able to look at the ratio of each progressively higher rank to the previous one, by gender, and to compile a ratio of those rates between men and women. This provides a proxy for promotion rates of men and women. When doing this, I analyzed promotion by individual rank to the next higher one. I also grouped ranks together to analyze the ratios of layers of ranks to each other. For instance, the first four enlisted ranks, referred to as E-1 to E-4 in the military, were grouped together, as were the first two ranks of non commissioned officer, E-5 and E-6, and the top three enlisted ranks, E-7 to E-9. I grouped officers into Company Grade (WO-1 to O-3), Field Grade (O-4 to O-6) and Flag Officers, essentially generals and admirals (O-7 to O-10). This helped to overcome some peculiarities of the numbers of incumbents in each individual rank and is justifiable as the military also groups these ranks. I looked at data both as a cross section and longitudinally. While the data is compiled quarterly, I used reporting on September 30, the end of each fiscal year and 2011 in particular, both because it is the most recent data and because it represents the accumulation of previous recruitment, development and promotion decisions.

Regarding mechanisms enhancing and obstructing equality, I relied on published sources, service member interviews and testimonies, surveys and environmental data. I identified mechanisms based on the commonality of their references in sources utilized, as well as logical consistency with theoretical and empirical literature. These mechanisms are hypothesized and should be subjected to further empirical research. Nonetheless, I felt it was important to include them to advance the research possibilities on this topic. In the next section I outline the empirical findings from the Department of Defense and U.S. Census Data. In the subsequent section I highlight my findings regarding mechanisms enhancing or inhibiting inequality.
Empirical Findings/Results

The personnel data that I examined suggest progress towards equality. At the same time, it also highlights the continued gender disparity. It is in this context that the mechanisms enhancing and inhibiting progress towards inequality are so important to consider.

**Armed forces participation rates, by gender.** Data shows that women made up between one and two percent of the armed forces between 1950 and 1972, but never more than that. The first time that women were more than two percent of the armed forces was in 1973, the first year of the all volunteer military making up 2.5% at the time. In most years after 1950, women made up slightly more than three percent of the officer corps, increasing to four percent in 1973. It should be noted that until the late 1970’s, women were not integrated into the regular military, but were part of female specific auxiliaries, such as the Women’s Army Corps.

Female participation first reached five percent in 1976, with officer representation at nearly five percent that same year. That was also the first year that women were accepted into the service academies. Female representation first reached the ten percent threshold in 1985, and was about ten percent of officers that same year. Female representation reached the fifteen percent threshold from 2001 to 2004, and was roughly fifteen percent of officers in those same years. After that, female participation reversed previous trends, decreasing slightly. By 2011 women were 14.5% of active duty service members. On the other hand, the female officer mix has continued to increase, and settled in at nearly sixteen percent by 2011. A review of “Table 1: Female Participation in the Armed Forces, 1960- 2011” shows the increasing participation of women in the armed forces since the 1950’s, as well as the relatively flat participation since 2005.

**Armed forces female representation rates, by gender.** As noted in the previous findings, the percent of women in the military has generally increased since 1950. The representation of women in higher ranks has also increased. The first female generals were promoted in 1970, starting with the commanders of the Women’s Army Corps and US Army Nurse Corps (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). The commander of the Women’s Air Force became the first female Air Force general in 1971 and earned her second star in 1973 (Martin, March 2, 2010). By 2011, there were 71 female general officers and admirals, including one four star general, the highest possible rank. On the other hand, female representation among these flag officers was only 7.3%, about half of representation among service members, and less than half of representation among officers.

Reviewing “Table 2: Female Representation by Rank in the Armed Forces, 1995- 2011” shows that although there has been general progress in female rank attainment over time, there is also a trend towards less representation in each successively higher rank. This becomes even more clear when reviewing “Table 3: Female Representation by Rank Category in the Armed Forces, 1995- 2005” As noted earlier, I have combined O7-O10, O4-O6, WO1-O3, E7-E9, E5-E6 and E1-E4, representing the categories of flag officers (generals and admirals), field grade officers (majors and colonels), company grade officers (warrant officers, lieutenants and captains), senior non- commissioned officers, junior non- commissioned officers, and junior enlisted. Looking at it this way, the pattern of improvement over time can be seen, as can the
significant decrease of women in the subsequent category, relative to their male counterparts. For instance, the female representation among flag officers is on slightly higher than half their representation among field grade officers, a focus of the next section.

**Armed forces promotion rates, by gender.** While the available data does not allow an assessment of promotion rates, the relative ratio of each successive rank category provides a proxy for promotion. As noted above, the relative representation of female service members has both improved over time, and diminishes when moving into the next higher rank category. In “Table 4: Female to Male Ratios by Rank Category, 1995-2011” both the ratio, by gender, to the next lower rank category, as well as the ratio of these ratios of female to male service members can be seen. While these are not promotion rates, it can be assumed that these are the results of promotion rates. There is improvement over time, as well continued significantly lower rates at which female service members are moving to the next rank category when compared with male peers.

The ratio at which female service members are represented in the junior non-commissioned officer category, versus the junior enlisted category, is almost the same as male service members, or .936. A ratio of 1.0 would mean that it is the same for men and women. The lower the ratio, the less equal it is for women. This ration drops to .782 when going from junior non-commissioned officer to senior non-commissioned officer. The ratio between field grade and company officers drops again to .756. Finally, the ratio from field grade to flag offices drops to .552, meaning that a female field grade officer is only half as likely to become a flag officer as her male counterpart. Ratios have been improving for women over time. However, ratios becoming worse for women as they move up the ranks means that they become increasingly disadvantaged at higher levels. As noted above, the female to male ratio would have to be 1.0 just to have the same representation at higher ranks as they have at lower ranks.

While both participation and representation have improved for women over time, the fact that women start off at less than 15% of service members, and then lose ground at each subsequent rank category, suggests that the gendered nature of the military continues to be strong. What explains the persistent inequality between female and male service members, in spite of the year over year improvement? Articulating mechanisms that enable progress towards equality, and others that obstruct it, is the subject of the next section of this paper.

**Mechanisms enabling progress towards gender equality in the military**

The evidence reviewed above suggests that there is both progress toward equality for women in the military and a stubbornly persistent inequality. This section reviews some of the most important mechanisms that enable progress for women in the military. It also reviews some of the mechanisms that contribute to obstructing further progress.

**There has been progress for women in American society, particularly in education, work and sports.** As noted earlier in this paper, New Institutional Theory (NIT) (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) suggests mimetic mechanisms. From this perspective, it is likely that progress towards greater equality for women in civil society is likely to have a positive effect on the role of women in the military. Women in the U.S. have increased their workforce participation from
38% in 1970 to more than 50% in 2010, while earnings grew from 60% of men’s in 1980 to 80% in 2000 (News & Observer, January 15, 2010; Lorber, 1994), with some demographics even earning more than their male counterparts (Luscombe, 2010). Women earn roughly 60% of bachelors and masters degrees and more than half of all PhDs (International Herald Tribune, September 19, 2010; Roberts, January 19, 2010; Williams, February 7, 2010).

**Contributing to this are regulatory changes, including Title VII and Title IX.** Consistent with NITs hypothesized mechanism of coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), regulatory changes have enabled this progress. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 declared that employers could not discriminate based on sex. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed employment discrimination against women and other protected groups. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 prohibited discrimination against women by educational institutions receiving federal aid. (Dworkin & Messner, 2000; Jackson, 1998; Thomas, April 20, 2010).

Title IX is particularly impactful, given the importance of physical conditioning in the military. As decades of women’s engagement in sports under Title IX have led to a narrowing of male and female athletic performance, they are proving themselves in the military as well. As *The New York Times* reported (Bumiller, May 29, 2010):

“The women, who carry the same weapons and receive the same combat training as the men, cannot leave the bases unless the men escort them. Lt. Natalie Kronschnabel, one of the team leaders, said she had to push a Marine captain to let her team go on a five-hour patrol. ‘It wasn’t that hard, it was only four or five clicks,’ said Lieutenant Kronschnabel, 26, using slang for kilometers. ‘And they kept asking, ‘Are you doing O.K.? Are you breathing hard?’ Like the other women, Lieutenant Kronschnabel, a high school athlete in soccer, softball and gymnastics, had to meet rigorous physical requirements in the Marines. When she got back that day, she said the captain told her, ‘O.K., we’ll start getting your girls scheduled for more patrols.’ ”

**All volunteer force and accelerated integration of women.** As noted earlier, the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 restricted female participation in the military. The first modification occurred in 1967, eliminating the representation and rank caps. A fuller integration of women was required in order to resource the all volunteer professional military (Sandhoff, Segal & Segal, 2010; Shilts, 2005). By August 1973, within six months of the end of conscription, the Army was 19%, and the Marine Corps 17%, short of personnel requirements, persisting until the Army announced that it would double the number of women in uniform and increased the number of accessible occupations from 139 to 436, out of 484. The Air Force doubled the number of jobs available to women, opening up all but five of its 282 occupations. That same year, the Navy put its first woman (since WWII) into pilot training and the Chief of Naval Operations announced plans to put women (back) on ships. Altogether, 81% of occupations across all services were made available to women. Women’s enlistment in the Air Force increased from 7,000 to 17,000 between 1968 and 1973. Other branches saw similar gains. By November 1973 the military was meeting its enlistment goals for the first time, with women accounting for 9% of entrants and 20% of incoming Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Cadets (Shilts, 2005). The Women’s Army Corps (WAC) grew from 12,260 to 52,900 members from 1972 to 1978, being merged into the Army that year (Monahan & Neidel-
Greenlee, 2010). It was clear that the requirements of the all volunteer military would have a greater effect on the proportional participation of women than any prior event.

The first Gulf War indicated the effectiveness of large scale participation of women in the military. The 1991 Gulf War was the first large scale conflict since female representation began to grow with along with all volunteer military. As noted earlier, more than 40,000 women deployed to the Persian Gulf theatre at that time. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed all services to open combat aviation positions to women. The following year the Department of Defense ordered occupations directly supporting ground combat units opened back up to women, making another 32,000 Army and 48,000 Marine Corps jobs available them, and Congress repealed the law barring women from surface combat ships in the Navy (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). These were major incremental changes to the role of women in the armed forces, legitimizing them as peers of their male counterparts.

Increased need for qualified personnel in current wars. There is little question that the needs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced women into combat more often than ever before. The Department of Defense estimates that only 75% of the military age population in the United States is unqualified for service (Military Leadership Diversity Commission, 2011; Quillan, 2009). Intensified deployment, combat casualties and a relatively robust civilian economy made it even more difficult to attract the 25% of the population that was qualified, requiring the accelerated use of waivers of standards, including moral waivers (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). Retired Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl stated: “We literally could not have fought this war (Iraq and Afghanistan) without women”, with retired U.S. Army Colonel Peter R. Monsoor adding, “Iraq has advanced the cause of full integration of women in the Army by leaps and bounds. They have earned the confidence and respect of their male colleagues.” (Alvarez, August 16, 2009)

Women have proven their ability through their performance according to Colonel Burt K, Thompson, past Commander of Forward Operating Base Warhorse in Iraq, with examples including the officer in charge of logistics for the redeployment of equipment from Iraq, Brigadier General Heidi V. Brown, and the former director of intelligence in Iraq, Brigadier General Mary A. Legere both being women (Myers, August 17, 2009). Major General Mary Kay Hertog was the commander of the U.S. Air Force Security Forces from 2006 to 2009 and subsequently commander of the Second Air Force before becoming the Director of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) in August 2011. As noted earlier, a total of 71 women were generals or admirals by the end of 2011, up from only 32 ten years earlier. In 2009 Ann E. Dunwoody became the first female four star general the highest rank possible, Command Sergeant Major Teresa L. King became the first female to oversee all U.S. Army Drill Sergeants (Dao, September 22, 2009), and in 2010, Sergeant Sherri Gallagher became the first woman to be awarded the Army’s Soldier of the Year.

The end of don’t ask don’t tell. Rescinding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was important for women in the military for a number of reasons. With the integration of women into the regular military in the 1970’s, it was not unusual for them to be accused of being lesbians, a discharge offense at the time (Frank, 2009; Shilts, 2005). This was not an unconvincing threat, given the discharge of at least 12,433 service members under the law (Costello & Burke, February 2,
Ending this stigma also eliminated the threat to service that it carried. It openly accepted varied gender norms. And it put both men and women on more equal footing in terms of having to deal with sexual propriety and respect in a healthy environment. While has been one more mechanism operating in favor of greater opportunity for women, there are others that have worked against it. I the next section I will outline some of those mechanisms.

**Mechanisms working against greater integration of women in the military**

**Hegemonic masculinity has continued to have a pervasive presence in the military.** One view of organizations is that modern bureaucracies drive out sex in order to maintain focus, efficiency and control, while also sometimes a justification for keeping women out of dedicated male institutions, such as the priesthood and the military (Burrell, 1984). “Male bonding” has sometimes been used against both women and gays, arguing they are incompatible with military service (Shilts, 2005).

Another perspective holds that organizations, and bureaucracies in particular, are themselves gendered (Britton, 2000; Acker, 1990; Silva, 2008), formed from the collective experience of masculinity over time. When Captain Owen Honors was relieved of command of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise earlier this year for producing videos that included anti gay slurs and sexual objectification of women, it built on a history of similar behavior (Bumiller January 4, 2011) and was reminiscent of the 1991 Tailhook convention, in which one hundred Navy and Marine Aviators sexually assaulted 87 women at Las Vegas hotel (Frank, 2009). A 1978 federal court ruling required the Navy to allow women aboard ships, but spurning advances by men often ended in investigations of female service members accused of being lesbians, as noted previously in this paper (Shilts 2005). Notorious examples of this occurred at U.S. Naval Academy and on board the USS Norton Sound (Shilts, 2005).

Early in women’s integration into the military, Annapolis graduate and Vietnam War veteran James Webb argued that high rates of male violence against women in the U.S. would also make it inevitable in the military, while the presence of women would lessen focus the enemy, since sexual aggression would be re- oriented towards female service members. Webb insisted that men cannot control their aggressive, violent and sexual nature for longer than an eight hour work day and questioned the motives and sexuality of women wanting to be in the military, arguing that the presence of women would undermine military capability (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010; Shilts, 2005; Webb, 1979). Webb later became Secretary of the Navy and is currently a Senator from Virginia. More recently, former Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak spoke out against women in combat roles, saying that he would prefer a less qualified male service member (McSally, 2011) and argued that “male bonding” should be an effective argument against ending “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” (McPeak, March 5, 2010).

**Sexual harassment and assault continue to be present.** Female service members strongly emphasize the importance of a healthy environment, free from harassment or assault. A Secretary of Defense ordered report on the issue found the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) outdated and insufficiently oriented towards victims. Until recently, military evidentiary procedures did not allow for either privacy or confidentiality. Both force and lack of consent needed to be proven, while the crime had to be deemed to be sexual in nature to be
prosecuted as such. Compounding the problem, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) is usually not independent of command authority or well trained or experienced in issues of sexualized violence (Brooks, Mullins, Lumpkin, Guardiano, Fox, Sacks, Larsen & Sparks, 2005; Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). One of the outcomes of the report was the establishment of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) under the Department of Defense. The introduction of confidential and anonymous reporting has improved visibility (Brooks, et al 2005) and in 2007, the UCMJ was updated to include offenses such as indecent exposure and stalking (Myers, December 28, 2009).

In 2004, there were 1,700 reported assaults against U.S. Military women, with only 329 ending in charges being brought against the alleged perpetrators (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010). There were 2,688 assaults reported in 2007, increasing by 8% to 2,908 in 2008. Of the 2,171 investigation in 2008, only 317 faced court martial and 515 had administrative punishments or discharges (Myers, December 28. 2009). The number of reported assaults increased again in 2009, by 11%, to 3,230. Eighty seven percent were male against female assaults. While these increases represent more comfort with reporting, the belief that these represent only ten percent of the incidents highlights the scope of the problem (Bumiller, March 16, 2010). In 2010, reported assaults decreased slightly, to 3,158, with 90% being female victims and 532 subjects facing courts-martial (SAPRO, 2010).

A female U.S. Army Captain said sexual coercion became so severe that “It got to the point where I felt safer outside the wire.” Even as a commissioned officer, she hesitated to bring her case forward as she had no confidence it would be taken seriously. She felt that “…predators believed that they will not be held accountable for their misconduct during deployment because commanders’ focus on the mission overshadows other concerns.” When a female Army Sergeant reported sexual harassment by a male soldier, she was accused of adultery, a charge she denied, and was discharged from the military, while the male soldier continued on active duty. When another female Army Sergeant stepped away from her weapon to smoke she was raped by a fellow soldier. When she reported it, she was threatened with prosecution for leaving her weapon. Efforts to address this are being undermined by commanders who are skeptical, conflicted or fearful regarding the issue. For these and other reasons, the DoD estimates that only ten percent of assaults are being reported. (Myers, December 28, 2009).

Sexual harassment also creates an unhealthy work environment. According to the DoD 2010 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members, 21% of women and 3% of men had been sexually harassed in the previous 12 months, with 52% of women and 38% of men indicating that “in their work group people would be able to get away with sexual harassment to some extent, even if it were reported.” (General Accounting Office, 2011; Defense Manpower Data Center, 2011). By comparison, in 2006 34% of female service members had been harassed in the previous 12 months, which 24% indicated it in 2002 and 46% in 1995 (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006). According to a 2011 General Accounting Office (GAO) study, almost 23% of female and seven percent of male service members said that they were sexually harassed in the previous 12 months (GAO, 2011). While the general trend appears to be decreasing over time, like other mechanisms negatively effecting women in the military it is still pervasively high.
Women continue to be excluded from combat arms branches. Another important issue is that women continue to be excluded from high prestige combat arms and special operations roles, particularly in the Army and the Marine Corps. This blocks women from more than 220,000 positions (McSally, 2011), often the most important for future promotions.

In 1989 the Defense Department Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITs) recommended that they be allowed into all military fields, including combat. However, persistent bias against women worked against this, with former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Merrill McPeak, stating in testimony to Congress:
“I believe the combat exclusion law is discrimination against women. And second, that it works to their disadvantage in a career context…And I still think that it is not a good idea for me to have to order women into combat. Combat is about killing people…Even though logic tells us that women can [conduct combat operations] as well as men, I have a very traditional attitude about wives and mothers and daughters being ordered to kill people” (McSally, 2011)

As former Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel, Lawrence Korb noted: “Women are being put in danger, but denied the rewards that those in direct combat positions are entitled to in the service. Who gets promotions in the Air Force? The fighter pilot. The woman is flying the tanker- she’s in just as much danger, but she can’t get the promotions.” (Monahan & Neidel-Greenlee, 2010:341).

According to Elisabeth Bumiller, reporting in The New York Times (March 6, 2010):
“Whatever the outcome, the teams reflect how much the military has adapted over nine years of war, not only in the way it fights but to the shifting gender roles within its ranks. Women make up only 6 percent of the Marine Corps, which cultivates an image as the most testosterone-fueled service, and they are still officially barred from combat branches like the infantry. But in a bureaucratic sleight of hand, used by both the Army and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan when women have been needed for critical jobs like bomb disposal or intelligence, the female engagement teams are to be ‘attached’ to all-male infantry units within the First Marine Expeditionary Force — a source of pride and excitement for them.”

And in another article (Bumiller, October 2, 2010) she further outlined the process:
“In July, the female Marines were abruptly called back from their 16 outposts to more secure military installations in Helmand for a legal review to determine if they were in compliance with Pentagon directives on women in combat. The timing, more than halfway through their deployment, bewildered them. In a telephone interview last week, Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, the commander of the 20,000 Marines in Helmand, said he had called the women back after he was contacted by Pentagon officials because a congressman — neither he nor Marines in Washington would identify him — ‘had shown some interest in what exactly the females were doing.’ General Mills acknowledged that the female engagement teams are ‘out on the point of the spear many times.’ Current Pentagon policy bars women from joining combat branches like the infantry, armor and Special Forces, and Congress in the past has sought to restrict military women’s roles even more. But in a common side step during nearly a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, women are ‘attached,’ rather than assigned, to combat units. The female
engagement teams simply say they ‘accompany’ Marine infantry units on their patrols. The review ended after three weeks, when lawyers and Marine commanders clarified some rules: the teams could not go on foot patrols primarily intended to hunt and kill the enemy, and they were not allowed more than ‘temporary stays’ at the combat bases where they had been living for months. When a debate broke out over what constituted a ‘temporary stay,’ General Mills decreed it as 45 days. To fulfill the letter but hardly the spirit of the guidelines, the female Marines now travel from their combat outposts every six weeks for an overnight stay at a big base like Camp Leatherneck, then head back out the next morning. To Captain Naslund, the legal hoops are absurd when there are no front lines — and when members of her team are taking fire almost daily on foot patrols. ‘The current policy on women in combat is outdated and does not apply to the type of war we are fighting,’ she wrote to her parents, friends and this reporter in an e-mail after the legal review in July. Since then, she has grudgingly accepted that the Marine Corps, which promotes an image as the most testosterone-fueled service, is a long way from allowing women in the infantry, and that she will live within the guidelines.”

Earlier this year, a Congress ordered report on diversity in the military was released. It called for the elimination of barriers to career advancement for females and minorities. The group of former generals and admirals who authored the report called on the military to “eliminate combat exclusion policies for women, including removing barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all service members who meet the qualifications.” (Military Diversity Leadership Commission, 2011).

The lack of family support and other services continues to play a role. Family support, veteran services and other infrastructure have not caught up to the levels required for the current involvement of women in the military (Cave, November 1, 2009; Hefling, December 16, 2009). Nearly half of the 255,000 female service members who have been deployed to combat had children, with one third of them being single mothers (Alvarez September 27, 2009). The military introduced paternity leave for men in 2009 (Alvarez September 27, 2009). In spite of these efforts, there have been high profile cases of women not able to deploy because of child care issues (The New York Times November 17, 2009; Dao February 12, 2010).

Another ramification has been greater exposure to the mental and physical scars of combat. By the end of 2009, more than 19,084 female veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan had been diagnosed with mental disorders by the Veterans Administration. Of these, more than 8,454 had post traumatic stress (Cave November 1, 2009). In the same period, 121 female service members died, including 66 in combat, with another 620 wounded (Alvarez August 16, 2009), with over 130 deaths and 700 wounded by the beginning of 2011 (McSally, 2011). While there is no indication that women suffer worse problems from combat than men, they tend to be more isolated, as society has not yet gotten used to women’s new role as combat veteran (Cave, November 1, 2009). Few programs are targeted at the special needs or circumstances of female veterans (Hefling, December 16, 2009). While family support and veteran services are service member issues, shortcomings in current offerings are often disproportionately difficult for women.
Discussion, summary and conclusions

Publically available Department of Defense personnel data allow for a comprehensive assessment of equality of opportunity for women in the military. A review of the data demonstrates significant progress for women, as well as a persistence of inequality. In this paper, I have also highlighted mechanisms that enhance opportunities for women, as well as those that inhibit progress.

The available data allow for an assessment of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines separately. While that data was not analyzed in that level of detail in this current paper, it would likely be informative to do that in subsequent research. The Air Force has a very strong track record of opening almost all jobs to women, as well as providing for a safe environment. The track record for the Army and Marines has not been as positive. A study of individual branch performance, correlated with policy differences, could help to validate hypotheses related to the mechanisms outlined in this paper.

Additionally, the available data did not allow for a full assessment of promotion opportunities for women. While it is possible to analyze ratios of one rank to the next, that is not the same as promotion rates. Actual promotion rates would allow for testing assumptions made in this paper using proxies.

Finally, occupational data is not publically available. Theories on gendered occupations are prevalent in the literature on gender and work. There is likely to be the case in the military as well. In the absence of military occupation specific data, however, it is not possible to test these assumptions.

The Department of Defense conducted surveys on gender issues among service members in 2006 and 2010. These are large scale surveys, rich in information. Summaries of the surveys are publically available, though specific survey responses are not. Without those responses, it is difficult to do a full assessment of service member attitudes and opinions on gender related issues, or to correlate them with outcomes. The Department of Defense has responded positively to requests for the detailed survey responses. As a result, it will be possible to do more detailed analysis once that information has been received. Service member interviews can provide additional context not available through other sources. This is important data collection for testing mechanisms identified in this paper.

This paper has implied, but not addressed, policy interventions. This would be a valuable addition to future research. As noted previously, different military branches have experimented with different approaches. Additionally, the Coast Guard is arguably the U.S. Security organization that has made the most progress on gender equality. Including the Coast Guard in future studies is likely to provide additional perspective to the policy discussion. Other nations have also experimented with different approaches. Canada’s armed forces do not exclude women from any roles, but qualify individual service members based on their ability to meet job qualifications (BFOQs). In addition to Canada, New Zealand and Israel both allow women in all roles, with Australia announcing that they will follow suit. Germany is experimenting with quotas to increase the participation of women in the newly voluntary military.
Another issue is the question of choice. It is sometimes argued that women’s participation in the military is low because women do not want to do this kind of work. It is difficult to fully test that hypothesis when women are excluded from high profile roles and promotional opportunities in the military. Non-military examples suggest that when given the opportunity women choose to do these previously male gendered roles and do very well (Liedner, 1991). Additionally, it is probably reasonable to assume that women who have voluntarily joined the military, and chosen to stay, have done so because they want to be there.

Finally, this research has the ability to provide insight into women’s prospects in other male gendered organizations (Cotter, Hermsen & Vanneman, 2001). As noted throughout this paper, women have consistently broken through barriers, to the benefit of themselves and the organizations that they are part of. Nonetheless, these barriers continue to exist, arguing strongly for a continuation of this stream of research.
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Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence: How Good are the Available Instruments?

William K. Gabrenya, Jr., Rana G. Moukarzel, Marne Pomerance, and Richard Griffeth

Abstract

The assessment of cross-cultural competency (3C) and related constructs is important to the U.S. Military and to civilian organizations for both theoretical and practical reasons. The present study was initiated to evaluate the quality of instrumentation for measuring competencies in the Defense Language Office Framework for Cross-Cultural Competency. The construct, criterion, and face validities of over 30 instruments deemed most important, useful, and visible in the field were examined and the extent to which the instruments have contributed to our understanding of 3C and overseas adjustment was evaluated.

Findings regarding the adequacy of 3C measures were mixed. First, published or unpublished reports of validation efforts were not available for most proprietary instruments. Second, the quality of validation efforts across instruments, in particular those involving criterion validity, was found to vary widely. The criterion variables in most validity studies were limited to measures of psychological or sociocultural adjustment. The paucity of research employing performance criteria diminishes the usefulness of several instruments for assessment in a competency modeling context. Third, the instruments relied too highly on self-reports of own adjustment or performance.

Recommendations emerging from this study include: (1) behavioral measures of cross-cultural competencies as well as antecedents or precursors to 3C are needed; (2) the assessment of competencies in competency models should employ behavioral methods derived from assessment center style procedures; (3) the Framework should be revised to include causal models for each of its competencies in order to facility research, measurement, and training.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence: How Good Are the Available Instruments?

Cross-cultural competence (3C) has garnered increasing attention within the U.S. Military as military missions have become more complex, blending traditional military operations with nation building goals that require a broader set of competencies, over a greater range of specialties and ranks, than the Military was previously required to sustain. The U.S. Department of Defense, through entities such as DEOMI, the Defense Language Office, and the Army Research Institute, has devoted substantial resources to understanding and enhancing 3C. Doing so requires resolving three issues: (1) What is 3C, or more specifically, which competencies are needed by which personnel, and at what level of performance? (2) How can these competencies be assessed, for both selection or training purposes? and (3) How can these competencies be trained?

The first question, defining and delineating cross-cultural competence, has been addressed through an ongoing process initiated in 2008. The Defense Regional and Cultural Capabilities Assessment Working Group (RACCA WG) was charged with establishing a common terminology for “identifying, developing, measuring, and managing regional and cultural capabilities” (McDonald, McGuire, Johnston, Selmeski, & Abbe, 2008, p. 2). The Working Group employed a Delphi-like process involving military subject matter experts (SMEs) and an examination of the extant civilian expatriate adjustment literature to formulate the Framework for Cross-Cultural Competence (Johnston, Paris, McCoy, Severe, & Hughes, 2010). The Framework, similar to a competency model as developed in work psychology, is the focus of the present paper.

The second question, assessing 3C in the Military, was introduced in an exploratory manner in the original RACCA work, that is, the working group suggested a list of existing instruments that might be used to assess the competencies that they identified for the Framework. Thornson and Ross (2008) extended this work in identifying additional instruments of potential use in measuring 3C. Several comprehensive lists of instruments for measuring 3C, overseas adjustment, and expatriate worker performance in the civilian domain have been published as well (e.g., Fantini, 2009). The present study was initiated to evaluate the quality of the available instrumentation for measuring 3C, specifically as defined in the DLO Framework.

The third question, identifying and developing methods to train 3C, is under investigation by our research group but is outside of the domain of the present paper.

The DLO Framework

The Framework can be viewed as a competency model (Shippmann, Ash, Battista, Carr, Eyde & Hesketh, et al. 2000) in which core competencies are identified in a hierarchical categorization system. In this system, general competencies such as “cultural perspective taking” are used to form categories encompassing more specific competencies that are defined behaviorally, for example, “understands how one’s own group is viewed by members of another group.” Competency potential dimensions (Bartram, 2005) are also identified, termed enablers in the Framework and antecedents or precursors in the expatriate literature. Enablers refer to personality traits, such as the Big Five, and to cognitive abilities, including general intelligence, but are presented in a competency modeling (i.e., behavioral) style. Some Framework enablers
correspond to dispositional qualities that have been studied in the larger civilian literature (e.g.,
tolerance of ambiguity), but associating enablers with previously researched variables in this
literature is sometimes difficult.

The Framework as a competency model may be subject to some of the unresolved
problems in competency modeling in general. Although competency modeling is popular in
human resource management, it suffers from a great deal of ambiguity concerning its core
construct—competency—as well as how it differs from traditional job analysis (Shippman et al.,
2000). As Leung & Van de Vijver note, “It could be argued that intercultural competence is no
exception to the rule that there are no widely shared definitions of crucial concepts in
psychology” (2009, p. 406). Specifying the correct number of competencies and their
organization poses a problem for competency modeling that is also present in the Framework.
For any given MOS, mission, or action, which competencies are important and how many can be
assessed, practically?

The DLO Framework is an evolving model, but the present paper employs the March
2011 revision, which includes five competencies and seven enablers. Each competency is
defined or explained by sets of more specific behaviors and skills. However, in this revision,
these definitional items are themselves considered competencies. Some definitional items are in
turn comprised of more than one relatively distinctive component competency. For example, the
competency Culture Perspective Taking includes three (arguably four) distinguishable
components:

- Demonstrates an awareness of one’s own world view (i.e. cultural perceptions,
  assumptions, values, and biases) and how that influences our behavior and that of others;
  Understands how one’s own group is viewed by members of another group

- Understands and applies perspective-taking skills to detect, analyze, and consider the
  point of view of others and recognizes how the other will interpret his/her actions

- Takes the cultural context into consideration when interpreting situational cues
  Similar to a long standing issue in competency modeling theory, it is difficult to establish
  a priori the appropriate level of specificity of a competency (Bartram, 2005). In order to
  understand the Framework using the existing 3C literature, we worked at a high level of
detail to identify unitary constructs potentially found in the 3C literature. We refer to
these lowest-level Framework components as elements. Figure 1 shows the hierarchical
structure of the Framework thus construed. Gabrenya, Moukarzel, Pomerance, Griffith &
Deaton (2011) performed a critique of the DLO Framework but the quality of the
Framework itself is outside the scope of this paper.

**Strategy for Assessing the Framework**

Our goal in the present investigation was to determine if existing instruments can be used
to assess individuals’ degree of cross-cultural competency as defined in the Framework. An
adequate answer to this question requires (1) identifying instruments that can assess 3C; (2)
evaluating the quality of the identified instruments; and (3) associating the valid instruments with Framework competencies and enablers to determine which ones can be assessed adequately.

Given that all of the available instruments in this field were designed for civilian use, and these instruments were validated against other civilian measures and civilian cross-cultural effectiveness, performance, or adjustment measures, it was necessary to reinterpret the Framework in terms of the constructs found in the civilian literature. Accordingly, the Framework was “parsed” into elements, as described above, and these elements were in turn mapped onto these constructs. The right side of Figure 1 illustrates the construct validity mapping process. (The left side of Figure 1 illustrates a related attempt to assessing the content validity of the Framework; see Gabrenya et al. 2011.) For example, the Framework Communication competency element C4.1, Acquires and applies knowledge and concepts of intercultural communication skills, maps to constructs such as intercultural communication competence (ICC), which in turn can be assessed by some existing measures.

**Identifying Measures of Competency and Enabler Elements**

We performed a comprehensive search of the sojourner adjustment/performance literature to identify measures that could be used in this evaluation. Our search capitalized on other attempts to create comprehensive lists of instruments, for example Fantini (2009), Thornson and Ross (2008), and the website of the Institute for Intercultural Training (www.intercultural.org). Several consulting companies also maintain lists of measures on their websites.

Our literature search suggested that two styles of measurement can be identified: “batteries” and single-construct measures. By batteries, we mean instruments that include more than one subscale and in which instrument validation and instrument use usually focus on the subscales, similarly to the MMPI and 16PF instruments in clinical psychology or Five Factor Model instruments in personality assessment. Single-construct instruments measure one construct or include subscales that are rarely used alone; instead, total scores are used as predictors in adjustment/performance studies. The trend in this literature seems to be from single-construct to battery style instruments.

For both battery and single-construct instruments, we discovered three “business models” in the field. *Open-access instruments* are published in the scientific literature and are free to use by researchers. We found that most of the older instruments are open access and most open access instruments are single-construct. *Controlled access instruments* are usually copyrighted by individuals who are working in academia and/or their small companies or consultancies, but are easily obtained for research use by other academics, free of charge or for a nominal fee. Controlled access instruments are usually validated using generally acceptable methods in studies published in peer reviewed journals. Most controlled access instruments are batteries. *Proprietary instruments* are developed and owned by consulting companies and sold to clients on a per-use basis or packaged in more comprehensive organizational development or training arrangements. Some gray area exists between controlled access and proprietary instruments when the consulting company is owned by and/or closely associated with academics, for example, the Kozai Group (see kozaigroup.com).
We present a list of identified instruments in Table 2. Undoubtedly a few more instruments exist, and some commonly used personality instruments that have been used in the large sojourner adjustment literature are not listed, such as the NEO, coping style scales, and measures of individual differences in social interaction (e.g., the Self-Monitoring Scale).

**Validity of the Instruments**

Based on an examination of previous research and the mapping exercise described above, we divided the identified instruments into two categories. We selected 10 *primary instruments* for close scrutiny. These instruments included one or more of these characteristics: they included subscales that would be especially useful in assessing the Framework; they had been used in considerable previous research; the quality of development or validation by the instrument authors appeared to be very good; and they are currently popular in the field. Table 3 includes this set of instruments. *Secondary instruments* are shown in Table 4. We evaluated the primary instruments on three qualities: (1) face validity, (2) construct validity, and (3) criterion validity. By construct validity we mean convergent and divergent validity and the internal structure of the instrument, if it was designed to include more than one subscale. By criterion validity we mean the predictive or concurrent validity of the instrument with respect to three criterion measures, performance, psychological adjustment, and sociocultural adjustment. We also accepted two additional sources of criterion validity: successful use of the instrument as a dependent variable in training experiments and “differential” studies that demonstrated known-groups validity when the instrument differed between samples as predicted by theory (e.g., groups of individuals who did or did not live overseas). We evaluated the quality of secondary instruments only on the basis of criterion validity.

Two kinds of criterion measures are used in the expat/sojourner literature: adjustment measures and performance measures. Criterion validation of instruments in the expat/sojourner domain is hampered by the difficulty of assessing performance criteria, indeed, culture competency of any kind (Gabrenya et al., 2011). Behavioral measures are particularly lacking in this area (Thomas et al., 2008). So while the adjustment literature abounds with instruments of varying quality, the criterion measures used in studies of interest to the present analysis are fewer and often unsatisfactory.

Two kinds of adjustment are often distinguished: psychological adjustment and sociocultural adjustment (Ward, Okura, Kennedy, & Kojima, 1998). Psychological adjustment refers to intrapersonal emotional and somatic problems, often operationalized as depression, but also including anxiety, fearfulness, homesickness, and at the extreme, symptoms of the “culture shock syndrome” identified by Oberg (1960). Sociocultural adjustment refers to self-reported success and quality of interaction with the social environment and institutions in the host country. The most commonly used measure of sociocultural adjustment is the aptly named Sociocultural Adjustment Scale (SCAS; Ward & Kennedy, 1999). In the expatriate worker literature, the Black adjustment instrument is often used (Black & Stephens, 1989), which include general, work, and interactional adjustment. Black’s instrument is discussed in more detail below.
Performance measures include job performance (manager ratings, peer ratings, self-ratings; see Mol et al., 2005) and several informal ratings of overseas “success” or “effectiveness” in non-job situations. Terminology in definitions of performance is inconsistent (Mol et al, 2005) and some overlap in usage can be seen in the use of “performance,” “competency,” and “adjustment.” In addition to performance ratings, expatriate “performance” is also assessed indirectly through self-reports of intent to remain on the job, job attitudes, and occupational citizenship behaviors (Mol et al., 2005; Thomas & Lazarova, 2006).

Black’s (1988) introduction of work adjustment has clouded interpretation because it is measured (in the later 3-dimension version of his scale) through three items that ask for self-assessment of degree of adjustment in “specific job responsibilities, “performance standards and expectations,” and “supervisory responsibilities.” Thomas and Lazarova (2006) criticize the validity of the Black scale and its underlying three-part construct. The Black scale is widely used in this literature, so studies that claim to include a performance criterion measure must be read carefully to determine if the dependent measure is in fact the Black performance subscale. Additionally, Thomas and Lazarova (2006) argue that the relationship between performance and adjustment is unclear, ranging from nil to moderate in studies and metaanalyses. Therefore, substituting adjustment measures (such as two of the Black instrument subscales) for a performance criterion is probably not justified.

We identified seven categories of variables used to assess criterion validity in the literature: (1) work and academic performance; (2) work and academic attitudes; (3) psychological adjustment; (4) sociocultural adjustment; (5) experimental and quasi-experimental manipulations and designs; (6) demographic (known-group) variables; and (7) a miscellaneous assortment of personality and self-report measures.

To evaluate the instruments, we conducted literature searches for each instrument, beginning with the instruments’ initial validation studies. These literature searches were comprehensive but we do not claim to have found every article that used every instrument, in particular those for instruments that have been heavily used and/or have been used in studies that are not commonly read in cross-cultural psychology or I/O Psychology, such as studies of university study abroad experiences or teaching method quasi-experiments. Primary instruments were investigated more closely than secondary instruments.

Propriety instruments were difficult to validate: validation studies have been published in peer reviewed journals for only a few such instruments and in a few cases validation reports are published on consulting companies’ websites. These validation studies are rarely convincing. A few consulting companies were contacted in an effort to obtain true validation reports, but none were forthcoming. We found that descriptions and evaluations of 3C related instruments in previously published compendiums were occasionally incorrect, indicating the need for a thorough evaluation study of the available instrumentation.

Findings for Instrument Validity

Table 3 presents preliminary validation information for the primary instruments. For each instrument and its subscales, judgments about face validity, construct validity, and criterion validity are presented using a good/moderate/poor distinction. Construct validity was first
estimated by looking at the correlation matrices of the instrument and its subscales in studies that included additional measures that would be expected to have high or low relationships with the instrument/subscales according to the instrument author’s description of the instrument, the constructs it was designed to assess, or explicit hypotheses. Using a criterion of $r=.30$, results were divided into four categories by crossing the strength of the expected relationship (high or low) and the size of the observed correlation (greater than .30; less than or equal to .30). Construct validity was judged “good” if the number of supportive outcomes (high/high and low/low) was greater than the number of unsupportive outcomes (high/low and low/high). It was judged “moderate” when the number of supportive and unsupportive outcomes was approximately equal and “poor when unsupportive outcomes outnumbered supportive outcomes. Limitations of this methodology are discussed in a later section. We have lower confidence in identifying relationships in the low/high and low/low categories due to possibly lower interest in these relationships on the part of instrument developers or to the “file drawer problem” related to unpublished research.

It can be seen in Table 3 that validation information for several primary instruments is unavailable (see GCI, IES) and little information of any kind is available for the INCA, an otherwise highly compelling instrument that included some behavioral measures. We evaluated the MPQ most highly, and found several instruments to be of moderate overall quality.

Table 4 presents validation information for the secondary instruments. “Validation” in this table refers to criterion validation exclusively. It can be seen that we were unable to obtain any validation information for some of the scales and in other cases the validity was judged to be low.

**Mapping Elements to Constructs and Measures**

The element-level deconstruction of Framework competencies formed the basis for mapping elements to constructs and to available instruments. For this analysis, we attempted to map the competency and enabler elements to constructs used in the extant expatriate or sojourner performance and adjustment literature. The Framework enablers had been derived from this literature in earlier DLO and ARI efforts described above, so the enabler element-to-construct mapping is reasonably straightforward. However, the competencies had been derived from an SME-driven Delphi process, several earlier statements of competencies, theoretical and empirical, as well as from the expat performance/adjustment literature. Our mapping of competency elements to previously-studied constructs is therefore less precise and in a few cases we were not able to find a corresponding construct. For example, we could not identify a construct or a measure of the Communication competency element C4.2, employs human and material resources to facilitate intercultural communication.

The elements-to-construct mapping exercise was used to perform an elements-to-instruments mapping. Tables 5a and 5b illustrate this mapping. The imprecision of the elements-to-construct mapping introduces error into the elements-to-instruments mapping, so the result is not wholly satisfactory, as discussed in a later section.

Elements were mapped to instruments (most often, subscales of batteries) when a direct connection could be argued between the element and the instrument/subscale. In some cases, the relationship was partial, that is, only part of the construct assessed by the instrument appeared to
have a direct connection to the element. Indirect relationships were not mapped, that is, those in which the construct assessed by the instrument could be considered a precursor or antecedent (or in some cases, an enabler as used in the Framework) to the element but not a measure of the element itself. Many judgment calls were made in this process, so it could be argued that for some elements and measures we were too narrow or too inclusive. It can be seen in Tables 5a and 5b that many candidate measures were not deemed sufficiently valid for use in this analysis of the Framework.

Several elements could not be mapped against 3C-related instruments or subscales in the set presented in Tables 5a and 5b, including four competency elements and six enabler elements. The enabler elements in this set are for the most part constructs that have been used in the past to predict performance and adjustment outcomes, and have been assessed using common personality and attitude measures that are reasonably well validated. Several elements could be evaluated using instruments not included in Table 2, such as personality measures of the constructs listed in Tables 5a and 5b. We used published metaanalyses and qualitative reviews for evidence regarding these measures. In the end, we were unable to determine a corresponding construct for several elements, and we could find no corresponding measures for some others.

Results of the Assessability Analysis

The final column in Tables 5a and 5b present assessment details for each of the elements. We indicate the valid instrument/subscale to which the element has been mapped. Instruments for which we could not find sufficient validation information, or that we judged to be invalid based on available evidence, are not included in this column. For some elements, we also include in parentheses relevant constructs for which measures not originally designed for use in 3C research have been developed, such as self-efficacy or social skills. Gabrenya et al. (2011) discuss each element in this table in more detail that is possible in this paper. For the present analysis, we examine the overall pattern of findings. Notable in both tables is the large number of “candidate instruments” for many of the elements relative to the fewer number of valid instruments.

Assessing Framework Competencies

In Table 5a (Competencies), it can be seen that C1: Knowledge is not well assessed. The CCAI subscale that may measure one of its elements has been found to be of moderate validity, overall, however. C3: Perspective Taking fares better in that two of its elements can be assessed. However, the SEE instrument was judged to be of only moderate validity. C4: Communication may be indirectly assessed by the SCAS and more directly assessed by the CCAI-PAC subscale. Competency C4.2 is too detailed to be assessed by a general purpose instrument. C5: Interpersonal Skills can be assessed in part through individual difference measures that were designed outside of the 3C domain although we were not able to find an individual difference measure for element C5.2: Conflict Management. C6: Cultural Adaptability can be assessed with several instruments of good or moderate validity.

Assessing Framework Enablers

Table 5b presents findings for the Framework enablers. Antecedent variables typically include constructs for which measures have been developed outside of the 3C domain, but the
Framework enablers are phrased similarly to competency model components and are therefore somewhat more specific than the antecedent variables commonly found in this literature. Nonetheless, most enabler elements can be assessed by one or more instruments, many of which are used outside of intercultural research, such as the Big 5 measures. A few elements are not measurable by valid instruments, mainly because they are highly specific, such as E2.2.2: Acts as a calming influence.

**Conclusions about Assessment**

These findings show: (a) some Framework competencies, and most enablers, can be assessed using existing instruments, but (b) the relationship between the competency elements and the measures is often distal. By distal, we mean that the measure, operationalizing a construct, rarely corresponds closely to the competency, framed in terms of behaviors, to which it is mapped. Several constructs and their measures may be related to a particular competency, as shown in Tables 5a and 5b, and an instrument or subscale is often mapped to more than one competency. The relationships among the identified constructs, enablers, and competencies can be understood in causal models (see Gabrenya et al. 2011) that can include multiple relationships. Some problems involving our strategy for assessing the Framework are discussed in the following sections, and we propose some solutions to the measurement problem below.

**Shortcomings of the Criterion Validation Analysis**

*Mapping competency elements to constructs.* Competency models are based on KSAOs that are expected to increase performance, but unlike constructs employed in most of the social science research on expatriate performance/adjustment and related literatures, competencies are not phrased in terms of constructs and they are not operationalized as measures and variables, rendering the mapping difficult. Many of the element-construct mappings performed in this analysis were one-to-many relationships, i.e., one element to more than one construct. In some cases, we may have not fully deconstructed a competency, so elements retained more than one meaning, leading to some many-to-many mappings. In addition to this complexity, some mappings associated only part of a construct to an element. Altogether, this mapping exercise results in ambiguity concerning the adequacy of evaluating competencies via familiar constructs. We discuss some remedies to this problem below.

*Mapping enabler elements to constructs.* The Framework enablers were created in a manner consistent with a competency model in that behavioral outcomes are used to describe the enabler. However, in this field, antecedent or precursor variables are identified from the domain of trait or individual difference constructs (plus situational variables, which are outside our consideration). Hence, the Framework enablers are, in a sense, “precursor competencies” that in many cases can be traced to even more fundamental antecedents such as traits. Hence, enablers can be thought of as “competency potential” dimensions (Bartram, 2005) rather than traditional antecedent variables, and had to be mapped against such constructs. As a result, construct analysis of the enabler elements is subject to the same ambiguities as the competency elements analysis.

*Weakness of instrument validities.* We were surprised at the extent to which well-known instruments were poorly validated or validation information, especially criterion validity, was unavailable. For some instruments, only construct validity validation findings were available,
begging the question of the usefulness of the instruments. Therefore, we had to reject several otherwise highly compelling instruments for lack of validity. Of greatest concern, the criterion validity information that was available for most instruments was disproportionately based on psychological and sociocultural adjustment rather than any kind of performance measures. Hence, our conclusion that an instrument/subscale possesses criterion validity must be tempered by the caveat that this judgment was not necessarily based on the needed performance measures.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Competency Models and Causal Models

A competency model of 3C is a type of compositional model (Spitzberg & Changnon, 2009). Compositional models are primarily lists of KSAOs that comprise 3C, usually organized in logical sets in a way that implies a causal sequence without explicitly proposing one. In competency models, the list of competencies is described in terms of job-related behaviors, whereas in compositional models, the list includes traditional constructs and variables. The Framework, as well as other compositional models, is not a scientific model in the sense of a mini-theory that is a “simplified representation of phenomena [that has a] point to point correspondence with some of the characteristics of the phenomena” and can “provide convenient, manageable, and compact representations of the larger, complex, and mostly unknown reality” (Graziano & Raulin, 2004, p. 40).

Competency models have advantages and disadvantages compared to causal models. A competency model provides generalizable guidance for training, selection and assessment and is therefore directed to solving an applied psychology problem, such as enhancing 3C capabilities in the Military. Causal models, however, provide conceptual, theoretical, and research advantages that theoretical researchers depend on, and can guide selection and training by showing where in the antecedent-to-competency relationship they should be used to greatest effect. These two approaches may be blended, however, if the Framework were revised to integrate the competencies and enablers in models that show causality, mediation, and/or moderation. Perhaps each Framework competency would be embedded in a model, and perhaps the competencies would be related to each other in larger models. Valid measures of the competencies would be need to be identified or developed. The need for new instrumentation is discussed in the next section. Cross-sectional and longitudinal correlational studies, and experimental training studies, can be conducted to test the Framework reconfigured as a causal model. In this way, the applied usefulness of the Framework can be retained, while a research capability is added.

Need for New Instrumentation

A primary reason for the difficulties we identified in using traditional expatriate adjustment and intercultural effectiveness instruments to assess the Framework is that competencies are best measured using assessment center methods. Such methods are specifically designed to assess the components of a specific competency model, that is, the measure is developed after its target competency is included in the model. We suggest that assessment center methods be developed specifically for the Framework, once it is stable and consensually accepted within the U.S. Military. However, assessment center methods are expensive and time
consuming and might prove practical only for a limited range of MOSs, ranks, or missions. The Framework would need to be articulated with respect to MOS/rank and perhaps mission before suitable assessment center methods were developed.

Some of the resource related drawbacks of assessment center methods may be reduced by transforming the Framework to a blended composition/causal model, as discussed in the previous section. When embedded within models, competencies may be assessed through a triangulation that incorporates measures of both the competencies and its known antecedents, increase accuracy and reducing the investment needed in the assessment center-like measure of the competency itself.

Finally, we suggest that research be devoted to developing more efficient assessment center methods. Some assessment or selection methods have been developed in the civilian domains that are based on sophisticated Internet technologies. We refer to these methods as “internet mini assessment centers” (iMAC). The implementations of iMACs for diverse competencies in the Framework may themselves be quite diverse, but by being short and objectively scorable, they can be produced in multiple versions tuned to MOSs/ranks/missions. They would be easier to validate than traditional, assessor-scored assessment centers, as well.

The preponderance of self-report measures within this field is becoming a problem due to confounding by extraneous third-variables, response biases, overly great focus on explicit, declarative knowledge, and under emphasis on affective processes. Hence, behavioral measures need to be developed, as well as implicit measures for some of the antecedent constructs.

**Stability of the Framework**

Future progress on developing the Framework and its associated assessment instrumentation and training methods requires that the Framework is consensually accepted by the relevant entities within the DOD. If a reformulation of the Framework were undertaken, we suggest that the blended composition/causal modeling approach described above should be employed from the very beginning of the project. Such a reformulation should also attempt to incorporate considerations of MOS, rank, and possibly mission using appropriate SMEs throughout the process.
References


## Appendix

**Table 1**

*Framework parsed to level of elements*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Specific Competency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.1a</td>
<td>1. Culture-General Concepts and Knowledge</td>
<td>Acquires … culture-general concepts and knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.1b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Applies culture general concepts and knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Comprehends and navigates intercultural dynamics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.1</td>
<td>3. Cultural Perspective-Taking</td>
<td>Demonstrates an awareness of one’s own world view (i.e. cultural perceptions, assumptions, values, and biases) and how that influences our behavior and that of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Understands how one’s own group is viewed by members of another group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Understands and applies perspective-taking skills to detect, analyze, and consider the point of view of others and recognizes how the other will interpret his/her actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Takes the cultural context into consideration when interpreting situational cues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4.1</td>
<td>4. Communication</td>
<td>Acquires and applies knowledge and concepts of intercultural communication skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Employs human and material resources to facilitate intercultural communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| C5.1 | 5. Interpersonal Skills | Develops and maintains rapport  
Builds relationships in support of mission performance |
| C5.2 | - | Manage and resolve conflict in support of mission objectives |
| C6.1 | 6. Cultural Adaptability | Understands the implications of one’s actions and adjusts approach to maintain relationships with other groups, or cultures |
| C6.2 | - | Minimize/maximize, adjust, or integrate cultural differences according to operational demands |

**Enablers**

1. **Cognitive Bias Resilience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E1.1</th>
<th>Tolerance of ambiguity</th>
<th>Accepts, or does not feel threatened by, ambiguous situations and uncertainty. Manages uncertainty in new and complex situations where there is not necessarily a “right” way to interpret things.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1.2</td>
<td>Low need for closure</td>
<td>Restrains from settling on immediate answers and solutions, and remains open to any new information that conflicts with those answers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1.3</td>
<td>Suspending Judgment</td>
<td>Withholds personal or moral judgment when faced with novel experiences, knowledge and points of view. Perceives information neutrally and withholds or suspends judgment until adequate information becomes available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1.4</td>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>Tendency to include and accept things (including people) based on commonalities rather than dividing things into groups or categories; emphasizes commonalities and minimizes differences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Emotional Resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E2.1.1 Stress Resilience</th>
<th>E2.1.2</th>
<th>E2.1.3</th>
<th>E2.2 Emotion Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tolerates emotionally shocking, frustrating, or exhausting circumstances; can retain task focus and enthusiasm, even when faced with repeated setbacks, failures and obstacles to success; demonstrates tendency for positive emotional states and to respond calmly and steadfastly to stressful events</td>
<td>Avoids adopting stress-induced perspectives that overly simplify culture</td>
<td>Acts as a calming influence</td>
<td>Regulates/controls one’s own emotions and emotional expression to support mission performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Self-Identity Resilience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E3.1 Self Confidence</th>
<th>E3.2 Self-Identity</th>
<th>E3.3 Optimism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Believes in one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet situational demands.</td>
<td>Demonstrates ability to maintain personal values independent of situational factors</td>
<td>Views problems as solvable challenges and as exciting learning opportunities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Learning Motivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>E4.1.1 Learning through Observation</th>
<th>E4.1.2 Sensemaking motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gathers and interprets information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about own treatment and how to treat others.</td>
<td>Is motivated to make sense of inconsistent information about social rules and norms;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge acquisition</td>
<td>Continually learns and updates own knowledge base as new situations are encountered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4.2</td>
<td>Inquisitiveness</td>
<td>Is receptive towards, and takes an active pursuit of understanding ideas, values, norms, situations, and behaviors that are new and different. Demonstrates curiosity about different countries and cultures, as well as interest in world and international events.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5. Social Interaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Flexibility</th>
<th>Presents self to others in a manner that creates favorable impressions, facilitates relationship building, and influences others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E5.1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Is able to modify ideas and behaviors, … to be receptive to new ways of doing things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5.1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Is able to compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5.2</td>
<td>Willingness to Engage</td>
<td>Actively seeks out and explores unfamiliar cross-cultural interactions and regards them positively as a challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument Name</td>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Subscales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Emotional Stability (ES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Social initiative (SI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Open-mindedness (OM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Flexibility (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Cultural Empathy (CE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Creativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Endorsing Individualism/Collectivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Emotional Resilience (ER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Perceptual Acuity (PAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personal Autonomy (PA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Multicultural Competence Inventory | MCI | - Knowledge  
- Skills  
- Awareness  
| Multicultural Awareness, Knowledge and Skills Survey | MAKSS-CE-R | - Knowledge  
- Skills  
| Multicultural Counseling Knowledge and Awareness Scale | MCKAS | - Knowledge  
| Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy | SEE | - Empathic feeling and expression (EFE)  
- Empathic perspective taking (EP)  
- Acceptance of cultural differences  
| Intercultural Development Inventory | IDI | - Denial/Defense (DD)  
- Reversal (R)  
- Minimization (M)  
- Acceptance/Adaptation (AA)  
| Munroe Multicultural Attitude Scale Questionnaire | MASQUE | - Knowledge (know)  
- Empathy (care)  
| Behavioral Assessment Scale for Intercultural Communication Effectiveness | BASIC | • Display of respect  
• Interaction posture  
• Orientation to knowledge  
• Empathy  
• Task role behaviors  
• Relational role behaviors  
• Interaction behavior and management  
| --- | --- | --- |
| European Multidimensional Models of Intercultural Competence | EMMIC | • Attitude  
• Knowledge of one's self and others  
• Skills of interpreting and relating  
• Skills of discovery and interaction  
| Intercultural Communicative Competence | ICC | • Awareness  
• Attitudes  
• Skills  
• Knowledge  
| The Inventory of Student Adjustment Strain | ISAS | • Education  
• English  
• Problem  
• Personal  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Companionship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Judgments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Behavioral reactions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Personal consequences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Organizational outcomes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory | BEVI | Basic openness  
Negative life events  
Naive determinism  
Sociocultural closure  
Authoritarian introjects  
Religious traditionalism  
Need for control  
Emotional attunement  
Self access  
Separation individuation  
|---|---|---|
| The Culture in the Workplace Questionnaire | CWQ | Individualism  
Power distance  
Certainty  
Achievement  
Time orientation | Developed by Dr. Geert Hofstede  
http://www.itapintl.com/ITAPCWQuestionnaire.htm |
| Global Awareness Profile | GAP | Environment  
Politics  
Geography  
Religion  
Socioeconomics  
Culture | http://www.globalawarenessprofile.com/ |
| Intercultural Competence Assessment | INCA | • Tolerance of ambiguity  
• Behavioral flexibility  
• Communicative awareness  
• Knowledge discovery  
• Respect for otherness  
• Empathy | http://www.incaproject.org |
|-----------------------------------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Peterson Cultural Awareness Test  | PCAT | • Power distance  
• Uncertainty avoidance  
• Individualism  
| Peterson Cultural Style Indicator | PCSI | (based on PCAT) | http://acrosscultures.com/pcsidescription.html |
| Sociocultural Adaptation Scale    | SCAS | • Cultural Empathy and Relatedness  
| Cultural Intelligence Scale       | CQS  | • Cognition  
• Metacognition  
• Motivation  
| Interpersonal Reactivity Index     | IRI  | • Perspective Taking  
• Empathic Concern  
• Personal Distress  
| Global Competencies Inventory | GCI | • Perception management  
|                              |     | • Relationship management  
|                              |     | • Self-management  
| Intercultural Effectiveness Scale | IES | • Continuous Learning  
|                              |     | • Interpersonal Engagement  
|                              |     | • Hardiness  
| Cross-Cultural Social Intelligence | CCSI | • Cross-cultural dimension  
|                              |     | • Social intelligence dimension  
| Intercultural Readiness Checklist | IRC |  
|                              |     | [http://www.ibinet.nl](http://www.ibinet.nl)  |
| Intercultural Sensitivity Scale | ISS | • Interaction Engagement  
|                              |     | • Intercultural awareness  
|                              |     | • Respect of Cultural Differences  
|                              |     | • Interaction Confidence  
|                              |     | • Interaction Enjoyment  
|                              |     | • Interaction Attentiveness  

*Note. Type: B=battery; S=single; Business model: OA = open access; CA = controlled access; P = proprietary.*
Table 3

Summary of Evaluation of Primary Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Instrument Name</th>
<th>Subscales</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Face Validity</td>
<td>Construct Validity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCAI</td>
<td>Cross-Cultural Adaptability Inventory</td>
<td>Full scale Good</td>
<td>Poor Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility/Openness (FO) Good Poor Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emotional Resilience (ER) Good Poor Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceptual Acuity (PAC) Good Moderate Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Autonomy (PA) Good Poor Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CQS</td>
<td>Cultural Intelligence Scale</td>
<td>Metacognition Moderate Poor Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cognition Good</td>
<td>Poor Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation Moderate Poor Moderate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Behavior Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCI</td>
<td>Global Competencies Inventory</td>
<td>Perceptual Management (5 dimensions) Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship Management (5 dimensions) Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-Management (6 dimensions) Good</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAPS</td>
<td>Intercultural Adjustment Potential Scale</td>
<td>Full Scale Good</td>
<td>Poor Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emotion Regulation (ER) Poor Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Openness (OP) Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility (FL) Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creativity (CT) Poor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDI</td>
<td>Intercultural Development Inventory</td>
<td>Full Scale Good</td>
<td>Good Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Denial/Defense (DD) Good Not assessed n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reversal [R] Good</td>
<td>Not assessed n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimization (M) Good</td>
<td>Not assessed n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptance/Adaptation (AA) Good Not assessed n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Disengagement (CD) Good Not assessed n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrument</td>
<td>Subscales</td>
<td>Full Scale</td>
<td>Interpersonal Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IES</td>
<td>Intercultural Effectiveness Scale</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCA</td>
<td>Intercultural Competence Assessment</td>
<td>6 scales</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Intercultural Sensitivity Scale</td>
<td>Full scale</td>
<td>Interaction Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction Attentiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPQ</td>
<td>Multicultural Personality Questionnaire</td>
<td>Cultural Empathy</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Openmindedness</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Initiative</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emotional Stability</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>Scale of Ethnocultural Empathy</td>
<td>Full Scale</td>
<td>Empathic Feeling and Expression (EFE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Empathic Perspective Taking (EP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acceptance of Cultural Differences (AC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Empathic Awareness (EA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Intercultural Communicative Competence</td>
<td>Complex structure: 3 domains; 5 dimensions; 4 developmental levels</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. See text for explanation of ratings. Full scale construct validity includes internal structure and convergent/divergent validities using full scale scores.
### Table 4

**Summary of Evaluation of Secondary Instruments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Instrument Name</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADS</td>
<td>Adjustment Difficulties Subscale</td>
<td>4-item scale; not validated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory</td>
<td>No validation information found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIS</td>
<td>Acculturative Stress Scale for International Students</td>
<td>Validated (DV, Cov)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BASIC</td>
<td>Behavioral Assessment Scale for Intercultural Communication Effectiveness</td>
<td>Insufficient validation information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEVI</td>
<td>Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory</td>
<td>Based on a humanistic model; not validated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSII</td>
<td>Cross-Cultural Social Intelligence</td>
<td>Situational judgment test; no validity information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGAIC</td>
<td>Culture-Generic Approach to Intercultural Competence</td>
<td>(not examined)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWQ</td>
<td>The Culture in the Workplace Questionnaire</td>
<td>No validity information found</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMMIC</td>
<td>European Multidimensional Models of Intercultural Competence</td>
<td>This is not a measure; it is a model of intercultural competence; led to development of INCA instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAP</td>
<td>Global Awareness Profile</td>
<td>Poor validity information; see website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSI</td>
<td>Intercultural Sensitivity Inventory</td>
<td>No validation information; has rarely been used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Intercultural Readiness Checklist</td>
<td>No validation information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRI</td>
<td>Interpersonal Reactivity Index</td>
<td>Appears valid, but no 3C studies reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAS</td>
<td>The Inventory of Student Adjustment Strain</td>
<td>No validation information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAKSS</td>
<td>Multicultural Competence Scale</td>
<td>Validation only for composite (total score)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASQU</td>
<td>Munroe Multicultural Attitude Scale Questionnaire</td>
<td>Validation only for composite (total score)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCI</td>
<td>Multicultural Competence Scale</td>
<td>No validation information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCKAS</td>
<td>Multicultural Competence Scale</td>
<td>No validation information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCAT</td>
<td>Peterson Cultural Awareness Test</td>
<td>No validation information; dissertation based on Hofstede</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Scale Name</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PCSI</td>
<td>Peterson Cultural Style Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proprietary scale based on PCAT;</td>
<td>No validation information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>Social Connectedness Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Valid, one study (PA, SA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WDS</td>
<td>Workplace Diversity Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Insufficiently validated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5a. Summary of Criterion Validity Findings - Competencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref #</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Explanation or Specific Competency</th>
<th>Constructs</th>
<th>Candidate Instruments</th>
<th>Criterion Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C1.1a</td>
<td>1. Culture-General Concepts and Knowledge</td>
<td>Acquires …</td>
<td>Acquired knowledge</td>
<td>CQS-Cognitive Knowledge</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation to acquire knowledge</td>
<td>MAKSS-Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MCKAS-Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICC-Knowledge level 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INCA-Knowledge discovery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GAP Test</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.1b</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Applies …</td>
<td>Behavioral CQ</td>
<td>INCA-Knowledge discovery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>… intercultural dynamics</td>
<td>Knowledge of cultures</td>
<td>CCAI-PAC (Social Skills)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge of intercultural relationships and intercultural norms, styles, etc.</td>
<td>CCAI-Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-cultural social skills</td>
<td>CCAI-Perceptual acuity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.1</td>
<td>3. Cultural Perspective-Taking</td>
<td>Demonstrates an awareness …</td>
<td>Knowledge of attributed stereotypes</td>
<td>MAKSS-Awareness</td>
<td>SEE-EP (Perspective taking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Self-insight</td>
<td>ICC-Awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Understands and applies …</td>
<td>Empathy Perspective taking skill</td>
<td>MPQ-Empathy</td>
<td>MPQ-CE (Perspective taking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emotional Intelligence</td>
<td>BASIC-Empathy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Takes the cultural context into consideration …</td>
<td>Metacognition</td>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4.1</td>
<td>4. Communication</td>
<td>Acquires and applies …</td>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>MCI-Skills (part)</td>
<td>SCAS (part)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICC-Skills (part)</td>
<td>CCAI-PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INCA-Communicative awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SCAS-Cultural Empathy and Relatedness (part)</td>
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<td>C5.1</td>
<td>5. Interpersonal Skills</td>
<td>… rapport</td>
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<td>IRC-Interaction behavior and management</td>
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<td>IRC-Conflict management</td>
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<td>C5.2</td>
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<td>Manage conflict …</td>
<td>Social skills</td>
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<td>(a skill related to conflict resolution)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C6.2</td>
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<td>Minimize/maximize, adjust, or integrate …</td>
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Note. See Table 2 for instrument acronyms. (part) = partial mapping or partially corresponding measure.
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<td>constructs: xenophobia, multicultural attitudes, social dominance orientation</td>
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<td>Emotional regulation</td>
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<td>Coping skills</td>
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<td>Disgust sensitivity</td>
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<td>MPQ-Emotional Stability</td>
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<td>ICAPS-Emotion regulation</td>
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<td>COPE scale and others</td>
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<td>Gross - Emotion regulation scale</td>
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<td>IV would be E2.1 variables and DV would be cognitive style variables; stress as moderator</td>
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<td>E2.1.2 -</td>
<td>Avoids adopting simplify culture...</td>
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<td>Acts as a calming influence</td>
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<td>Regulates/controls one’s own emotions...</td>
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<td>Believes in one's capabilities...</td>
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<td>Ego strength</td>
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<td>Identity strength</td>
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<td>Cognitive differentiation</td>
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<td>Resistance to influence</td>
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<td>GSE – generalized self-efficacy scale and others</td>
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<td>E3.2 Self-Identity</td>
<td>Maintain personal values...</td>
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<td>Optimism</td>
<td>Problems as solvable …</td>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>Need for cognition</td>
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<td>E4.1</td>
<td>Learning Motivation</td>
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<td>E4.1.1</td>
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<td>E4.1.2</td>
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<td>E4.1.3</td>
<td>Learns and updates own knowledge…</td>
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<td>E5.1.1</td>
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*Note. See Table 3 for instrument acronyms. PA = psychological adjustment; SA = sociocultural adjustment; P = performance; DV = dependent variable in experiment; KG = known groups. No = research shows no relationships; none = no research evidence available; yes = criterion validity support is present. (part) = partial mapping or partially corresponding measure.*
Figure 1. Hierarchical structure of Framework, mapped to constructs, measures, and content sources.

Gray arrows indicate partial mapping (element does not wholly correspond to the construct, or the construct to the measure). One-to-many and many-to-one mappings are illustrated. In this example, Enabler element 1.1 has no corresponding construct, and Abilities Construct 2 has no corresponding measure. Competency element 2.2 is not supported by content source 1 but Competency element 2.1 is supported by two competencies. At far right, P = personality, At = Attitudes, C = Cognition, Ab = Abilities.
Why Black Officers Still Fail

COL Irving Smith III

Abstract

In 1996, LTC Remo Butler found that although African-Americans had served in the United States Army in all of America’s Wars they had failed to reach the very top levels of the organization in any significant numbers. He suggested several reasons that African-Americans did not reach the pinnacle of the profession in measurable numbers. This paper advances the clock fourteen years forward to examine what if anything has changed since Butler wrote his monologue. The author asks the following question (1) what are the factors that contribute to the dearth of Black officers joining the General Officer ranks in the United States Army? He finds that the Army has made significant progress in terms of promotions to the rank of Colonel (O-6) and command selection; however, Black-Americans are still promoted at much lower rates than White-Americans to the rank of General. He concludes that there are several reasons including lack of mentorship, persistent good ol' boy networks, faulty junior officer development systems, and cultural biases that contribute to this phenomenon. Furthermore, he provides some remedies to help future Army leaders ameliorate the problem.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
The Problem

Many, including Charles Moskos and John Sibley Butler, have suggested that the US Army is a meritocracy at the forefront of diversity efforts (Butler; Moskos, 1996). In fact, Moskos and Butler go so far as to state “It is the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks” (Butler; Moskos, 1996). They, and others who espouse this point of view, routinely emphasize three facts. First, the Army was one of the initial US institutions to integrate blacks and whites as a result of President Harry Truman’s Executive Order 9981 (Truman). Second, blacks have risen to the highest levels of command in the American military, including Colin Powell’s appointment to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, a black man, Barack Obama, has risen to the rank of Commander-in-Chief. While these points are immutable, it is also true that two of them are simply anomalies.

Moskos and Butler described an Army they believe has ideally accommodated African-Americans. In their vision, the Army is an inclusive organization in which African-Americans can rise to the highest level, proving that the Army values African-Americans’ unique cultural perspective. At the same time, however, that Moskos and Butler came to the conclusion that America’s Army was akin to a utopia for the black man and woman, Colonel Remo Butler, a student at the US Army War College (USAWC) came to a very different conclusion. He found that black officers were not, in fact, serving in a form of utopia; indeed, they were failing when compared with their white contemporaries. Based on his research project while a student at the USAWC, Butler offered evidence of his finding, “black officers are falling behind their white counterparts in promotions at and above the rank of lieutenant colonel at a disconcerting rate” (Butler, 1995).

Butler and various sociologists offered evidence that the Army has done a remarkable job in providing African-Americans in the noncommissioned officer (NCO) and enlisted ranks exceptional opportunities to grow, develop, and prosper professionally. Black officers; however, appear to have encountered structural barriers they were unable to overcome when Remo Butler wrote his treatise in 1995. It is this author’s contention that these barriers persist today. Black officers are still failing.

Several USAWC student papers over the past 20 years affirm there is a perceived problem from the black officer perspective regarding professional opportunities. It was only Butler’s research paper, however, that received any extensive attention throughout the Army. Following the major drawdown of Army forces in the 1990s, Butler published a later version of his study that stated the reason for black officers falling behind their white peers was due to “a debilitating inertia in the way young black officers are mentored and a lack of common cultural understanding among both black and white officers” (Butler; Moskos, 1996). As a result of these observations and a simple convenience survey conducted during his student year at the USAWC, Butler determined the remedy for this deficiency was fourfold:

---

2 President Truman’s Executive Order 9981, did not end segregation or begin integration it more generally declared, “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”
• Minimize the influence of the “good old boy network” in an effort to get young black officers quality assignments.

• Increase the quality of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadre by increasing the status of ROTC assignments.

• Provide quality mentoring for young black officers.

• Educate officers and senior leaders in cultural awareness.

Ensuing Army initiatives to improve the environment were based on a number of Butler’s recommendations and well-received at the time. Indeed, his report was mandatory reading for various units in the late 1990s. The problem, however, persists: black officers still lag behind their white counterparts in much the same fashion as Butler identified in 1995. Specifically, black officers are still failing to reach the rank of general officer in numbers commensurate with their representation at senior levels of the Army.

Butler suggested black officers were failing in two areas that ultimately reduced their chances for promotion to general officer: promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel and selection for battalion and brigade command. This article extends Butler’s study by attempting to determine what, if anything has changed in the 14 years since he published his paper. One of the biggest criticisms of Butler’s paper was that his methodology was overly simplistic and lacked intellectual rigor. It was, however, this simplicity that made his study understandable and appealing to a broad audience. This study replicates Butler’s 1995 methodology, understanding that his methods were unrefined, while preserving his work’s integrity and allowing for a comparative dialogue.

The hypothesis for this article is that little has changed: black officers, as a collective, continue to fail in today’s Army. Failure in this study is defined as not obtaining the rank of general officer. Understandably, some will take issue with this definition of failure and by default the associated definition of success. From an institutional perspective, however, it is hard to argue that blacks should not be represented in the highest leadership echelons at rates proportional to those who serve within the organization. From a collective perspective, the inability to obtain representation at the highest level of the organization is failure.

**Study Comparisons**

The first data Butler extrapolated was the number of blacks serving in the Army. According to Butler, in 1994, blacks made up 27 percent of the Army and 11 percent of the officer corps (Butler, 1995).3 Today, blacks make up 19.8 percent of the Army and 12 percent of the officer corps.4 So, the total percentage of black Army officers has changed little over the past 14 years. Butler then compared the number of officers by race and rank, using the racial categories of black and white non-Hispanics. Table 1 depicts these comparisons. In 1995, Butler

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3 Even though Butler’s paper was written in 1995, he used 1994 data which was the most current data available at the time.

4 Remo Butler never clarified whether his numbers were based on the total Army or just the active component.
noted that blacks comprised about 12 percent of the officer corps through the rank of major; however, that percentage dropped off precipitously at the rank of lieutenant colonel. He found that whites’ proportionate numbers increased continually through the rank of general officer. Today’s findings are similar to Butler’s with a few significant differences.

Black officers . . . continue to fail in today’s Army.

Table 1: Comparison of the Number of White and Black Officers by Rank in 1994 and 2007.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>3,460</td>
<td>3,661</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>453</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>(90.9%)</td>
<td>(82.7%)</td>
<td>(4.9%)</td>
<td>(10.2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>7,951</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>(86.6%)</td>
<td>(78.5%)</td>
<td>(8.3%)</td>
<td>(12.2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>11,713</td>
<td>11,627</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>1,984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(80.7%)</td>
<td>(74.0%)</td>
<td>(12.5%)</td>
<td>(12.6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>21,111</td>
<td>19,009</td>
<td>3,258</td>
<td>3,553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(80.1%)</td>
<td>(69.6%)</td>
<td>(12.4%)</td>
<td>(13.0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>7,027</td>
<td>5,713</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenant</td>
<td>7,453</td>
<td>7,196</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(81.0%)</td>
<td>(69.8%)</td>
<td>(10.1%)</td>
<td>(12.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, blacks now represent 12 percent of the officer corps through the rank of lieutenant colonel, whereas Butler’s study found that black representation fell precipitously at the rank of major. Second, there has been a dramatic increase in the percentage of black colonels since 1995. Finally, although the percentage of white officers still increases through the rank of general, the percentages are much lower than Butler reported in 1995.

There are several plausible explanations for these differences. The most obvious of these is the difference in selection rates in 1994 versus 2007. In 1995, the selection rate for the 1985 cohort to major was 62 percent (Butler; Moskos, 1996). By 2007, as a result of the need for an increased number of officers to fight two wars, the selection rate ballooned to 91 percent; (Reserve Component Readiness) officers were being promoted earlier in their careers as well (Henning, 2006). With regard to the decreased percentage of white officers in the Army, a plausible explanation is the fact that other minorities are increasingly joining the officer ranks; Asians, Hispanics, and other minorities have been commissioned at much higher rates since 1994.5

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5 Butler’s paper was written in 1995; however, his data were taken from the DSCPER-441, Racial Statistical by REDCAT Grade Quarter Ending September 1994.
Table 2 depicts the percentage of change by race for officers at a particular rank between the 1994 and 2007 data. For whites, the only increase occurs at the rank of colonel; whereas the percentage of blacks has increased at every rank except first lieutenant. This table clearly depicts the dramatic increase in the number of black colonels; it also reveals the relatively small increase in the number of black generals. One statistic that Butler did not consider was the ratio of second lieutenants to general officers. In 1994, 4.1 percent of white lieutenants could anticipate becoming general officers, whereas only 2.4 percent of black lieutenants could statistically share this expectation. By 2007 this ratio had hardly changed for white officers at 4.1 percent, but it had fallen to 1.8 percent for black officers.

Table 2: Percentage of Change in Rank Between 1994 and 2007 Statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>White (Non-Hispanic)</th>
<th>Black (Non-Hispanic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General Officer</td>
<td>-4.56%</td>
<td>4.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>5.81%</td>
<td>144.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>-3.6%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>-10.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenant</td>
<td>-18.7%</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenant</td>
<td>-3.4%</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps Butler would characterize these changes as encouraging or, at the very least, a step in the right direction. He would probably concur that black officers are still failing to achieve the very highest ranks in the Army. Darlene Iskra has identified the phenomenon of particular groups failing to achieve upward professional mobility in the military as a “Brass Ceiling.” Although Iskra focused most of her attention on structural barriers, she did highlight a number of the cultural aspects related to the brass ceiling. It is fair to conclude that black officers similarly serve under a brass ceiling, which is more of a cultural barrier than a structural phenomenon.

Remo Butler identified part of the problem as the pipeline (the supply of officers available for promotion). He reasoned that fewer officers selected at a lower rank meant that fewer officers were retained within the population to compete at the next higher rank. For example, if a year group hypothetically consisted of 100 second lieutenants and only 75 percent of them were promoted to first lieutenant, then only 75 remained available for consideration to captain; whereas, if 90 percent of these officers were promoted to first lieutenant, then 90 could potentially be promoted to captain. When these decrements are factored all the way to the rank of colonel, one sees how the pipeline may tend to shrink if blacks are systematically and disproportionately eliminated from the promotable pool. In order to quantify this phenomenon,

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6 When speaking about women and their lack of opportunity to reach the highest ranks in the Department of Defense, Dr. Darlene Iskra dubbed this phenomenon as a “Brass Ceiling.”
he analyzed selection rates from captain through the field grade ranks for year groups 1973 and 1974 (Table 3). He selected these year groups because they were predominate year groups of students at the USAWC where he conducted his study. His findings corroborated the first part of his study; blacks were falling behind beginning at the rank of major.

Table 3: Percentage of Selection Rates of Whites and Blacks for Years 1973 and 1974.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Year Group 1973</th>
<th>Year Group 1974</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>For Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>92.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This study replicates Butler’s methodology for analysis of selection rates based on race. It surveys year groups 1986 and 1987 for comparison, which made up a large percentage of the officers enrolled in the USAWC class of 2010. Butler’s analysis of selection rates from captain to major led him to conclude that the selection rates for black officers were a key problem in getting blacks to the senior ranks of the Army. Specifically, in year groups 1973 and 1974, the overall white selection rates were much higher than black rates: 6 percent higher for year group 1973 and 11 percent higher for year group 1974. Accordingly, Butler concluded that racially disparate selection rates to major were the genesis of the pipeline issue.

Analysis of year groups 1986 and 1987 provides similar evidence. Black officers in these year groups were selected at much lower rates than their white peers. For year group 1986, the difference was 14 percent, and for year group 1987 the difference was 8 percent. In the aggregate, the differences in Butler’s sample population were smaller than the differences in the current population. At the rank of colonel, however, the numbers converge. In year group 1973, the difference between blacks and the rest of the cohort was only 1.8 percentage points. Although there was little difference in the promotion rates to colonel, there was a significant difference in the number of officers ultimately selected. Selection of 42.8 percent for promotion to colonel produced 455 white colonels; selection of 41 percent of the black officers for promotion produced only 48 black colonels. Butler believed these numbers validated his pipeline theory that blacks are systematically squeezed out.

Similarly, for year group 1986, blacks were promoted at a rate that was two percentage points higher than whites. White officers in this year group had a 53.1 percent selection rate to colonel; 408 of 760 eligible white officers were selected. Of the 98 black officers eligible for promotion, 54 were ultimately selected. Clearly, Butler’s theory of the constricting pipeline was at play for this year group as well. Butler did not have an opportunity to compare the ratio of the number of officers who began with the year group to the number who ultimately were selected for colonel because the data were not available at that time (Butler).

Butler’s analysis, however, extends beyond statistics. The numbers were merely a starting point supporting his primary contention that the dearth of black officers at the field grade ranks
made it almost impossible for a significant number of blacks to be promoted to general. He also espoused that blacks who made it to the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel were being selected at lower rates for command-designated positions than their white contemporaries. In 1995, Butler reasoned that the gateway to promotion to colonel was battalion command. Today, battalion command is no longer seen as a prerequisite for promotion to colonel. Selectees for battalion command certainly have a greater likelihood of being selected for promotion to colonel than those who have not commanded at that level.

Those selected for battalion and brigade command are much more likely to ascend to the rank of general officer. In an attempt to validate his command selection hypothesis, Butler examined the lieutenant colonel command designated position list (CDPL) board selection rates for black and white officers for fiscal years 1993 through 1995 (see Table 4).

Butler’s analysis of the data suggested that blacks had a much lower selection rate than whites across the board. He reasoned that their nonselection rates put blacks at a disadvantage for promotion to colonel. To replicate Butler’s year group selection analysis, this study uses fiscal years 2005 through 2007 for comparison of white and black officers’ selection to the CDPL.\textsuperscript{7} Table 4 depicts this comparison.

\textsuperscript{7} In keeping with Butler’s methodology, it would have been more advantageous to move forward thirteen years instead of twelve. However, at the time the data for Fiscal Year 2008 was not available.
**Table 4: 1993-95 & 2005-2007 Board Selection Rates for Lieutenant Colonel Command Designated Positions**

**Comparative Fiscal Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Butler’s Subset</th>
<th>Author’s Subset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection Rates for</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1993</strong></td>
<td><strong>1994</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>13.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>12.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data bear out the fact that there is still a disparity between black and white selection rates for the CDPL at the lieutenant colonel level. These results are substantively different for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and significantly different in fiscal year 2006 (P<.01). Based on this analysis one may conclude that white officers still get selected at significantly higher rates than blacks.

**Discussion**

These data reveal that, although there has been progress since the time that Butler initiated his original study, black officers are still failing, based on the criteria that Butler established in 1995. Why has there been so little progress for blacks over this extended period? It would be hard to deny that the institutional Army has made valiant attempts to institute programs and policies that enable black officers to thrive within a meritocratic system. It would also be difficult to blame the victim and suggest that black officers are doing something collectively or individually to keep themselves from reaching the highest levels. In an attempt to discover why so little progress has been made between 1995 and 2010, it is necessary to examine what Butler defined as the four root causes of the problem: education, mentorship, culture, and the “good old boy network.”

**Education**

By education Butler simply meant that black officers were not getting a quality undergraduate military experience. He reasoned that most black officers were being commissioned through ROTC units from historically black colleges and universities. These

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8 In order to conduct the test for significance, I used the Z-test for independent groups to determine if they were significantly different from one another.
9 I conducted an analysis to see if Fiscal Year 2005, the year that blacks had higher selection rates than whites, was an outlier and found that there have been two other Fiscal Years in which blacks had higher selection rates on CDPLs. Those years were 1998 and 2001.
young officers were not properly socialized to understand the nuances of an institution dominated by white officers. In fact, he stated that black officers commissioned through West Point, more often than not, did better than their black peers commissioned through ROTC. The reason for these differences was not the education per se, but the level of professionalism of the officers that comprised the faculty serving at those institutions. He felt that the best and brightest officers were on the faculty at West Point and that ROTC programs were being staffed with lower performing and less qualified officers to educate young black officers. He based this conclusion on evidence that a number of the black officers who taught at West Point were ultimately selected for battalion command while few of the black ROTC faculty officers were selected.

Since the publication of Butler’s thesis in 1999, there have been a great number of changes regarding the assignment of officers to ROTC duty; however, the preponderance of his premise still rings true. One change that has not helped develop young, black officers or officers in general is the use of contractor personnel to support ROTC programs. Although active lieutenant colonels and colonels still serve as Professors of Military Science in various ROTC programs, many of the Senior Military Science Instructors, Military Science Instructors, Administrative Technicians, and Staff Specialists are contractors. The contract personnel are retired or former active component officers, who are either retired or serving as Reserve or National Guard Army officers (COMTEK, AROTC). ROTC cadets now receive much of their exposure to and understanding of the military profession from these contract personnel, while West Point cadets continue to receive their exposure to and understanding of the Army from a hand-picked cadre of active duty officers all of whom have at least a master’s degree. Without denigrating the quality of contractor ROTC cadre, it appears that, in the aggregate, black officers commissioned through ROTC are probably not being exposed to the same quality of faculty as those commissioned through West Point. Remo Butler’s education hypothesis may still play a large part in this relationship and the ensuing challenges.

Mentorship

Butler also determined that young, black officers were not receiving the type of mentorship required to be successful in the Army. Specifically, he believed that junior black officers did not have senior role models to help them grow and develop professionally. Although Butler states that “mentoring should be color-blind,” he concedes that a successful black officer might be better able to relate to a junior black officer, thereby ensuring greater success in the mentorship process. In an effort to validate this hypothesis, Butler used anecdotes from his classmates in the USAWC class of 1995. This subjective survey supported his original assessment that there was a dearth of senior black officers available to serve as mentors. The anecdotal information obtained from classmates in the USAWC Class of 2010 was amazingly similar to Butler’s conclusions. Whites tended to say that they had one or two black officers who were really good, and those officers tended to be West Point graduates. They also implied that junior black officers were as technically and tactically proficient as their white peers, but they (the senior white officers) had to make an extraordinary effort in getting to know junior black officers. Others (students and authors) who have studied similar theses have come to mutually supporting conclusions. In a 2008 USAWC Strategy Research Project, while exploring the effects of ethnocentrism and its affect on work experiences and career outcomes, Colonel Florentino Carter stated, “There is not a conscious effort on the part of leaders to exclude
minorities but rather a recognition that certain innate human tendencies affect how leaders are more apt to mentor member[s] of his [or] her own phenotype” (Carter, 2008). Although an officer’s branch selection was not a part of the author’s analysis, some have suggested that an officer’s branch selection is a decisive factor in whether or not they attain the rank of general officer. If this assertion is true, mentoring may be a way to get black officers to understand the value of branching in the combat arms.

A number of the black officers in the USAWC class of 2010 suggested that, although they did mentor junior black officers, they themselves had few black mentors and role models in their careers. A number of white officers in the class also related how they had never had a black mentor or immediate supervisor during their entire career in the Army. This implies that there may still be a racial divide that manifests itself between whites and blacks in social and professional relationships and impacts the development of the contemporary officer.

**Culture**

One of the most controversial of Butler’s arguments is his assertion that blacks and whites in America have different cultures and that these cultures reveal themselves in everyday military life. In an effort to provide context for his assertion, Butler used anecdotal evidence from his own experiences and that provided by his USAWC classmates regarding dress, music, and social interaction. He believed that blacks grow up with a set of cultural mores that are different than those of whites and radically different than those of the white-dominated military. For example, he suggested that the expected mode of dress for officers at civilian functions is khaki pants, a collared shirt, and loafers—commonly referred to as “vintage casual” at the USAWC. Although he did not state it explicitly, Butler suggested that blacks do not generally dress in this manner and thus had to learn this new behavior or be ostracized. According to Butler, these differences are the result of a system of cultural mores that have to be inculcated by blacks if they are to succeed in the military. He went on to espouse the belief that blacks are not normally exposed to these cultural imperatives unless they are commissioned at West Point or some predominantly white institution.

Although Butler’s line of reasoning still makes sense, many basic facts have changed since the early 1990s. Most of the USAWC students interviewed in 2010 believe that the cultural gap between black and white youth is much narrower than it once was. They alluded to the fact that today’s youth, white and black, tend to be attracted to similar music and style of dress. Scholarly research in this area, however, does not appear to be nearly as certain regarding this narrowing cultural gap. In 2002, the National Endowment of the Arts reported that whites were three times as likely as blacks to attend a classical music performance, opera, or ballet, or even watch such events on TV (“The Black Wide Divide in Cultural Pursuits”). In any case, there has been insufficient research to ascertain whether the cultural gap that Butler spoke of has broadened or narrowed, but there is little doubt that it still exists to some degree and needs to be considered as part of the reason that black officers continue to fail.
“Good Old Boy Network”

One of the most obvious, but shortest, explanations Butler provided for why black officers fail was the “good old boy network.” In fact, he only spent one paragraph on this topic. He believed that the pervasive notion that it is all about who you know was a key component accounting for black officer failure. Sociologists often refer to this as interpersonal work relationships. He reasoned that black officers who had few mentors and little social interaction with senior black or white officers were less likely to be selected for battalion operations and executive officer positions. As a result, they were less likely to be selected for command and ultimately qualify for general officer. It is the subjective belief of this author that the “good old boy network” is still alive and well. In conversations with this author’s peers, both black and white, they universally expressed the belief that who you know is equally important as individual performance; this belief was especially true as one became senior in rank. Of particular interest was the recounting of the same story several times over about being selected to be on a certain staff because the individual officer had a prior relationship with the commander or senior leader. In essence, Butler’s notion of the “good old boy network” is still important in understanding why black officers are not promoted to general officer.

Conclusion

One would like to believe that the Army has progressed to a point in its history where race is no longer a factor in the success or failure of an individual service member; however, one can also make the case that we have not yet reached that point. Based on this author’s analysis of the current data, the conclusion is obvious; we have not changed much since Remo Butler penned his thesis in 1995. Black officers are still failing. Not only do black officers continue to fail, but it would also appear that we have not made significant progress in the areas that Butler described as the root causes of the problem: education, mentorship, culture, and the “good old boy network.”

As a result of the 2010 study, it is suggested that the Army needs to take a new approach to increasing black officers’ potential to reach its most senior levels. Several authors and sociologists have argued that there needs to be a top-down approach if we are to be successful in this endeavor. John Kotter, a well-known expert in the field of organizational change, stated, “Major change is often said to be impossible unless the head of the organization is an active supporter” (Kotter). The following advice is generally directed to senior leaders and more specifically to senior white leaders charged with improving Army diversity.

First, the institution needs to move beyond the concept of managing diversity to actually developing a diversity execution strategy. The development of the Commission on Officer Diversity and Advancement (CODA) and the subsequent creation of the Army Diversity Office are certainly steps in the right direction. It appears, however, that even these well-intentioned organizations have accomplished little beyond generating rhetoric and tomes having little impact on assisting black officers in reaching the highest levels of the Army. It has become apparent that the Army’s rank and file are not buying into or actively supporting diversity initiatives. The belief that this author took away from his analysis was that black officers believe that diversity efforts are ineffective and that a number of white officers feel these initiatives actually work against them. The one thing that these two groups do agree on is that diversity training is a waste
of time. But the Army should not feel it is alone in trying to meet these challenges. The following quote suggests corporate America is struggling with many of the same issues.

Mandatory diversity seminars or training programs can encounter just as much eye-rolling resistance from black executives as from white. It is not that they do not support the goal. But the general consensus is that it is going to be a waste of time. Even if everyone herded in the room agrees the goal is something that they all should care about, the didactic tone usually accompanying that process makes the participants feel as if they are being forced to eat vegetables (Daniels, 2004).

Diversity initiatives cannot exist as stand alone programs if they are to be effective. They need to be integrated into and aligned with the organization’s strategic plan.

Second, senior leaders have to communicate precisely why diversity is important. The Army has been less than successful in clearly communicating why diversity is critical to its success. There are two points that senior leaders should make perfectly clear. The first is that diversity is linked to performance as an institution. This is a difficult message to develop and communicate, because research on diversity with respect to complex tasks and group performance is rather ambiguous. Various individuals and institutions that have studied the problem have found that demographic diversity produces few if any benefits to group performance (Pelled; Eisenhardt; Xin; 1999). Others have determined that demographic diversity does, in fact, increase group performance (Tudor, 2010). In any event, if there is any modicum of chance that diversity increases organizational performance or mission accomplishment, then the Army needs to actively embrace it. The environments that senior leaders in today’s Army face are laced with complex problems requiring cognitive diversity, something that springs from cultural diversity. Furthermore, as a public institution, the Army needs to reflect society as a whole. In the end, an institution that claims to be representative of its host society needs to display a high level of professional and social competence if it is to gather the support of the American people.

Third, the Army needs to develop quantitative and qualitative criteria that will permit it to measure the impact of diversity efforts. In this respect, the author is in total agreement with Representative Elijah Cummings, who, in the following letter to the Secretary of the Army stated:

While the Army has made a good faith effort to address areas of minority underrepresentation, more aggressive steps are needed in order to achieve a fully diverse force and capitalize on the strength of this diversity. The Army has yet to identify concrete metrics to capture performance progress. Having addressed this issue for the past three years, the Army should be able to provide tangible results as a true measure of the leadership’s commitment to institutionalizing diversity into the culture through their effective and efficient practices (Cummings, 2009).

The criteria for achieving such goals needs to be linked to senior officer performance appraisals. If senior officers are held accountable through their performance appraisals for underwriting diversity, the entire organization will have little choice but to get onboard. Many
senior leaders may balk at this recommendation, because they view it as an attempt to foster affirmative action, or even worse, as an action that will place unqualified officers in positions of increased responsibility, thereby decreasing the overall effectiveness of the Army. It is this author’s belief that finding qualified black officers for positions of greater responsibility should not present a challenge. These individuals already exist in large numbers throughout the Army, and it is the senior leadership’s obligation to recognize, develop, and mentor these individuals if we are going to be truly successful.

Fourth, the Army needs to select the right individuals to lead its diversity office. The right people are those with the appropriate education, experience level, organizational knowledge, and passion to accomplish the mission. The designation of “right education” suggests including sociologists, cultural anthropologists, and social-psychologists.

Individuals selected to lead the diversity enterprise need to have a complete understanding of organizational culture and what is entailed in leading organizations through change. It would appear that the Army has taken a position based on the belief that if it selects successful black officers to oversee its diversity initiatives, then the successful pursuit of its diversity goals is assured. A cursory review of the officers assigned to CODA reveals what would appear to be a listing of successful black officers. Unfortunately, in a number of cases, these officers are no more qualified to lead a diversity study or enterprise than white officers with similar credentials. Cora Daniels, a teaching professional at New York University, sums it up nicely, “Basically there is a no barrier to entry. It requires no degree, no verification process, and no common credential for people to claim to be diversity gurus. Virtually anyone can hang up a shingle and proclaim their expertise” (Daniels).

Fifth, the Army needs to undertake the development of a talent management enterprise. Such an enterprise is fashioned in much the same manner as many of the top civilian firms: to identify an organization’s best talent; ensure they get the right assignments; and provide them career advice and mentorship. It has been well-documented that many blacks enter the service in an attempt to gain skills for use in the civilian sector. Once they have gained these skills and fulfilled their service obligations, they will leave active service unless they see the Army as adding value to their lives. There needs to be an organization designed to monitor qualified officers, provide them career guidance, and ensure they get the assignments required to be successful. In essence, the Army needs to have an active strategic process for identifying and developing this diverse pool of black officers. The tangible result will be more qualified officers, of every race, eligible to serve at the executive levels of the Army.

Finally, the Army needs to inspire its senior black officers to have a stake in the development of junior black officers. In order to make this a reality, the Army’s senior leadership needs to accomplish three things. First, senior leaders need to ask senior black officers what they are doing to mentor black officers. Many white officers may feel uncomfortable asking this question; however, it is critical that senior black officers know that this is an imperative. Moreover, people pay attention to what the boss pays attention to. Second, senior leaders should weed out those black officers unwilling to rise to the challenge. There are a number of senior black officers who feel no obligation to mentor junior officers. They are what Nathan Hare described as the black Anglo-Saxons, blacks who have “made it” but for some
reason have become disconnected from their race (Hare, 1991). Senior officers should hold them accountable by asking the question “what are you doing to resolve the problem?” Finally, the Army needs to put those who are willing to make a difference in the right positions, where they can have an impact. This includes executive command positions as well as administrative positions where they can expose junior black officers to their example, mentorship, expertise, and passion.

This study attempted to determine what, if anything, has changed since Remo Butler wrote his thesis in 1995. The findings overall suggest that contemporary black officers are getting promoted to the ranks of lieutenant colonel and colonel at higher levels than in 1995. Blacks are being selected for battalion- and brigade-level command at higher rates than 1995. Unfortunately, blacks are still failing to rise to the strategic decision-making levels of the Army. In trying to come to grips with this, the author found that there are some limitations inherent in this study. The first is that the supporting analyses do not employ a rigorous, methodological approach in evaluating senior officer perceptions. Instead, it relies on anecdotal evidence, much like Butler’s original thesis, to support contentions. Additionally, as with Butler’s study, this paper takes a myopic black and white approach to understanding why black officers fail. It is apparent after reviewing the initial data that the problem needs to be examined from a wider perspective. More specifically, the growth of the Asian and Hispanic officer populations needs to be factored into the equation. The number of general officer positions available is fixed throughout the Army and every position that goes to a Hispanic or Asian officer is one that cannot be filled by a black officer. In effect, it truly is a zero-sum game. A more in-depth study and comprehensive analysis would consider and control variables such as region of origin, parental education, and parental service affiliation to name a few. Ultimately, by examining the data in this study and addressing its limitations, the Army may gain a greater understanding of how best to increase its overall diversity in an effort to become a more effective organization.
Footnotes


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Expanding Insights on the Diversity Climate-Performance link: The Role of Work Group Discrimination

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Abstract

The present study extends knowledge on the effects of work group diversity climate by examining its relationship with work group discrimination and group performance. Findings from 211 military work groups comprising 7,689 respondents revealed that diversity climate is consistently related to group performance. This relationship is shown to be mediated by perceptions of work group discrimination, revealing a previously unidentified influence process in the diversity climate-performance linkage. Results from structural equation modeling illustrate the importance of creating a positive diversity climate, thereby improving group performance while simultaneously avoiding negative outcomes such as discrimination.

Keywords: diversity climate, work group discrimination, group performance, structural equation modeling

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Expanding Insights on the Diversity Climate-Performance link:
The Role of Work Group Discrimination

INTRODUCTION

Most organizations in the Western world have traditionally employed individuals who are highly heterogeneous in terms of their demographic characteristics (Doverspike, Taylor, Shultz, & McKay, 2000; Fullerton & Toossii, 2001). Trends like increasing globalization and migration, growing individual mobility, and demographic changes in populations have created diverse work settings (Pugh, Dietz, Brief, & Wiley, 2008; Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009). It is becoming increasingly common for employees of different genders, age groups, races, ethnicities, nationalities, sexual orientations, and disability status to work together. As a result of these trends, both scholars and practitioners are focusing on research and practical activities to amplify the potential positive outcomes of diversity (e.g., innovation and creativity) while preventing its negative aspects (e.g., increasing group conflict and discrimination) (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007).

One concept that has gained considerable attention in this regard is positive diversity climate, which describes members’ shared perceptions of an organization’s diversity-related policies, practices, and procedures (Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005; Kossek & Zonia, 1993; Mor Barak, Cherin, & Berkmann, 1998; Pugh et al., 2008). Positive diversity climate perceptions have been linked to more sustainable integrations and smoother collaborations between diverse employees in the workplace (Cox, 1994; Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009; McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2009). In spite of recent advancements in diversity climate research, some important questions have not been targeted to date. This study strives to broaden the knowledge base on diversity climate in two important ways. First, we contribute to the diversity climate literature by theoretically and empirically investigating its collective performance effects. Second, we strive to link the literatures on diversity climate and discrimination which have been surprisingly unconnected to date (Triana, Garcia, & Colella, 2010; Smith, Brief, & Colella, 2010).

In contrast to studies on other forms of climate, such as innovation climate (Charbonnier-Voirin, El Akremi, & Vandenbergh, 2010) or cooperation climate (Collins & Smith, 2006) which have often targeted the link to performance, the relationship between diversity climate and performance is less well explored. On the one hand, it generally seems that "empirical research on diversity climate is limited" (Pugh et al., 2008, p. 1423). Van Knippenberg and Schippers (2007, p. 532) attested it to be "at an embryonic stage", yet to be a promising avenue for further scholarly work. On the other hand, past research has typically focused on the antecedents of diversity climate (e.g., Kossek & Zonia, 1993; Pugh et al., 2008). Finally, as McKay and colleagues (McKay et al., 2009; McKay, Avery, Liao, & Morris, 2011) point out, the few existing empirical studies on the diversity climate-performance link are either of qualitative nature (e.g., Ely & Thomas, 2001; Gilbert & Ivancevich, 2000) or have addressed individual-level performance outcomes (e.g., Avery, McKay, Wilson, & Tonidandel, 2007; McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2008; McKay, Avery, Tonidandel, Morris, Hernandez, & Hebl, 2007).
Only recently have scholars started to empirically assess the collective-level outcomes of a pro-diverse work climate. As one example, McKay and colleagues (2009) have shown the positive impact of subordinates' and managers' diversity climate perceptions on store sales performance. Diversity climate has also been found to be a moderator between organizational diversity and firm productivity, as well as return on profit (Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009). While both studies demonstrate a business case for diversity climate, they remain comparably "silent as to the mediating mechanisms linking (...) diversity climates to subsequent (...) performance" (McKay et al., 2009, p. 786). Despite McKay and colleagues’ (2009) research utilizing Kopelman, Brief and Guzzo's (1990) climate model of productivity, which proposes climate effects on performance through certain cognitive, affective, or behavioral mediators, the authors’ focus concentrated on the interactive or moderating effects of subordinates' and managers' diversity climate perspectives on performance. This gap in the research has left potential mediators of the diversity climate-performance link unexamined. We therefore strive to take up this new line of research and extend prior findings by introducing discrimination as an important behavioral mediator in the relationship between diversity climate and collective performance.

By focusing on discrimination as a potential mediator, we contribute to the diversity climate literature in a second important way. Recent interest in diversity management and pro-diverse work climates has taken attention away from the construct of discrimination (Smith, Brief & Colella, 2010). Indeed, although diversity climate and discrimination have both been in the focus of scholarly interest for quite some time, almost no study has examined the theoretical and empirical relationship between both constructs (Smith et al., 2010). One exception is Triana, Garcia and Colella's (2010) study in which they simultaneously investigate the effects of organizational efforts to support diversity (i.e., diversity climate) and perceived racial discrimination on affective commitment. We build upon their work and show how diversity climate may reduce discrimination in work groups. Consequently, this study also extends the recently growing literature on the antecedents and outcomes of discrimination in the workplace (Avery et al., 2008).

A more thorough understanding of discrimination is essential due to its negative effects for employees (e.g., increase in work tension and stress, reduced satisfaction and health), as well as for companies (e.g., costly lawsuits, decrease in employee commitment and morale, flawed public images) (see Goldman, Gutek, Stein, & Lewis, 2006, for a recent review of this literature). Therefore, it is imperative to shed more light on the questions of how discrimination can be avoided in the workplace and which role a pro-diverse work climate plays in this regard.

THEORY

Diversity climate defined

The concept of organizational climate was originally developed by Reichers and Schneider (1990, p. 22) who defined it as "shared perceptions of the way things are around here". Climate perceptions evolve as part of a sense-making process, in which individual employees retrieve and interpret certain information from their work environment (Schneider, 1975; Schneider & Reichers, 1983). If colleagues sufficiently share these information on relevant organizational
events and characteristics, a collective climate perception may emerge. In the past 20 years, many different forms of climate have been proposed and empirically tested, such as cooperation climate (Collins & Smith, 2006), procedural justice climate (Naumann & Bennett, 2000), and safety climate (Yagil & Luria, 2010). Therefore, it is necessary to specify the focus of the climate which one refers to. The current study examines diversity climate, which is formally defined as "aggregate member perceptions about the organization's diversity-related formal structure characteristics and informal values" (Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009, p. 24).

**Main effect of diversity climate on work group performance**

In line with prior work on the effects of diversity climate (e.g., Triana et al., 2010; McKay et al., 2008; McKay et al., 2009), we theoretically build upon Cox's (1994) interactional model of cultural diversity (IMCD). Cox (1994) was among the first to propose potential outcomes of diversity climate at the individual and the collective level: Individual affective outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational identification) and individual performance outcomes (e.g., job performance ratings, compensation, or promotion) which may, in turn, lead to first-level effectiveness outcomes (e.g., attendance, turnover, or productivity), as well as second-level collective outcomes (e.g., productivity or financial performance). Similarly, Hicks-Clarke and Iles (2000) developed a conceptual model of a "positive climate for diversity " which they described as a situation "[...] in which human resource diversity is valued and in which employees from diverse backgrounds feel welcomed and included" (p. 324). Their framework encompasses different affective dependent variables including organizational commitment, job satisfaction, or satisfaction with managers. They point out that these individual outcomes may also have collective effects, such as less "negative feelings, lack of cooperation and loss of productivity" (p. 331).

In a similar vein, Avery and colleagues (2007) found that firms with a strong diversity climate are typically involved in distinct personnel practices (e.g., regarding recruiting and promoting) which are positively perceived by the employees. The authors believed that employees may observe these activities and interpret them "as a form of organizational goodwill" which they may "reciprocate through enhanced workplace affect and reduced withdrawal from the firm" (Avery et al., 2007, p. 881; Cox, 1994; Deery, Iverson, & Walsh, 2006; Somers, 1995). This reasoning can be traced back to social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) which suggests that employees’ perceptions of a supportive and equal exchange relationship between the organization and themselves is a necessary precondition for the development and preservation of high levels of affective commitment and ultimately of performance. Similarly, a positive diversity climate is likely to be perceived as a balanced relationship, and therefore employees within such environments may be more invested in the group's well-being and to commit towards collective goals.

Positive performance consequences of a positive diversity climate can also be explained by potentially reduced levels of conflict stemming from decreased categorization and social identity based processes (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987). Gonzalez and DeNisi (2009, p. 27) similarly propose that "a supportive diversity climate would weaken in-group bias and social categorization processes, leading to lower adverse impact on intergroup conflict and social integration". Taken together, we agree with McKay and colleagues' (2009) assumption about the
effects of diversity climate on performance: "By minimizing differential treatment on the basis of group membership, pro-diversity climates should foster more favorable attitudes, improved individual performance, and in turn, increased unit performance" (p. 771).

From an empirical perspective, the literature on the relationship between diversity climate and performance is rather limited. In addition to the aforementioned study from Hicks-Clarke and Iles (2000), there is some empirical work at the individual level that analyzes outcome variables which can be expected to correlate with performance (e.g., commitment or absenteeism). For instance, McKay and colleagues (2007) found that diversity climate perceptions are positively related with organizational commitment and negatively with turnover intentions, especially for African American employees. Similarly, Avery and colleagues (2007) showed the moderating effects of perceived diversity on absenteeism. With regard to performance in a more narrow sense, McKay et al. (2008) demonstrated that diversity climate impacts the sales performance of employees.

As previously mentioned, there is a limited number of studies investigating the diversity climate-performance relationship at the collective level of analysis. Previous research has found a positive association between higher levels of a pro-diverse work climate and unit performance and productivity (Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009; McKay & colleagues, 2009). In addition, McKay and colleagues (2011) demonstrated a positive relationship between diversity climate and customer satisfaction, moderated by service climate and business unit demography. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above, we propose the following:

H1: Diversity climate will be positively related to group performance.

**Effect of diversity climate on work group discrimination**

As Hypothesis 1 on the diversity climate-performance link indicates, scholars have repeatedly made use of implicitly assumed (and sometimes explicitly tested) mediators in explaining the performance implications of a heightened diversity climate. Interestingly, most studies investigating such mediation pathways propose positive mediators like increased exchange of information (Collins & Smith, 2006) or job satisfaction (Patterson, Warr, & West, 2004). Also, when analyzed empirically, scholars typically propose diversity climate to relate to positive employee attitudes and outcomes like organizational commitment or job satisfaction (e.g. Cox, 1994; Hicks-Clarke & Iles, 2000; Parks, Knouse, Crepeau, & McDonald, 2008).

While we fully agree with the assessment that the diversity climate-performance link cannot be fully understood without proposing and empirically testing meaningful mediators (McKay et al., 2009), we propose that one must not solely rely on models suggesting an intensification of positive states and behaviors, but to also test models suggesting a mitigation of potentially harmful attitudes and behavioral processes. Specifically, we propose diversity climate to negatively relate to perceived discrimination within work groups.

According to Gutek, Cohen, and Tsui (1996), "discrimination occurs when employment decisions such as selection, evaluation, promotion, or reward allocation are based on individual's immutable characteristics such as age, appearance, sex, or skin color rather than on productivity or qualifications" (p. 791). In contrast to diversity climate, which reflects a certain mindset or
attitude within groups or organizations, discrimination is a more behavior-oriented construct based on actual or perceived incidents against certain groups of individuals, which are considered to be unfair (Fiske, 1998). As both scholarly research and actual charges filed with the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have shown, discrimination is a multidimensional issue that comprises discriminatory behavior which might be based on various employee characteristics including race, gender, age, or disability status (EEOC, 2011). For employers, it therefore seems prudent to not focus on a single discrimination category (e.g., gender), but to take multiple forms of discrimination into consideration.

As described above, a strong diversity climate is usually associated with a distinct organizational mindset, fostering the social integration of employees from underrepresented groups (Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009; McKay et al., 2007; McKay et al., 2009). If shared within work groups, a pronounced diversity climate can function as a clear point of orientation and as a strong behavioral guideline for both employees and supervisors. As Bowen and Ostroff (2004) describe it for climates in general, "these can be viewed as a strong situation (Mischel, 1973, 1977), in which employees share a common interpretation of what is important and what behaviors are expected and rewarded" (p. 204).

Consequently, one can expect that group members and leaders who jointly perceive a pronounced diversity climate would also act in accordance to it. Because discriminatory behavior can be regarded as a clear violation of such a pro-diverse professional policy, it is expected that there be a negative effect of diversity climate on perceived discrimination within work groups. This assumption is in line with the theoretical work of Gelfand and colleagues (2005, p. 104) who suggested that entities "with positive climates for diversity are likely to exhibit lower levels of discrimination because of their heightened sensitivity and commitment to issues having to do with managing a diverse workforce". Furthermore, work groups with a strong diversity climate take reports of discrimination very seriously and take early corrective actions.

From an empirical point of view, research on the relationship between diversity climate and discrimination is comparably scarce. Triana and colleagues (2010) showed that perceived organizational diversity efforts attenuated the negative effects of perceived racial discrimination on affective commitment. While they did not investigate the main effect of a supportive diversity climate on discrimination, they still conclude from their study that "the more an organization shows a clear commitment to support diversity and endorses the idea that diversity is an opportunity and not a problem, the less likely it is to have problems resulting from perceived discrimination at work" (p. 841). Therefore, we propose the following:

H2: Diversity climate will be negatively related to work group discrimination.

**Effect of work group discrimination on group performance**

There is a well-developed stream of literature describing the negative effects of discrimination in the workplace. Among the negative outcomes of discrimination, there are reduced levels of job involvement, career and work satisfaction, commitment, and organizational citizenship behaviors (Ensher, Grant-Vallone, & Donaldson, 2001; Foley & Kidder, 2002; Hicks-Clarke & Iles, 2000; Sanchez & Brock, 1996), as well as increased levels of stress and strain, work conflict, and turnover intentions (Gee, 2002; Gutek et al, 1996; Shaffer, Joplin, Bell,
Lau, & Oguz, 2000). Regarding the effects of discrimination on performance, the literature is less explicit. However, from a theoretical point of view there are several arguments that suggest a negative effect of discrimination within groups on the performance outcomes of the respective work groups.

First, group members who perceive any kind of discrimination against them may emotionally (or physically) withdraw from the group and its goals (Mark & Folger, 1984), resulting in a drop in their individual performance that may, in turn, also affect the performance of the whole group. This assumption is in line with social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). Perceived discrimination within one's work group is likely to harm this "norm of reciprocity" (Gouldner, 1960), which, in turn, may negatively affect group members' motivation towards group goals and ultimately group performance.

Secondly, employees’ attitudes toward their employers and work groups are dependent on their perceptions of whether their own opportunities and treatment are equal to those of other group members (Gutek et al., 1996). If a certain group of employees believes that they have suffered from unfair, discriminatory treatment, then they are likely to develop a “sense of being under-valued by the organization and its members” (Snape & Redman, 2003; p. 80). Gutek and colleagues (1996) employed these processes to explain why whole groups of employees may emotionally withdraw when they feel that members of their own in-group (e.g., a gender group) are treated unfairly or in a discriminative way. Consequently, collective processes might emerge in work groups where whole clusters of employees (e.g., women, aging workers, or disabled employees) perceive certain forms of discrimination. This, in turn, could lead to a drop in their collective performance levels.

On the basis of these arguments, we suggest:

H3a: Work group discrimination will be negatively related to group performance.

Mediation effect of discrimination

In Hypothesis 1 we predict a positive influence of diversity climate on group performance. According to Hypothesis 2, diversity climate is expected to be negatively associated with work group discrimination. Finally, in Hypothesis 3a, we propose a negative influence of work group discrimination on group performance. Taken together, these three hypotheses indicate a direct as well as an indirect effect of diversity climate on group performance. Based on prior theoretical considerations in Cox's interactional model of cultural diversity (1994), we propose a mediation model. In contrast to prior theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Collins & Smith, 2006; Patterson et al., 2004), we do not rely on the mediating effects of positive employee attitudes but propose work group discrimination – a negative behavioral pattern – as a mediator in the diversity climate-performance link.

Based on the outlined rational, we suggest the following:

H3b: The relationship between diversity climate and group performance is mediated through work group discrimination.
METHODS

Sample

Data used to test the relationships were collected by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) from United States military personnel in the spring of 2008. A total of 8,707 military personnel from 248 separate work groups took part in the survey. We allocated each group an individual code to match respondents with groups. The average response rate was 50 percent which is in line with general findings concerning the response rate at the individual level (Baruch & Holtom, 2008). The survey consisted of an online version of the DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) developed by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (Dansby & Landis, 1991).

All analyses testing the proposed hypotheses were conducted at the group level. Following Klein, Conn, Smith, and Sorra (2001), we deleted groups with less than three members. This resulted in the exclusion of 35 groups. In addition, the two largest work groups containing 600 and 348 members were deleted as well due to outlier analyses. Thus, the final data set consisted of 7,689 employees from 211 work groups. On average, there were 36.44 employees per work group (SD = 44.63, median = 20.00).

The respondents’ demographics were 81.4 % male, and the majority of the respondents were between 22 and 40 years old (68.5 %). The sample comprised a wide variety of military branches (e.g., Air Force, Army, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Navy) and ethnicities (Hispanic, American Indian, Asian, African American, Caucasian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander).

To handle the potential problems arising from common method bias (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) we conducted a split sample design. Half of each group's respondents provided the rating for diversity climate and discrimination; the other half provided the group performance ratings. By doing so, we controlled for "(…) one of the major causes of common method variance (…) obtaining the measures of both predictor and criterion variables from the same rater or source (…)" (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 887). Avoiding this cause prevents the results from being biased by effects of consistency motifs, implicit theories, social desirability tendencies, dispositional and transient mood states, and any tendencies on the part of the rater to acquiesce or respond in a lenient manner (for a detailed description see Podsakoff et al., 2003).

Procedure

Typically, the DEOCS is administered annually at the request of a military unit commander and operates similarly to an annual employee survey. The DEOCS is administered and received by DEOMI personnel and is available in both paper-and-pencil and web-based versions. All personnel are provided with either a confidential unique online code to complete the survey online, or a paper copy of the survey and a response sheet. All responses to the survey are completely confidential, and although the DEOCS is deployed at the request of a military
unit commander, the commander does not receive specific details about individual respondents in terms of participation or outcomes on the survey.

**Measures**

Perceptions of diversity climate, work group discrimination, and group performance were measured with the DEOCS. The DEOCS evolved from the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (MEOCS; Dansby & Landis, 1991), and both surveys are suitable for military and civilian organizations of varying sizes. Tests of the internal consistency and factor structure of the DEOCS and its predecessor, the MEOCS, were previous conducted and showed sufficient results. For further details see Estrada, Stetz, and Harbke (2007), Landis, Fisher, and Dansby (1988), and Truhon (2003). Items for all constructs were measured with a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 "totally agree with the statement" to 5 "totally disagree with the statement." A summary of measures used in the current study is discussed below.

In total, the DEOCS contains 66 self-report items which are traditionally combined into 13 distinct scales, of which seven address equal employment opportunity and six address organizational effectiveness factors.

*Diversity climate* was assessed with a 7-item measure developed by Parks and colleagues (2008). The items closely overlap with items from Mor Barak and colleagues (1998), McKay and colleagues (2008), and Hopkins, Hopkins, and Mallette (2001). A sample item was, "Everyone in my work unit is treated fairly." Items were coded such that a high value indicated a positive diversity climate. A Cronbach’s alpha of .91 indicated a sufficient consistency of the scale.

*Discrimination* was measured with 10 items focusing on various forms of discrimination (disability, age, religion, gender, ethnicity). Each dimension was captured with two items. All items were developed by Dansby and Landis (1991). A sample item was, "A supervisor did not appoint a qualified worker with a disability to a new position, but instead appointed another less qualified worker." Items were coded such that higher values equal a higher level of discrimination. A Cronbach's alpha of .89 indicated a high internal consistency. In order to fully capture the various forms of discrimination (i.e., disability, age, religion, gender, ethnicity), we measured each separately; however we computed one overall discrimination score for the analyses in the current study.

*Group performance* was assessed with three items developed by Dansby and Landis (1991). A sample item was, "When high priority work arises, such as short deadlines, crash programs, and schedule changes, the people in my work group do an outstanding job in handling these situations". Items were reverse-coded so that a high value equals high work group performance. Cronbach's alpha of the scale was .91, indicating sufficient internal consistency.

Due to previous studies demonstrating that group size (e.g., Wegge, Roth, Neubach, Schmidt, & Kanfer, 2008) as well as actual diversity (e.g., van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007) may impact group performance we included both variables as controls. Work group size was assessed by information provided within the data set. Following past research examples, we averaged diversity information to create an overall demographic diversity measure (e.g., Nishii
To accomplish this, we first computed Blau's (1977) index of homogeneity for each facet. To ensure that every diversity score was given an equal weight, we followed the procedure by Schippers et al. (2003) and divided the score for each diversity category by the natural logarithm of the number of categories represented in the diversity characteristic.

Group Level Data Analysis

All hypotheses tests were conducted at the group level. Therefore, individual values were aggregated to the next higher level. The appropriateness of this procedure was tested using different aggregation statistics ($r_{wg}$, ICC(1), ICC(2)) (Bliese, 2000). The $r_{wg}$ evaluates if members' ratings within a group are interchangeable. The ICC(1) assesses the existence of group effects on the measure of interest, while the ICC(2) displays the reliability of group means (Bliese, 2000). Whereas there are no absolute standards for these indices, ICC(1) values based on significant $F$ statistics from a one way ANOVA, ICC(2) values above .50, and median $r_{wg}$ of more than .70 are usually considered as acceptable (Bliese, 2000; Kenny & La Voie, 1985; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).

For diversity climate all three statistics showed sufficient results (ICC(1) = .10; $F = 2.91$, $p<0.001$; ICC(2) = .66; median $r_{wg} = .68$). Only the $r_{wg}$ was slightly below the .70 cutoff value. Similar results were obtained for the discrimination scale with all three values justifying an aggregation to the group level (ICC(1) = .07; $F = 2.38$, $p<0.001$; ICC(2) = .58; median $r_{wg} = .80$). Finally, we also received sufficient aggregation statistics for the group performance measure (ICC(1) = .08; $F = 2.48$, $p<0.001$; ICC(2) = .58; median $r_{wg} = .71$).

Data Analysis

 Structural equation modeling (SEM) using maximum likelihood estimation was used to test the proposed mediation model. This was done because SEM has three important advantages, compared to classical regression analysis as proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) and refined by Frazier, Tix, and Barron (2004). First, SEM models can account for measurement errors, thus preventing results from being biased due to unreliability (Busemeyer & Jones, 1983). Second, instead of applying a hierarchical step-by-step regression procedure, the use of SEM allows for simultaneously testing of several relationships and thus reduces type II errors. Finally, SEM enables testing for the overall model fit and hence empowers us to do model comparisons to investigate the assumed mediation relationship (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988).

In order to not confound the meaning of the study variables by simultaneously estimating the measurement and structural model (Burt, 1976), we followed the recommendations for a two step approach by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). We first tested for the appropriateness of our measurement model. In a second step, we also considered the structural model including the proposed relationships according to our hypotheses. Thereby, we tested different models including the proposed mediation effect against the baseline model (Judge & Colquitt, 2004). To further investigate the mediation effect of discrimination, we directly assessed the significance of the indirect effect of diversity climate on performance via discrimination using bootstrap analysis (Cheung & Lau, 2008; James, Mulaik, & Brett, 2006). “The bootstrapping is accomplished by
taking a large number of samples of size \( n \) (where \( n \) is the original sample size) from the data, \textit{sampling with replacement}, and computing the indirect effect, \( ab \), in each sample" (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, p. 722; \( ab \) equals the paths which constitute the indirect effect). The major advantages of bootstrapping are that it makes no assumptions about the shape of the distribution of the variables or the sampling distribution of the statistic (Efron & Tibshirani, 1986, 1993), and allows computation of confidence intervals for the mediation effect.

**RESULTS**

**Descriptive statistics**

Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among the study variables. Cronbach’s alpha reliability values for the measures are in diagonal entries in parentheses. It can be seen that all constructs outside the control variables are significantly interrelated. All correlations are in the proposed directions. Diversity climate is negatively related to discrimination \( (r = -.57, p < .01) \) and positively correlated with group performance \( (r = .19, p < .01) \). Discrimination relates negatively to group performance \( (r = -.26, p < .01) \). Since the proposed mediation cannot be examined by correlation tables, we further used SEM to test our assumptions.

**Measurement model**

To examine the proposed hypotheses, we first established the measurement model. The model consisted of the three main latent study variables – diversity climate, discrimination, and group performance – with 20 indicators. The discrimination measure was modeled as a second order construct, with five discrimination sub-dimensions (each with two items) that together loaded on the overall discrimination construct.

Following propositions from an extensive simulation study by Beauducel and Wittmann (2005), we decided to refer to the comparative fit index (CFI), the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) as descriptive fit indices to assess the model fit. Based on propositions in the literature, we set the cut-off value for the CFI to .90 (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino 2006), for the RMSEA <.10 (Brown & Cudeck, 1993; Loehlin, 2004), and for the SRMR <.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Based on the defined criteria, the tested measurement model showed a sufficient overall model fit \( (\chi^2 = 405.6, \text{df} = 162; \text{CFI} = .917; \text{RMSEA} = .085; \text{SRMR} = .085) \).

In addition, since it could be argued that diversity climate and discrimination are strongly related, we tested for an alternative model. In this model, we formed one common factor instead of two distinct ones with all diversity climate and discrimination items, holding all other factors constant. The model fit decreased significantly \( (\chi^2 = 1280.7, \text{df} = 169; \text{CFI} = .623; \text{RMSEA} = .177; \text{SRMR} = .141) \). Therefore, we retained our specified model.
Structural model

After testing for the appropriateness of the measurement model, we examined the structural part of the specified model (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 1. We excluded the control variables from the figure for simplicity reasons. However, following the suggestions by Richardson and Vandenberg (2005), we regressed each dependent construct, namely diversity climate, discrimination, and group performance on the control variables. The only significant relationship was found between group size and discrimination ($\beta = .26, p < .01$).

We structured the reporting of the results according to the classical stepwise approach to mediation testing by Baron and Kenny (1986) and Frazier et al. (2004). First, we examined a model that only allowed a direct linkage between diversity climate and group performance (Step 1). The results confirmed this relationship ($\beta = .16, t = 2.14, p < .05$) and thus support Hypothesis 1. Therefore, in our sample, groups with a higher diversity climate level seem to perform better. However, the overall model fit suggests a non-sufficient model fit ($\chi^2 = 547.8, df = 202; CFI = .884; RMSEA = .090; SRMR = .194$) according to the defined criteria and thus led us to consider discrimination climate as a mediator in the model in a next step.

In a second step, we included the linkage between diversity climate and discrimination as well as between discrimination and performance in our model while constraining the direct effect of diversity climate on performance to zero to test for Hypotheses 2 and 3. The overall model fit increased significantly ($\Delta \chi^2 = -13.40; p < .001$) and showed sufficient fit values ($\chi^2 = 462.4, df = 199; CFI = .912; RMSEA = .079; SRMR = .083$). The estimates in the model also confirmed Hypothesis 2, which predicted a negative influence of diversity climate on discrimination ($\beta = -.51, t = -5.81, p < .001$). These results indicated that groups with a higher level of diversity climate showed lower levels of perceived discrimination.

Furthermore, we also found support for Hypothesis 3a which proposed a negative relationship between discrimination and performance ($\beta = -.36, t = -4.66, p < .001$). In our sample, work groups with higher levels of perceived discrimination seemed to perform less well.

Finally, according to Hypothesis 3b the relationship between diversity climate and group performance was expected to be mediated by discrimination. We tested for this relationship by applying bootstrap analysis (Cheung & Lau, 2008). For this purpose, we specified a third model that included direct relationships among all study variables. Diversity climate was linked with performance and discrimination, and discrimination was linked with performance. The model showed no significant fit improvement compared to model 2 ($\Delta \chi^2 = -.42; p > .05$; see table 2). Descriptive fit indices were ($\chi^2 = 461.9, df = 198; CFI = .912; RMSEA = .080; SRMR = .083$). However, the direct effect of diversity climate on performance was no longer significant, whereas the indirect effect stayed significant and increased in size ($\Delta \beta = .03$). In addition, we used bootstrap analysis to directly assess the significance of the indirect linkage of diversity climate on group performance via the mediation of perceived discrimination (Cheung & Lau, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Results showed a significant indirect effect from diversity climate on performance via discrimination, as illustrated in Table 3. Thus, Hypothesis 3b gained further support.


DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was to explore the link between diversity climate and group performance by shedding light on the role of work group discrimination – a so-far neglected mediator of this relationship.

In the first step, diversity climate at the work group level was tested for its direct effect on work group performance. In the second step, diversity climate was tested for a negative effect on discrimination within workgroups. In the third step, work group discrimination was examined for its potentially negative relation to group performance. Finally, in the fourth step, we investigated the mediating role of work group discrimination in the diversity climate-group performance link. All hypothesized relationships in our mediation model were found to be significant, including the full mediation of the diversity climate-group performance link via work group discrimination. We believe that these results contribute to the literature by substantiating and extending prior findings in several ways.

First, our research contributes to the empirical investigation of the effects of diversity climate, a study direction which seems promising, but is not yet very well developed (Pugh et al., 2008; McKay et al., 2009; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). While many studies have focused on the antecedents of diversity climate, we investigated its outcomes. More specifically, we were interested in its collective performance effects. By showing that diversity climate at the group level of analysis relates to performance, we contributed to the ongoing discussion on the business case for diversity climate (Avery & McKay, 2010).

Secondly, our study extends work by McKay and colleagues (2009, p. 786) who urged scholars to develop and test models which include "intervening climate-related behaviors [in order] to explicate how diversity climate, measured at the aggregate level, relates to group and organizational level work outcomes" (Avery and McKay, 2010, p. 242). Following these calls and building upon the theoretical work of Cox (1994), we proposed and empirically tested work group discrimination as an important behavioral process that may better explain how diversity climate perceptions actually translate into performance. From a theoretical point of view, the finding of the mediating role of discrimination is important as researchers have consistently proposed positive mediators in the diversity climate-performance link, thereby neglecting the mitigation of potentially harmful attitudes and behaviors such as discrimination. This circumstance has also been emphasized by Smith and colleagues (2010) as well as Triana and colleagues (2010) who bemoan that research has largely ignored the relationship between diversity management and discrimination. With our study, we hope that we have made one step toward a better integration of these important workplace issues. From a practical point of view, this finding is just as relevant, since discrimination charges and related discrimination lawsuits "now rank among the leading types of crises faced by business leaders in the United States" (James & Wooten, 2006, p. 1103).

There are several important implications of our research for company managers. On the one hand, our study results are in line with and extend prior empirical work suggesting a clear "business case" for diversity climate (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). In fact, our results indicate
that group perceptions of diversity climate positively relate to group performance. Thus, for both company and HR managers, the active fostering of a pro-diverse work climate should be a clear business objective. On the other hand, our study highlights the role of discrimination in the diversity climate-group performance link. For managers, this finding is important as it sheds additional light on the question of how to prevent discrimination within work settings. For companies, perceptions of discrimination continue to be both practically relevant and dangerous, as they often lead to costly lawsuits, spoiled public images, and severe drops in personnel morale (Hicks-Claire & Iles, 2000; James & Wooten, 2006; Pruitt & Nethercutt, 2002; Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Case in point, in 2010 there were 99,922 discrimination charges filed with the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC, 2011). Again, the active fostering of a strong and shared diversity climate can be recommended as a key preventive measure.

What is the best way of achieving this in practice? Research suggests that companies should introduce and continuously apply fair and transparent HR policies, practices, and procedures with regard to all relevant activities including recruiting, career development, remuneration, or dismissal (McKay & Avery, 2005). Especially for organizations with highly diverse personnel (e.g., different races, disabled or older workers), it seems decisive that employees hold positive diversity beliefs and trust the organization's overall efforts to support and value diversity (Homan, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007). Effective group and organizational level HR-practices should help to prevent negative effects of diversity (Chi, Huang, & Lin, 2009). Second, the diversity perceptions of employees should be carefully monitored. To achieve this, organizations and managers can use assessment tools such as employee opinion surveys, focus groups, exit interviews, and analyses of patterns of employees’ grievances (Ensher et al., 2001). Third, companies should think about the organization-wide implementations of specially designed diversity workshops and training events, educating both leaders and employees about the positive effects of a pro-diverse attitude and work behavior (McKay & Avery, 2005; Roberson, Kulik, & Pepper, 2009). A clear commitment to diversity from top management might further improve the credibility of such programs and training events.

In sum, companies that succeed in creating a positive diversity climate have the potential to improve simultaneously group and organizational performance, while avoiding negative outcomes such as discrimination and related costs.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Although our paper has numerous methodological strengths, such as independent data sources and a large sample size, several limitations should be considered when interpreting the study's findings.

First, due to the cross-sectional design of our data, no final conclusion about causality can be drawn. This is especially relevant for Hypothesis 1 for which a reversed direction of influence is also imaginable. Even though we believe that we have provided convincing theoretical arguments for the described direction in Hypothesis 1, future studies should aim at replicating our results, applying longitudinal methods in experimental or quasi-experimental research designs (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Such proceedings through which participants are
randomly or post-hoc assigned to treatments, and/or independent and outcome variables are separated over time, should allow future studies to establish a causal linkage for the observed relationships in our analyses.

Second, although we were able to analyze a large-scale data set, the generalizability of our findings is limited, due to the specific properties of our sample. Specifically, our participants came solely from one cultural sphere: the Anglo-Saxon cultural cluster (Hofstede, 2001). However, results by Chiu, Chan, Snape, and Redman (2001) indicate some evidence for varying discriminatory attitudes in different cultural backgrounds. Thus, future studies should aim at replicating our findings in different cultural settings, possibly with samples from Europe and Asia. Furthermore, our sample consisted exclusively of military employees. Therefore, the special hierarchal system and organizational culture of military entities might have influenced the study's findings. Consequently, in future studies, scholars should also try to replicate our results with civilian samples to increase the results’ validity. However, there is evidence demonstrating no differences between civilian and military contexts (Dvir, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002; Shamir, Zakay, Breinin & Poper, 1998), therefore we do not feel that this is a substantial threat to the validity of our study.

Third, we applied a group performance measure that is based on the aggregated perception of group members. Other sources of performance ratings may be desirable for future studies, such as group supervisors or objective information such as the number of tasks accomplished per group. Doing so would provide even more reliable and robust results for the diversity climate-performance relationship.

Beyond these limitations, our study results offer several interesting pathways for further research. First, future studies might conceptually and empirically integrate our results in multilevel models (e.g., Hox, 2002). For example, it may be interesting to consider group diversity climate as a cross-level moderator for individual relationships, such as the perceived discrimination-individual performance relationship (e.g., Goldman et al., 2006). Furthermore, our model might also be extended by integrating individual outcome variables influenced by group diversity climate and discrimination, such as individual turnover intention (Tett & Meyer, 1993) or job satisfaction (Wanous, Reichers, Hudy, 1997).

Second, future studies should examine potential boundary conditions that can help to prevent discrimination and translate diversity climate into group performance. An interesting factor in this regard might be transformational leadership climate which has been proven to be beneficial in diverse team settings (Kearney & Gebert, 2009; Kunze & Bruch, 2010; Shin, & Zhou, 2007). A transformational leader who aligns group members to a shared vision and common goals should be a positive factor for the dispersion of a diversity climate throughout the group, leading to positive effects on group performance via the mediation of decreased discrimination. Other interesting moderators are group cohesion (Knouse & Dansby, 1999) or group identification (Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). We expect both to be positive boundary conditions for the diversity climate-group performance association, since groups who are either closely connected or have a strong sense of a common identity should have better capabilities to transfer higher diversity climate, thus influencing decreased levels of discrimination and ultimately better group performance.
In sum, we hope that our study’s findings make a valuable contribution to the diversity and discrimination literature and provide a solid base on which many future studies targeting this theoretical and practical relevant issue may emerge.
References


Appendix

Table 1

*Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among the Variables used in this study*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Actual diversity</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Group size</td>
<td>36.44</td>
<td>44.63</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Diversity climate</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Discrimination</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>-.57**</td>
<td>(.89)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Group performance</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All correlations were tested two-tailed. The diagonal entries in parentheses reflect Cronbach's alpha internal consistency reliability estimates. **p<.01

*Figure 1. Diagram of paths in the proposed mediation model.  *p < .05; **p < .01 Controls were deleted from the figure for simplicity reasons.*
Table 2

*Model Comparison*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Model</th>
<th>$\chi^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1: direct effect model</td>
<td>547.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.884</td>
<td>.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 2: indirect effect model</td>
<td>462.42</td>
<td>-85.80*</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 3: mediation model</td>
<td>461.99</td>
<td>-.42</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.912</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation, CFI = comparative fit index; SRMR = standardized root-mean-square residual. All models are compared to the baseline model 1. *= $p<.05$. 


Table 3

*Mediation Analysis via Bootstrapping*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect Effect</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>95% Confidence Intervals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversity climate $\rightarrow$ <em>Discrimination</em></td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rightarrow$ Performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Standardized estimates are shown. 1,000 bootstrap samples were used. Two-tailed significance. Confidence intervals are bias-corrected.
Applicant Recruitment Perceptions & Voluntary Attrition by Race/Ethnicity

Taylor Poling and Katherine Helland

Abstract

The military Services have placed a priority on ensuring they recruit and retain a force that is both qualified and racially/ethnically diverse. However, while propensity to join the Military is higher for Black and Hispanic youth than it is for White youth, research has shown that propensed Black and Hispanic youth join at lower rates than propensed White youth (Ford, Griepentrog, Helland, & Marsh, 2009). Although some of the conversion issues may be related to eligibility concerns, it is also possible that experiences during the application and recruitment process may deflate racial/ethnic minority youth’s propensity to join the Military. Decades of research on career choice have shown that applicant perceptions of fairness about an organization and their satisfaction with recruiting experiences are key drivers of important organizational outcomes. These outcomes include intentions to pursue employment, job choice, early attrition, commitment to the organization, and job satisfaction (Aryee, Budwhar, & Chen, 2002). Studying these perceptions among military applicants can provide insights on recruits’ experiences with the Military recruitment and application process in order to improve the process, inform outreach and recruitment strategies, and ultimately improve the effectiveness of military recruiting. Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on the role race/ethnicity plays in these perceptions. A key part of becoming more efficient at attracting racially/ethnically diverse talent to the Military involves becoming knowledgeable about potential group differences in recruiting experiences and improving aspects as needed from an evidence based perspective.

In an effort to help the U.S. Military’s interest in effectively recruiting a qualified and racially/ethnically diverse force, the Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) program launched the In-Depth Applicant Study. The purpose of this study was to aid recruiting and outreach strategies by providing the Services with an In-Depth understanding of the factors that drive the enlistment decision across racial/ethnic minority subgroups. Our full applicant study covered an extensive variety of experiences and perceptions of the recruitment and application process that may differ by race/ethnicity. Here we focus on four key topics of interest among White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic applicants: perceptions of general and specific discrimination in the Military, satisfaction with initial recruiting experiences through the lens of procedural and interactional fairness, the impact of recruiter race/ethnicity on satisfaction, and the impact of recruiting experiences satisfaction on voluntary withdrawal among a growing group of military applicants - those who remain in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) or application process for an extended period of time (i.e., more than four months).

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.

10 JAMRS is a program within the Department of Defense (DoD). One core function is to perform market research and studies that enable DoD leadership and the Services to make informed, research-based recruiting decisions and eliminate redundancies across the recruiting communities. DoD personnel can sign up for access to all of JAMRS market research related data, communications, and recruitment tools at www.dmren.org.
Method

In order to better understand enlistment decisions across racial/ethnic minority subgroups, the JAMRS In-Depth Applicant Survey was developed and administered to military service applicants. Applicants were defined as individuals who applied for enlistment in the Military (i.e., submitted a USMEPCOM Form 680-3A-E). This included applicants to all branches, covering the Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard Components. To be eligible for the survey, the applicant had to be at least 18 years old at the time of application, could not have previously served in the Military, and must have identified the Service to which he or she was applying. Since some individuals submit an application form but do not complete any other action toward applying, only individuals who had completed another action toward enlistment (e.g., taken the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) or had a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) physical) within two weeks of their application date were eligible for the survey. A stratified sample of 56,097 applicants was drawn from the sampling frame provided by USMEPCOM. Black, Hispanic, and Asian applicants were oversampled to achieve the goals of this study.

The survey consisted of two phases, first surveying respondents at the time of their application (Phase 1) and then following up with Phase 1 respondents who had not yet joined and had not yet shipped to boot camp as of four months later (Phase 2). Data regarding Phase 1 responders who had joined the Military and shipped to boot camp (and thus were not eligible for Phase 2) was based on accession records provided by USMEPCOM. One year later, USMEPCOM also provided updated accession data on all applicants in both the Phase 1 and Phase 2 sample so that we could calculate joiner and non-joiner rates. The final unweighted sample size included 15,362 applicants in Phase 1 and 4,029 applicants in Phase 2. Table 1 provides sample sizes by race/ethnicity for Phases 1 and 2. The data were weighted to be representative of the military applicant population (applying between September 2009 and May 2010). Weighting procedures included post-stratification based on population estimates provided by USMEPCOM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White only, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>5,627</td>
<td>1,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black only, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>3,480</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian only, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>1,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other race or multi-race, non-Hispanic</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,362</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,029</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Applicant Perceptions of Discrimination by Race/Ethnicity

Perceptions of General Discrimination in the Military vs. Society

Perceptions of organizational discrimination have proven to be an important distal predictor of employee attraction, commitment, job satisfaction, and work tension especially among racial/ethnic minorities (Sanchez & Brock, 1996). As a result, the first set of perceptions we describe among racial/ethnic minority military applicants focuses on perceptions of discrimination in the Military. Our findings demonstrate that first and foremost, military applicants perceive very little general discrimination in the Military (see Table 2). Compared to their own ratings of general discrimination in society, 95% or more of applicants report that discrimination is less prevalent in the Military or at most equal to the extent of discrimination they perceive in society. The majority of Black and Hispanic applicants see less discrimination in the Military than society while White and Asian applicants are more equally split between reporting discrimination is equal in the Military and society or lower in the Military than society. (See Table 2 & Figure 1). For the most part, this is a good news story showing that general perceptions of discrimination in the Military are low. However, racial/ethnic differences are present and worth noting. In almost all cases, non-majority racial/ethnic group applicants perceive more discrimination relative to White applicants. This is particularly true for Black applicants who consistently perceive the most discrimination in the Military and society compared to other groups. This finding demonstrates that potential discrimination continues to be a very relevant issue for traditionally minority group applicants. The Department of Defense and each of the Services’ Recruiting Commands must be diligent in investigating factors that may signal discrimination and be equipped to address the topic and any concerns that Black applicants in particular may hold. Our next set of findings sheds some light on these factors by delving into some specific forms of discrimination in the Military.

Table 2. Perceived Discrimination in the Military by Race/Ethnicity

| Perceived Discrimination in Applicants’ Military Branch of Choice Against Following Groups: |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                                 | Whites                          | Black                          | Asian                          | Hispanic                        | Arab                           |
|                                 | M (SE)                          | M (SE)                         | M (SE)                         | M (SE)                          | M (SE)                         |
| Respondent Race:               |                                 |                                |                                |                                |                                |
| White                          | 1.42 (.01)                      | 1.57 (.01)                     | 1.57 (.01)                     | 1.60 (.01)                      | 2.15 (.02)                     |
| Black                          | *1.52 (.01)                     | *2.00 (.02)                    | *1.88 (.02)                    | *1.96 (.02)                     | *2.39 (.02)                    |
| Asian                          | *1.48 (.02)                     | *1.80 (.03)                    | *1.86 (.03)                    | *1.84 (.03)                     | *2.25 (.03)                    |
| Hispanic                       | *1.36 (.01)                     | *1.73 (.01)                    | *1.67 (.01)                    | *1.76 (.02)                     | 2.17 (.02)                     |
| Other                          | 1.40 (.04)                      | *1.73 (.06)                    | *1.68 (.05)                    | *1.76 (.06)                     | 2.19 (.07)                     |
Note. Mean ratings come from a 4 point scale where 1 means ‘none’ and 4 means ‘a great deal’.
* = Significantly different than White group mean rating.

Table 3. Perceived Discrimination in American Society by Race/Ethnicity

Applicants’ Perceived Discrimination in American Society Against Following Groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent Race:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2.11 (.01)</td>
<td>2.68 (.01)</td>
<td>2.40 (.01)</td>
<td>2.75 (.01)</td>
<td>3.27 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>*2.00 (.02)</td>
<td>*3.06 (.02)</td>
<td>*2.51 (.02)</td>
<td>*2.94 (.02)</td>
<td>3.26 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>*1.84 (.03)</td>
<td>2.66 (.03)</td>
<td>*2.51 (.03)</td>
<td>*2.68 (.03)</td>
<td>*3.02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>*1.83 (.01)</td>
<td>*2.79 (.01)</td>
<td>2.39 (.01)</td>
<td>*2.84 (.01)</td>
<td>*3.21 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>*1.98 (.05)</td>
<td>*2.80 (.06)</td>
<td>2.41 (.05)</td>
<td>2.78 (.05)</td>
<td>3.24 (.06)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Mean ratings come from a 4 point scale where 1 means ‘none’ and 4 means ‘a great deal’.
* = Significantly different than White group mean rating.

Figure 1. Perceived Discrimination: Military vs. Society

Perceived discrimination against own group

Note. Blue arrows = significantly higher than White estimate; grey arrows = significantly higher than Asian estimate; orange arrows = significantly higher than Hispanic estimate; red arrows indicate significantly higher than Black estimate. Significance marked at the p < .01 level.
Perceptions of Specific Acts of Discrimination in the Military

Next, we examine perceptions in specific job related decisions by race/ethnicity. Specifically, we examine applicant beliefs regarding their likelihood of: being promoted, getting a good paying job, being injured in combat, and being assigned to the frontlines in the Military compared to other racial ethnic group members. Interestingly, White applicants were least likely to believe that people of their own racial/ethnic group would be promoted or get a good paying job compared to other racial/ethnic groups. However, racial/ethnic minority applicants more often believed members of their racial/ethnic group would be assigned to the frontlines than other groups. These findings are displayed in Figure 2. Although applicants’ perceptions of a general discrimination in the Military are low, clearly concerns of discriminatory practices are prevalent in the applicant population across all racial/ethnic groups. Specifically, 22% of Black and Hispanic applicants believed they were ‘more likely’ or ‘much more likely’ to be assigned to the frontlines than other racial/ethnic group members. In comparison 9% of White applicants and 13% of Asian applicants expressed this belief.

**Figure 2. Specific Forms of Discrimination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% More Likely / Much More Likely</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Get a good paying job?</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be promoted?</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get injured in Combat?</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be assigned to the frontlines?</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Blue arrows = significantly higher than White estimate; grey arrows = significantly higher than Asian estimate; orange arrows = significantly higher than Hispanic estimate; red arrows indicate significantly higher than Black estimate. Significance marked at the p < .01 level.

Applicant Satisfaction with Recruiting Experiences

While perceptions of discrimination are more distal factors that affect organizational attraction, satisfaction with recruiting experiences represents a more proximal and actionable factor in the conversion and commitment of military applicants. Meta-analytic results on organization attraction and job choice have demonstrated that attitudes toward the recruiting process and recruiter behaviors reliably predict a variety of key organizational outcomes including job pursuit intentions, job choice, and commitment (Chapman et al., 2005). Therefore, we also describe our findings regarding satisfaction with recruiting experiences across core racial/ethnic groups. We examined satisfaction with recruiting experiences in terms of two key
organizational fairness constructs: procedural justice and interactional justice (Colquitt, 2001). Our measure of recruitment procedural satisfaction encompassed whether applicants found the application process fair, timely, and felt they had the opportunity to express their views about the process. Our measure of recruiter interaction satisfaction encompassed applicant perceptions of their recruiter’s honesty, respectfulness, communication, and willingness to help. Table 4 displays procedural and interaction satisfaction mean scores by race/ethnicity. Although all applicants were generally satisfied with the application and recruitment process, Black, Asian, and Hispanic applicants were all less satisfied with the application and recruitment procedures they experienced compared to White applicants. Further item level analyses revealed that minority applicants were less satisfied with the general fairness of procedures and less satisfied with their opportunity to express their views. Across racial/ethnic groups, the vast majority of applicants expressed satisfaction with how their recruiter treated them. Nonetheless, Black and Asian applicants had relatively lower levels of satisfaction with their recruiter interactions compared to White applicants. Item level analyses reveal that ratings of willingness to help, timeliness, and honesty of the recruiter were typically lowest among Black and Asian applicants.

Table 4: Applicants’ Satisfaction with Recruiting Procedures and Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Satisfaction</th>
<th>Interactional Satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>4.16 (.01)</td>
<td>4.57 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>*4.07 (.01)</td>
<td>*4.52 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>*4.01 (.01)</td>
<td>*4.44 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>*4.12 (.01)</td>
<td>4.57 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.09 (.05)</td>
<td>4.59 (.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Mean ratings come from a 5 point scale. * = Significantly different than White group mean rating.*

Impact of Applicant-Recruiter Race/Ethnicity Match

Extensive research asserts that recruiters play a key role in attracting job applicants by conveying information about organizational characteristics (Larsen & Phillips, 2002; Powell, 1991; Turban, Forret, & Hendrickson, 1998). In practice, many diversity recruitment strategies have assumed that matching recruiter/applicant demographics results in enhanced organizational attraction and job choice among racial/ethnic minorities (Taylor & Collins, 2000), yet meta-analytic results show that recruiter demographics have no reliable impact on applicants’ attraction to an organization (Ployhart, 2006). In order to explore this issue in the Military recruiting context, we examined if applicants’ satisfaction with their recruiter interactions differed depending on if they perceived their recruiter to be of the same race/ethnicity as themselves. Table 5 displays these results. Among racial/ethnic minorities, having a recruiter of
the same race/ethnicity did not increase how satisfied these applicants were with their recruiter. In fact, we were surprised to find Hispanic applicants reported slightly higher levels of satisfaction when their recruiter was not Hispanic compared to Hispanic applicants who had a Hispanic recruiter. In addition, we found a difference in satisfaction scores among White applicants such that White applicants reported greater satisfaction with White recruiters than recruiters of other race/ethnicities. Thus, recruiter-applicant match only appeared to make a difference for White applicants. Our current study does not provide the insight necessary to explain why these differences exists, but should be explored in future theoretical and empirical work.

**Table 5. Satisfaction and Recruiter-Applicant Race/Ethnicity Match**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruiter – Applicant Race/Ethnicity Match</th>
<th>Recruiter-Applicant Race/Ethnicity No Match</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M (SE)</td>
<td>M (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>*4.60 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4.53 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4.51 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>*4.55 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.44 (.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Mean ratings come from a 5 point scale. * = Significantly different than the no recruiter-applicant race/ethnicity match mean.

During the recruitment phase, applicants rely on their recruiter as their primary signal of information concerning organizational climate, perceived fit, guidance, and general expectations (Rynes et al., 1991; Taylor & Bergmann, 1987). Satisfaction with a recruiter depends on how helpful, honest, and timely the information is provided by the recruiter. Thus, the more frequently applicants interact with their recruiter, the more likely they are to report higher levels of satisfaction since they are afforded more opportunities to gather information and discuss concerns. Moreover, applicants are likely more apt to discontinue interacting with the recruiter if they are dissatisfied with the recruiter. Using our data we evaluated this assumption and indeed found that across all racial/ethnic groups, recruiter interaction frequency predicts ratings of recruiter interaction satisfaction (see Table 6). Since recruiter contact is a predictor of satisfaction, we examined if the frequency of applicant interactions with their recruiter differed by applicant race/ethnicity.
### Table 6. Recruiter Contact Frequency as a Predictor of Recruiter Interaction Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>14.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>15.21</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All beta coefficients are significant at the p < .01 level.

Overall, new applicants (i.e., Phase 1 applicants) report multiple interactions with their recruiter during the previous month with over 85% of each racial/ethnic group reporting they had two or more interactions with their recruiter in the last month. Unfortunately, our data also reveal that racial/ethnic differences exist in terms of the quantity of multiple interactions (See Figure 3). Significantly more White applicants report having interacted with their recruiter more than four times in the last month than racial/ethnic minority applicants. This finding is concerning as interaction frequency predicts satisfaction across all racial/ethnic groups. We do not know whether the differences in interaction frequency is due to differences in the frequency in which recruiters are reaching out to applicants or the extent to which applicants are proactively reaching out to their recruiter. Nonetheless, given the finding it is important for recruiters to understand that they need to be more proactive in frequently reaching out to minority applicants to discuss their application status, expectations and concerns, and encourage questions.

**Figure 3. Recruiter Interaction Frequency**

**Within the past month, how many times have you interacted with your military recruiter from this branch (e.g., in person, phone, email, instant message, text message)?**

*Note. Blue arrows = significantly higher than White estimate; grey arrows = significantly higher than Asian estimate; orange arrows = significantly higher than Hispanic estimate; red arrows indicate significantly higher than Black estimate. Significance marked at the p < .01 level.*
Voluntary Withdrawal among Long-Term Applicants

Satisfaction with recruiting experiences is a critical benchmark and barometer for assessing the effectiveness of recruiting processes across racial/ethnic groups. One area we are particularly interested in concerns the relationship between recruiting experiences that last beyond the initial recruitment stage that leads an individual to submit an application, and voluntary withdrawal among applicants who remain in the application process or Delayed Entry Program (DEP) for an extended period of time. Here, we refer to military applicants who have not shipped to boot camp four months after their application as ‘long-term applicants’.

In recent years, as the Services’ have met mission quickly and filled their DEPs, this segment of the applicant pool has become more common. Furthermore, the Services have documented significant increases in DEP attrition over the last decade (e.g., 16% in 1999 to 25% in 2004 for the Navy) and have noted the likelihood that many of these losses are not ‘good’ nor ‘wanted’ attrition and may have otherwise been successful accessions for the Military (Lane, 2006). Long-term applicants continue to experience the recruiting process for many months beyond the initial interactions with recruiters and procedures that lead to their application. However, little is known about these long-term applicants’ attitudes about these extended recruiting experiences. In the final section of this paper, we describe findings regarding recruiting experiences from Phase 2 of the JAMRS In-Depth Applicant Study which provides results from the follow-up survey of applicants who had not shipped to boot camp four months after responding to our first survey. Specifically, we re-evaluate satisfaction with recruiters and recruiting procedures by race/ethnicity and examine the extent to which these two fairness based attitudes affects voluntary withdrawal among long-term applicants within different racial/ethnic groups.

First, Table 7 provides a summary of the final status of our phase two applicants (i.e., non-quick shippers) categorized as joiners (i.e., those who did eventually join), ineligibles (those who were declared ineligible), and self-report withdraw (i.e., those who reported they had withdrawn). Voluntary withdrawal among long-term applicants was about 9% across racial/ethnic groups. It is important to note that about 27% of our Phase 2 respondents (1106 out of 4029) had missing data for this variable since they could not be classified into one of these categories due to lack of information. They did not have a record of joining within one year from MEPCOM, but also did not self-report voluntary withdrawal or ineligibility on the Phase 2 survey (i.e., at 4 months after applying). As a result, our estimate of voluntary withdrawal is likely to be an underestimate. Nonetheless, these findings show that voluntary withdrawal rates among long-term applicants do not appear to differ across racial/ethnic groups.
Table 7. Final Status of Long Term Applicants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ineligible % (SE)</th>
<th>Voluntary Withdrawal % (SE)</th>
<th>Joiners % (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>9% (.01)</td>
<td>9% (.01)</td>
<td>82% (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>*16% (.02)</td>
<td>9% (.01)</td>
<td>*75% (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>*15% (.03)</td>
<td>11% (.03)</td>
<td>*73% (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>12% (.01)</td>
<td>8% (.01)</td>
<td>80% (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11% (.05)</td>
<td>4% (.03)</td>
<td>85% (.05)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * = Significantly different than White group mean rating.

Next, Table 8 displays process and interaction satisfaction ratings by race/ethnicity among long-term applicants. Unlike our Phase 1 results, no racial/ethnic differences are evident in ratings of recruiting procedures and recruiter interactions. However, both procedural and interactional satisfaction ratings were lower among applicants at Phase 2 (i.e., those who had remained in the process long-term) than at Phase 1 (i.e., those who had recently submitted an application).

Table 8: Applicants’ Satisfaction with Recruiting Procedures and Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Satisfaction M (SE)</th>
<th>Interactional Satisfaction M (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>3.89 (.02)</td>
<td>4.37 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3.86 (.03)</td>
<td>4.36 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3.89 (.04)</td>
<td>4.33 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>3.89 (.03)</td>
<td>4.38 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.92 (.07)</td>
<td>4.39 (.07)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Ratings based on a 5 point scale. No significant differences in mean ratings were found.

Finally, we present results in Table 9 that shows the extent to which satisfaction with procedural and recruiter satisfaction predict voluntary withdrawal among long-term applicants in different racial/ethnic groups. For White, Black, and Hispanic applicants, these constructs do
predict voluntary withdrawal but the relative predictive impact of these two attitudes were
different for White applicants than our racial/ethnic minority applicants. Among White
applicants, satisfaction with the procedures of the recruiting process predicts withdrawal but
satisfaction with their recruiter interactions does not. Increasing procedural satisfaction among
White applicants by one point improves the odds the applicant will join versus withdrawal by
76%, but an increase in interactional satisfaction alone does not reliably improve the likelihood a
White applicant will ultimately join versus withdrawal. For minority applicants, the opposite is
generally the case. Increasing satisfaction with recruiter interactions by one point significantly
improves the likelihood a Black or Hispanic applicant will eventually join rather than withdrawal
by 73% and 139% respectively, but increasing procedural satisfaction has no reliable impact. A
similar trend is evident among our Asian applicants and those classified on our ‘other’
racial/ethnic groups, but the estimated impact of interactional satisfaction for these two groups
was associated with too much error to be considered a reliable predictor.

Table 9. Logistic Regression Model of the Impact of Satisfaction on Voluntary Withdrawal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Procedural Satisfaction</th>
<th>Interaction Satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>*1.76</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.51 (ns)</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.59 (ns)</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.82 (ns)</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>.90 (ns)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * = Odds ratio estimate is significant of p < .05; ns = not significant

Discussion

The findings in this paper highlight several key take away points that can be used to
enhance military recruiting strategies geared to improve the racial/ethnic diversity of military
applicants and accessions. First, recruiting communities within the Military must recognize that
concerns regarding discrimination in specific employment and job related decisions exist even
among those who have decided to pursue the Military as an employer. Whether or not the
perception is true, racial/ethnic minorities continue to believe that the Military assigns minority
group members to dangerous roles disproportionately. Minority applicants have gotten the
message that the Military offers pay and promotional opportunities for racial/ethnic minorities
that may be better than many civilian opportunities; nonetheless, stereotypes regarding higher
injury and combat assignments for racial/ethnic minorities persist. The Services must make
concerted efforts in their general outreach and public affairs campaigns to counter the misinformation that may be causing these negative assumptions to persist.

Unfortunately, discrimination concerns are not always isolated among racial/ethnic minorities. Our findings indicate that White applicants may be perceiving inequity in pay and promotional decisions since they less often report they are ‘more likely’ to be promoted or get a good paying job compared to other groups. These findings could be interpreted as evidence that ‘reverse discrimination’ perceptions may exist among White applicants. For instance, it may be that efforts to increase pay and promotional opportunities among minorities are having an adverse effect on White applicants, who less often report the same high levels of confidence regarding pay and promotion that racial/ethnic minority applicants express. However, it also may be that White applicants simply see their promotional and pay related decisions as completely equitable to other racial/ethnic groups and thus infrequently report they are ‘more likely’ to be promoted or get a good paying job than other racial/ethnic groups. Regardless of which explanation is more accurate, efforts to improve the diversity of the All-Volunteer force should always be coupled with a consistent message that promotion and pay decisions are first and foremost based on unbiased performance standards.

As previously mentioned, recruiters play an extremely critical role in the DEP process as they are the conduit of information linking the applicant to the Military. For applicants, interactions with their recruiter and the recruiting process establish expectations of what to expect from their new employer (i.e., the Military) and can facilitate the motivation to be part of the organization or the motivation to disengage with the organization. In general, applicants were satisfied with the recruiting process and interactions with their recruiters. However, the results showed for all racial/ethnic groups that satisfaction with the process and their recruiter decreased from Phase 1 to Phase 2 suggesting that frustration by their time spent in DEP colored their perceptions of the recruiting process and recruiters. As the average time spent in DEP continue to be long, it is critical that recruiters stay in contact and develop strategies to mitigate frustration. For instance, it is crucial that recruiters continue to reach out to applicants during their DEP time. Recruiters need to be as open and honest as possible about the enlistment process and time in DEP up front so applicants have a realistic expectation about when they will enlist. Moreover, the results of this study showed that in understanding withdrawal behavior for White applicants, attending to satisfaction with the recruiting process is key, but for minority applicants attending to satisfaction with recruiter interactions is key. Thus, for White applicants it is important that the recruiter focus on ensuring that the process is fair and timely. Conversely, for minority applicants it is not the process that matters as much as the recruiter interactions. Therefore, recruiters should initiate multiple interactions with minority applicants that are honest, respectful and demonstrate a willingness to help.

Another interesting finding from this study is the lack of support for the benefits of applicant-recruiter race/ethnicity match. A common practice within organizations is to match recruiters with applicants (on a particular characteristic like race/ethnicity, gender, alma mater) under the assumption that applicants will perceive that people similar to them work for and succeed in the organization and thus, make the organization more attractive to the applicant. The results of this study failed to demonstrate that applicants with a recruiter of the same race/ethnicity were more satisfied with their recruiter and the recruiting process than applicants
with a recruiter of a different race/ethnicity. Given that applicants perceive the Military as less discriminatory than society as a whole, it is possible that minority applicants already perceive the Military as an attractive organization because all people can succeed; thus, little is to be gained from recruiter-applicant match in this respect.

Overall, these findings highlight several overarching practical implications specific to military recruiting. Applicants may carry assumptions about discriminatory hiring and placement practices in the Military. Recruiters must be willing and prepared to discuss these perceptions, where the beliefs came from, and provide detailed information that combats any stereotypes about being assigned to the front lines and clearly spell out promotion and pay decision standards and procedures. Among racial/ethnic minority applicants, proactive contact many times a month should be emphasized. Take these opportunities to reiterate specific next steps in the joining process, offer help where feasible, and convey information as honestly as possible. Regardless of race/ethnicity, when applicants stay in the application phase and DEP for extended periods of time, it is critical to keep interactions frequent and informative. Furthermore, worry less about matching recruiter-applicant race/ethnicity and more about selection or training strategies that improve recruiter competence and interpersonal skills. Finally, our results highlight that many core practical recommendations culled from existing research on general organizational recruitment apply. Specifically, Ployhart (2006) suggests that recruitment efforts are most effective when an organization focuses on the following:

- Emphasize fit information
- Provide details about the job and organization
- Select and train recruiters
- Treat applicants with fairness and respect
- Use job-related procedures and explains the purpose of the selection process
- Articulate the right employer brand image
- Create a unified, consistent, and coherent recruiting campaign
References


Framework for Cross-Cultural Competence and Learning Recommendations

Carol Paris

Abstract

Post 9/11 military operations have highlighted a need within the U.S. military to increase organic capabilities for foreign language, regional expertise, and cultural readiness. Driving the U.S. cultural transformation, the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap established four major goals, one of which was to “Create foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve Components.” In support of this goal, the Defense Language Office (DLO) funded research to identify core cross-cultural competencies and associated learning recommendations for the general purpose forces. This paper will describe a framework for cross-cultural competence (3C) that includes six “thinking” and “connecting” core competencies and a set of personal characteristics considered to be 3C core enablers. The core enablers describe individual characteristics that accelerate or hinder the development of the core competencies. They include attitudes, affect/feelings, or behavioral tendencies that influence an individual’s choices or decisions to act in a certain way under particular circumstances. Empirical validation studies are needed to establish the degree that 3C core competencies and 3C core enablers are valid predictors of on-the-job performance. Understanding how core competencies and core enablers interact to affect cross-cultural job performance has significant implications for the design of a learning strategy for DOD military and civilian personnel. Sets of learning recommendations, which emerged from this effort, should benefit DOD military and civilian organizations. The recommendations can be used to generate specific learning requirements and objectives based on individual Service and agency needs.

Keywords: cross-cultural competence, 3C, cultural readiness, 3C learning recommendations

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Framework for Cross-Cultural Competence and Learning Recommendations

The war against terrorism requires our military personnel to interact with locals in foreign nations to gain information and accomplish mission goals. To facilitate these interactions, and effectively adapt their behavior, Service members need to possess not only regional expertise, but also cross-cultural competence. Cross Cultural Competence (3C) refers to “a set of culture-general knowledge, skills, abilities, and attitudes (KSAAs) developed through education, training, and experience that provide the ability to operate effectively within any culturally-complex environment” (Greene-Sands, 2009). Initially, there was little understanding of 3C and how to train it. However, researchers have begun to break down the components of 3C (McDonald, McGuire, Johnston, Selmeski, & Abbe, 2008), first into a set of 40 knowledge, skills, and other personal characteristics (KSAOs), then later into a consolidated set of 19 KSAOs, simply called “The 3C Framework” (Johnston, Paris, McCoy, Hughes, Severe, & Reid, 2010; Johnston, Paris, Wisecarver, Ferro, & Hope, February 2011).

The 3C Framework

The 3C Framework was developed under the direction and guidance of the Defense Language Office (DLO). It is based on a thorough analysis and synthesis of the 3C literature, and proposes six “core competencies” and 13 “core enablers,” for a total of 19 KSAOs, as presented in Figure 1.

The core competencies constitute that cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and affective/attitudinal characteristics that is considered relevant and required by all personnel in an organization, regardless of job series or rank, to effectively perform in cross-cultural environments. Core competencies provide consistency and common language to describe the requirements needed for successful performance. Core competencies are defined in Appendix A.

Core enablers, on the other hand, are those personal characteristics (e.g., attitudes, affect, or behavioral tendencies) that influence an individual’s choices and predispose them to act in a certain way under particular circumstances. These enablers are pre-competence factors that serve to influence job success in cross-cultural contexts. They can accelerate the development of core competencies. They may or may not be trainable; however, they can be used to select individuals into leadership positions. The complex and stressful aspects of irregular warfare missions (e.g., working in cultures that are very different from one’s own culture) trigger the need for these factors, as will be discussed shortly. Each competency element in Figure 1 is further defined in Appendices A (core competencies) and B (core enablers).

The core enablers are based on needs and carry motivational value. The classic motivation theories (e.g., Maslow’s Need Hierarchy Theory, 1943, 1954) convey that individuals must feel that basic personal needs are met before they can begin to reach out to the world in more fulfilling capacities. The self must be protected before it is willing to explore and engage with the world. Thus, Resilience Factors armor the inner self and allow the individual to recover from, or adjust easily to, change or stressful circumstances. The Self and Emotion enablers serve as buffers or protective mechanisms to lessen the impact of culture shock or threat to one’s own cultural identity. The Cognition enablers move beyond the protection of self to a level of
acceptance of other cultures. The Engagement factors are more social in nature; they facilitate proactive interactions in diverse contexts. The Learning enablers focus on how an individual gathers and processes information. Interaction refers to the attitude and behaviors associated with the social aspect of communicating with others. Remembering that traits, then, provide intrinsic motivational value is important, as we will see next.

**Trait Activation**

How do we purport that these competencies interact with one another? Why are the core enablers needed and what implications do they have for a DOD learning program, since many of these are not trainable? Certain culture researchers (e.g., Caligiuri, 2006; Matsumoto, 2007; Triandis, 1989) have advanced the idea that trait activation theory may best explain how abilities and traits might interact to support military personnel who must deal with the complexity and high stress of working in cultures other than their own. Traits are “…latent potentials residing in the individual…consistencies within the individual to behave in identifiable ways in light of situational demands…unique propensities for interacting with others” (Tett & Guterman, 2000, p. 398). Thus, if we categorize the core competencies side of the 3C Framework as abilities, and the core enablers side of the Framework as traits (or attitudes, affect, or behavioral tendencies that stem from personality traits and predispose individuals to act in certain ways), then we can begin to apply trait activation explanations to understand the mechanisms that operate to bring these two sides of the framework together to produce optimal performance in high-stress multicultural environments.

In particular, we point to Tett and Burnett’s (2003) “trait-based interactionist model of job performance,” which demonstrates how abilities and traits can operate synergistically. Tett and Burnett hold that abilities and traits are unique and separate capabilities that contribute jointly to the prediction of job performance. Abilities provide the “can do,” while traits provide the “will do.” Both of these constructs can be activated by extrinsic rewards and by trait-specific cues. However, they are different in the following ways (Tett and Burnett, 2003):

1. Abilities are unidirectional, which means that they are valued positively and more is always better. Personality traits are bidirectional or bipolar, which means they may be positive or negative, depending on the situation.

2. Abilities carry no intrinsic motivational potential. Personality traits do carry intrinsic motivational value.

3. The expression of abilities does not depend on traits, as they can operate independently of traits. The expression of personality traits does depend on ability—the ability to carry out the inclination.

These companion constructs are both impacted by the environment. Tett and Burnett conclude the following: The environment moderates whether abilities or personality traits (or both) are expressed, although the expression of personality traits is less straightforward than that of abilities. The activation of abilities is clear—external rewards typically trigger their manifestation. “Trait activation,” on the other hand, is moderated by the demands, distracters,
and constraints of job settings/situations. These factors, surfacing at three levels—organizational, social, and task—determine whether trait expressions are evaluated as positive or negative in terms of job performance. When situations allow or reward trait expression (that is, when they are viewed by others as favorable in light of task, social, and/or organizational demands), such traits can support and bolster job performance. This is due to the highly reinforcing quality of the behavior when intrinsic rewards are layered on top of extrinsic ones. Thus, when job cues trigger expression of a specific ability, and the individual also possesses motivating trait(s) triggered by this ability, then job performance will be significantly better than it might be for an individual who does not have the complementary compatible trait(s).

Individuals operating under the influence of both abilities and traits will tend to seek out and be satisfied with tasks, people, and organizational features that afford opportunities for expressing their particular array of personality traits. It seems to follow that military personnel who successfully operate in very different cultures must have both core competencies (abilities) and enablers (traits), and conversely, that personnel with good core competencies, who lack the accompanying core enablers, may be at risk in situations with extensive and stressful social interactions.

**Implications for DOD**

These propositions have implications for military 3C training. Appendices C and D present the recommendations developed for the 3C Framework. For the core enablers, it seems imperative that individuals learn about and be assessed on personal traits/characteristics (attitudes, personality) in order to be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses and their potential impact on job success. Individualized learning plans based on these personal characteristics should be used to improve or accelerate skill acquisition. They should enable personnel to understand their own personal characteristics and how to leverage their strengths to consciously support cross-cultural interactions.

Beyond training, these findings suggest that DOD might consider personnel selection, at least for individuals slated to perform in highly complex and stressful foreign cultural task environments, as a complementary method to optimize personnel performance. At the very least, these findings underscore the importance of understanding how abilities and traits might interact to influence performance outcomes in such environments.

**Conclusion**

The last two years have witnessed a renewed commitment by DOD to developing cross-cultural competencies, regional expertise, and language abilities in the total Force. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review established a priority to develop 3C to improve force readiness. The 2011 DOD Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (LREC) plans to provide an accessible and comprehensive repository of all LREC training and education opportunities by the year 2016. Given these ambitions and the pressures from recent and ongoing wars on foreign soil, it is imperative to quickly establish and build consensus for a) a theoretical and empirical foundation for organizing and analyzing the findings from 3C research to date; b) DOD and Service-specific requirements for developing 3C in the total Force; and c) military and civilian training curriculum to support those requirements.
References


Figure 1. A Framework of 3C Core Competencies and 3C Core Enablers. Proposed framework consisting of six core competencies and 13 core enablers, logically grouped into cognitive and social aspects of each.
## Appendix A

### Definitions: 3C Core Competencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thinking Factors</th>
<th>Connecting Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 - Applying Cultural Knowledge</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 - Communication</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Acquires and applies knowledge of factual information about a country/region’s past and current (a) social, political, and military structure, (b) economy, (c) belief system, and (d) national security situation</td>
<td>• Interprets and uses a range of acceptable behaviors and display rules, and understands how different methods of nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expressions and gestures, personal distance, sense of time) are relevant in different contexts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Applies knowledge in planning and other activities</td>
<td>• Follows norms about and is sensitive to assertiveness in communicating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Makes sense of inconsistent information about social rules and norms</td>
<td>• Listens carefully to others, paying close attention to the speaker’s point of view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communicates thoughts and ideas in a way that is relevant to the listener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adjusts communication style to meet expectations of audience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Seeks additional clarifying information when necessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>2 - Organizational Awareness</strong></th>
<th><strong>5 - Interpersonal Skills</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Understands the mission and functions of one’s own organization</td>
<td>• Develops and maintains positive rapport by showing respect, courtesy, and tact with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Comprehends how the social, political, and technological systems work in one’s own organization</td>
<td>• Understands and interacts effectively with a variety of people, including those who are difficult, hostile, or distressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operates effectively within the organization by applying knowledge of organization’s missions and functions, including the programs, policies, procedures, rules, and regulations</td>
<td>• Relates and adjusts well to people from varied backgrounds in different situations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>3 - Cultural Perspective-Taking</strong></th>
<th><strong>6 - Cultural Adaptability</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Demonstrates an awareness of one’s own cultural assumptions, values, and biases, and understands how the U.S. is viewed by members of another region/culture</td>
<td>• Gathers and interprets information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about how to interact with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Applies perspective-taking skills to detect, analyze, and consider the point of view of</td>
<td>• Integrates well into situations in which people have different values, customs, and cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Adjusts behavior or appearance as necessary to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others and recognizes how the other will interpret his/her actions</td>
<td>Comply with or show respect for others’ values and customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takes the cultural context into consideration when interpreting environmental cues</td>
<td>Understands the implications of one’s actions and adjusts approach to maintain positive relationships with other groups, or cultures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B
### Definitions: 3C Core Enablers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resilience Factors</th>
<th>Engagement Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Learning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Tolerance of Ambiguity</strong> - Accepts, or does not feel threatened by, ambiguous situations and uncertainty. Manages uncertainty in new and complex situations where there is not necessarily a “right” way to interpret things.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Low Need for Closure</strong> - Restrains from settling on immediate answers and solutions, and remains open to any new information that conflicts with those answers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Suspending Judgment</strong> - Withholds personal or moral judgment when faced with novel experiences, knowledge and points of view. Perceives information neutrally and withholds or suspends judgment until adequate information becomes available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Inclusiveness</strong> - Tendency to include and accept things (including people) based on commonalities rather than dividing things into groups or categories. Emphasizes commonalities and minimizes differences.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emotion</strong></td>
<td><strong>Interaction</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Stress Resilience</strong> – Tolerates emotionally shocking, frustrating, or exhausting circumstances; can retain task focus and enthusiasm, even when faced with repeated setbacks, failures and obstacles to success; Avoids adopting stress-induced perspectives that overly simplify culture; demonstrates tendency for positive emotional states and to respond calmly and steadfastly to stressful events; acts as a calming influence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Emotion Regulation</strong> – Regulates/controls one’s own emotions and emotional expression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Learning through Observation</strong> – Gathers and interprets information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about own treatment and how to treat others. Is motivated to make sense of inconsistent information about social rules and norms. Continually learns and updates own knowledge base as new situations are encountered.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Inquisitiveness</strong> – Is receptive towards, and takes an active pursuit of understanding ideas, values, norms, situations, and behaviors that are new and different. Demonstrates curiosity about different countries and cultures, as well as interest in world and international events.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction</strong></td>
<td><strong>Emotion</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Social Flexibility</strong> – Presents self to others in a manner that creates favorable impressions, facilitates relationship building, and influences others. Is able to modify ideas and behaviors, to compromise, to be receptive to new ways of doing things.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Willingness to Engage</strong> – Actively seeks out and explores unfamiliar cross-cultural interactions and regards them positively as a challenge.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to support mission performance.

**Self**

- **Self Confidence** - Believes in one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet situational demands.

- **Self Identity** - Demonstrates ability to maintain personal values independent of situational factors.

- **Optimism** - Views problems as solvable challenges and as exciting learning opportunities.
## Appendix C

### Learning Recommendations for 3C Core Competencies

#### Core Competency: Applying Cultural Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learn Facts and Concepts About Culture</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know the definition of culture</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the definition of cross-cultural competence &amp; how it can have an effect on human interaction, behaviors, teamwork, &amp; mission accomplishment</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know common cultural processes and variations (e.g., decision-making, perception, collective organization, communication, mobilization)</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know common cultural concepts (e.g. holism, relativism, symbols, reciprocity, etc.)</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know common cultural behaviors/systems &amp; structures/beliefs &amp; values (e.g., 12 Cultural Domains: family &amp; kinship, religion &amp; spirituality, sex &amp; gender, political &amp; social relations, economics &amp; resources, time &amp; space, technology &amp; material, language &amp; communication, history &amp; myth, sustenance &amp; health, learning &amp; knowledge, aesthetics &amp; recreation)</td>
<td>Air Force Culture &amp; Language Center – Expeditionary Airman Field Guide, Selmeski, 2009; McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand how cultures evolve</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the existence and relevance of multiple layers of cultures (e.g., own, US, team, military, coalition, host, enemy) in an operational environment</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the cross-cultural aspects of the U.S. population</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learn Facts and Concepts About Country/Region’s Culture</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand the existence and relevance of operational culture (i.e. high-level drivers such as geography, politics, history, religion, U.S. interests in the region) within an operational environment</td>
<td>NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the existence and relevance of environmental cues within an operational environment</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know history and major political/military/religious/other personalities</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Ross et al., 2010a; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the environment, to include geographical features such as land formation, country size and location, neighboring countries,</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topic</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate, distribution of flora and fauna</td>
<td>Ross et al., 2010; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know current social, ethnic, language, political, economic, and</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Ross et al., 2010; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military features (i.e., structures, policies, current state, trends)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the current belief/value system, to include roles, rituals,</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Ross et al., 2010; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>superstitions, religion, beliefs, attitudes, values, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the relationship between the country/region and the U.S &amp; a</td>
<td>NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country/region’s current national security situation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know U.S. national security interests in the job-relevant country/region</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know U.S. higher commander intent in the area of responsibility (AOR)</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know how the U.S. is viewed by members of another region/culture</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Core Competency: Organizational Awareness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learn Facts, Concepts, and Procedures</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquire and apply knowledge about the mission and functions of the</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand similarities and differences among military cultures,</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>joint environment, and civilians within military environments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquire and apply knowledge about how one’s own organizational</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social, political, and technological systems work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand how to operate effectively within the organization,</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including understanding the programs, policies, procedures, rules,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and regulations of the organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand how to adhere to one’s own organizational requirements</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>while dealing with conflicting requirements within and outside the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand cross-cultural teamwork skills (such as information</td>
<td>Sutton et al., 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exchange, coordination, assigning roles and responsibilities, error</td>
<td>Tuckman, 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>checking, and phases of team evolution)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Core Competency: Cultural Perspective Taking Skills**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learn Facts, Concepts, Procedures, and Cognitive Skills</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facts and Concepts.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand how thoughts and predispositions have deep cultural roots and influence behavior</td>
<td>Russell et al., 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand one’s own cultural assumptions, values, and biases</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand cultural models, such as Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and long vs. short-term orientation</td>
<td>Russell et al., 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand attitude formation (how attitudes develop and how they change); Stereotype formation (how stereotypes develop and how to overcome them); Attribution formation (how attributions are made about others’ behavior)</td>
<td>Russell et al., 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observing and Interpreting Skills.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detect situational cues that indicate a particular cultural schema or behavioral script is relevant</td>
<td>Abbe, et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derive meaning out of perceptual cues and factors within a situation</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take cultural context into consideration when interpreting environmental cues</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognize similarity and differences in various cultures for tactical, operational, and strategic planning</td>
<td>Ross et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skills in Detecting, Analyzing, and Considering the Point of View of Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand and accept that one’s own cultural assumptions, values, and biases differ from other value systems (e.g., understanding how the U.S. is viewed by members of another region/culture)</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the influence of culture on one’s own and others’ perception of self and others</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have sensitivity to individual diversity by avoiding stereotypes and respecting differences</td>
<td>Hardison et al., 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand how another’s cultural values and assumptions affect their behavior</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core Competency: Communication Skills</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn Facts, Concepts, Nonverbal Concepts and Skills</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facts and Concepts.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know acceptable behaviors, display rules, and different methods of nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expressions and gestures, personal distance, sense of time) that are appropriate in different contexts</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand how and why different methods of nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expressions and gestures, personal distance, sense of time) are relevant or necessary in different contexts</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Ross et al, 2010; Russell et al., 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the meaning of typical non-verbal cues (e.g., facial expressions and gestures), symbols, and communication strategies (e.g., personal distance) within a region of interest</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know acceptable behaviors and display rules in the job-relevant AOR, as well as different methods of nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expressions and gestures, personal distance, sense of time)</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010; Russell et al., 1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Skills.**

| Interpret and use a range of acceptable behaviors and display rules, and understand how different methods of nonverbal communication (e.g., facial expressions and gestures, personal distance, sense of time) are relevant in different contexts | McDonald et al., 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009; Ross et al, 2010; Russell et al., 1995 |
| Project and employ appropriate nonverbal cues (i.e., hand gestures, facial expressions, etc.) to communicate a message | McDonald et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010; Wisecarver et al., 2010 |

**Learn Facts, Concepts, Verbal Concepts and Skills**

**Facts and Concepts.**

| Know “survival” and “tactical” language skills to operate effectively within a multi-cultural context | McDonald, 2008; NAVMC 3500.65, 2009 |
| Know how to communicate thoughts and ideas in a way that is relevant to the listener, or to adjust communication style to meet expectations of audience | Wisecarver et al., 2010 |

**Verbal Skills.**

<p>| Convey and receive verbal information accurately and efficiently in cross-cultural interactions | McCloskey et al., 2009 |
| Possess “survival” language skills consisting of a few common greetings and some limited words and phrases in the dominant language of the region or country; possess “tactical language” skills (i.e., a level of speaking and listening capability that involves the use and recognition of memorized words and phrases, as well as construction of simple sentences specific to particular missions) | McDonald et al., 2008 NAVMC 3500.65, 2009 |
| Speak clearly, understandably, and patiently in order to avoid language and cultural misunderstandings | Wisecarver et al., 2010 |
| Communicate effectively in groups and in one-on-one conversations, taking audience and type of information into account | Wisecarver et al., 2010 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use a tone of voice to increase target interest and reinforce communication goals</th>
<th>Wisecarver et al., 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Learn Written Communication Concepts and Skills</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey and receive written information accurately and efficiently</td>
<td>McCloskey et al., 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use correct grammar, punctuation, and spelling when preparing written materials</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convey written information in a clear, concise, and well-organized manner</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write information targeted to the level of the intended audience</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Learn Strategic Communication Concepts and Skills</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facts and Concepts.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop active listening skills to enhance communications in multi-cultural contexts or to prevent, solve, or mediate problems when interacting with non-native speakers</td>
<td>INCA, 2004; Ross et al., 2010, Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know the major “do’s and don’ts” for a specific region</td>
<td>Selmeski, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skills.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listen carefully to others, paying close attention to the speaker’s point of view, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions</td>
<td>Ross et al., 2010; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek additional clarifying information when necessary</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow norms about assertiveness in communicating</td>
<td>McDonald et al., 2008; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use appropriate terms, examples, and analogies that are meaningful to the audience and help to build rapport</td>
<td>Ross et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use appropriate interpersonal styles and techniques to share ideas or plans</td>
<td>Ross et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate problems of intercultural interaction to conflicting communicative conventions and identify their effects on the communication process</td>
<td>INCA, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt to different communicative conventions</td>
<td>INCA, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate new discourse rules in order to prevent or clarify misunderstandings</td>
<td>INCA, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use a variety of strategies (e.g., clarification, simplification) to prevent, solve, or mediate problems when interacting with a non-native speaker</td>
<td>INCA, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track and react appropriately to audience responses</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Core Competency: Interpersonal Skills**

**Learn Interpersonal Concepts and Skills**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

151
### Facts and Concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know about norms of assertiveness when communicating with others in different cultures</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know about basic influence techniques that are consistent with social norms and role expectations, as well as others’ ways of thinking and operating</td>
<td>Hardison et al., 2009; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know about one’s own personal strengths and weaknesses in interpersonal skills to interact more effectively in cross-cultural contexts</td>
<td>McCloskey et al., 2009; Mendenhall et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know how to interact effectively with a variety of people, including those who are difficult, hostile, or distressed</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know basic conflict resolution approaches</td>
<td>Hardison et al., 2009; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know how to effectively integrate into situations in which people have different values, customs, and cultures</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know basic persuasive techniques to promote cooperation</td>
<td>Hardison et al., 2009; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Skills.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop and maintain positive rapport by showing respect, courtesy, tact, and tolerance</td>
<td>Mendenhall et al., 2008; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand and interact effectively with a variety of people, including those who are difficult, hostile, or distressed</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relate and adjust well to people from varied backgrounds in different situations</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcome language barriers when necessary</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess and respond appropriately to the emotional and psychological needs of others</td>
<td>Mendenhall et al., 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage - communicate and interact – with others from different countries, regions, and cultures</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create and manage enduring interpersonal cross-cultural relationships</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Core Competency: Cultural Adaptability
## Learn Cultural Adaptability Concepts and Skills

### Facts and Concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facts and Concepts</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Know how to adapt own behavior when working with other cultures</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Know how to adjust behavior or appearance as necessary to comply with or show respect for others’ values and customs</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
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<td>Understand the implications of one’s actions and adjust behavioral approach to maintain positive relationships with other groups or cultures</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2008; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010; Russell et al., 1995; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
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### Skills.

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<th>Skills</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gather and interpret information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about how to interact with others</td>
<td>Mendenhall et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integrate well into situations in which people have different values, customs, and cultures</td>
<td>McCloskey et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2008; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010; Wisecarver et al., 2010</td>
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<td>Monitor and adjust own behavior or appearance as necessary to comply with or show respect for others’ values and customs</td>
<td>Abbe et al., 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2008; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Ross et al., 2010; Russell et al., 1995</td>
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<td>Understand the implications of one’s actions and adjust behavioral approach to maintain positive relationships with other groups or cultures</td>
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Appendix D

Learning Recommendations for 3C Core Enablers

Overall, we recommend that individuals learn about and be assessed on personal characteristics (attitudes, personality) in order to be aware of their own strengths and weaknesses and their impact on job success. Individualized learning plans based on personal characteristics should be used to improve or accelerate skill acquisition. They should enable personnel to understand their own personal characteristics and how to leverage their strengths to consciously support cross-cultural interactions. Education should enable personnel to:

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<tr>
<th>3C CORE ENABLERS - LEARNING RECOMMENDATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Learn critical-thinking and perspective-taking skills</td>
<td>Matsumoto et al., 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Learn how to perform well even under stressful conditions (e.g., stress exposure training)</td>
<td>Driskell &amp; Johnston, 1998</td>
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<td>Learn emotion management skills</td>
<td>Matsumoto et al., 2007, 2001</td>
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<td>Learn how to deliver performance-based feedback that facilitates self-correction</td>
<td>Smith-Jentsch et al., 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engage increasingly more difficult cross cultural interactions over time, in order to build confidence and allow success.</td>
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<td>Obtain an assessment of current skills and abilities, for accelerated learning strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Take training on perspective taking and cultural adaptability</td>
<td>Sutton et al., 2006</td>
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<td>Seek to see yourself as others see you and recognize subtle changes in your own personal affect</td>
<td>McCloskey et al., 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand your own strengths and weaknesses in interpersonal skills</td>
<td>McCloskey et al., 2009; Mendenhall et al., 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Notice and make connections between yourself and outside cultural events or situational cues</td>
<td>Ross et al., 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select and employ appropriate stress coping strategies when faced with unexpected and frustrating situations</td>
<td>Wisecarver et al, 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willingly adapt your own communication and behaviors to be compatible with cultural norms and use proper modes for interaction (e.g., according to customs, norms, traditions, gender-specific rules)</td>
<td>McCloskey et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2008; Mendenhall et al., 2008; Ross et al, 2010; Russell et al., 1995</td>
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Protecting the Past to Secure the Future: Heritage Mapping, Planning, and Education for Global Military Operations

Laurie Rush

Abstract

All too often, through ignorance, loss, theft, and deliberate destruction, generations of the present fail to preserve, protect, and hand on the physical expressions of culture to the generations of the future. Driven by the belief that preservation of cultural property can provide shared goals and an opportunity for cross cultural and trans-national dialogue, a small group of archaeologists and museum professionals have begun to work together at the international level to develop educational materials specifically designed to teach respect for cultural materials to members of military forces. Like it or not, members of fighting forces are often the very people humanity must rely on to save sacred places, historic structures, collections of cultural property like museums and libraries, and even archaeological sites from the ravages of disaster both natural and man-made. From heritage mapping to archaeology awareness playing cards, this paper describes teaching methods, preservation accomplishments in conflict and disaster areas, plans for future effort and international cooperation, and the implications of these efforts for peace keeping, peace-making, and conflict resolution.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Introduction

Archaeologists, the Military, and Protection of Heritage

In the United States, all lands that are owned by the federal government must follow the United States National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). These rules include military land. As a result, every military base in the US is required to have a cultural resources management program that is responsible for the protection of any cultural property that could be eligible for the US National Register of Historic Places. These properties can and do include historic structures as well as archaeological sites. Quite often, the US military cultural resource programs are run by archaeologists who have advanced degrees in anthropology and/or archaeology. In addition, the US Department of Defense Native American Consultation policy makes it very clear that each base will also have a Native American Affairs Coordinator who is responsible for handling diplomatic relations between the military leaders of the installation and Native American Heads of State whose ancestors have ties to the military lands. Quite often, the Cultural Resources Manager also serves as the Native American Affairs Coordinator and works as an advocate for partnership between descendent populations and the military so that ancestral sites are preserved and are available for worship and ceremonial activity when appropriate.\(^{11}\) Qualified archaeologists who work in the US military cultural resources management program number in the hundreds. They have surveyed millions of acres, have discovered hundreds of thousands of archaeological sites, and they work to understand and preserve tens of thousands of these important places. The US military archaeology program does not receive much publicity, and its existence often comes as a surprise to citizens of the United States as well as to members of the international community.

When the United States entered Iraq in 2003, it very quickly became clear that in spite of a robust cultural heritage protection program at home, military archaeologists had a lot of work to do to help prepare personnel deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan to understand the nature and importance of the archaeology and cultural heritage that they were going to encounter abroad. The results of these efforts have become known as the “In Theater Heritage Training Program for Deploying Personnel.” With support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Legacy Resource Management Program and Defense Environmental International Cooperation Program, military archaeologists and preservation professionals from all over the United States began to work together to develop reference materials for teaching military personnel about heritage, archaeology, historic structures, and sacred places. These materials even included archaeology awareness playing cards.\(^{12}\) As the team began to work more on issues of cultural properties and their protection, to collaborate with international colleagues, and to encounter increasingly thoughtful questions from military personnel, it became clear that the challenges posed by the need to “respect physical expression of cultural values at the trans-national level” are more complex and sophisticated than originally thought.

\(^{11}\) See also the references to US Defense Consultation Policy prompted by Federal Legislation and Executive Orders that are all listed in the References.

\(^{12}\) An example of the reference materials developed can be found at http://www.cemml.colostate.edu/cultural/cptraining.html.
Physical Expression of Cultural Values

It is not unusual for material culture to be forgotten when people think about the areas that Culture Studies may encompass. It is even more common for scholars and scientists to fail to recognize and identify features in the landscape that have tremendous cultural significance. While comprehensive scholarship is important, when military personnel operating in an unfamiliar place fail to recognize and therefore fail to respect an important landscape feature, perhaps the grave of a child marked by a pile of stones, the omission can result in violent retribution. Therefore, it is important to consider what the nature of these features might be.

One way to begin is to consider geographic features in the landscape to which people assign cultural attributes. Examples include the Monteluco Sacred Forest in Umbria, Italy; the Creation Place of the Wanapum People in central Washington State; and the Devil’s Tower National Monument, in the State of Wyoming. Inscriptions and markers tell us that some forests in Italy have been considered sacred places at least since ancient Roman times (Spellani, 2011; Lex Spoletina) and the Monteluco Forest today is still used as a place for religious practitioners to retreat and pray. During World War II, British Forces failed to recognize the spiritual significance of this forest and began to cut down the trees in order to rebuild bridges across the Po River that the Germans had destroyed (Hartt, 1949, pp 93-94). Forest damage was causing great distress to the Italians, and the British were helped by the Monuments Officers to find bridge building alternatives.

The Creation Place of the Wanapum people consists of a semi-circular rock formation with caves that overlooks the Columbia River. From their Creation Place, the Wanapum can survey the portion of the River that has been their traditional access for water and fish resources. Because the United States Army is now responsible for the care of this place, the Wanapum people now have the access that they need to come and worship there.

Spiritual or cultural value can also be ascribed to individual or types of plants and animals. The Okinawan dugong, a Pacific Ocean marine mammal, is considered to be a cultural icon by the Okinawan people and appears on the Okinawan equivalent of the United States National Register of Historic Places. US courts have supported the Okinawan’s request that concerns for the dugong be taken into consideration during the course of planning for Naval Base expansion in the area (Dugong vs Gates, 2008).

Once a place or geographic feature takes on sacred or cultural attributes, it is not unusual for people to begin to add architectural features or objects of symbolic or sacred significance. Throughout the world, we find temple podia on the summits of hills and mountains. It is also not unusual for religious features to become contested spaces or for religious structures to change in nature and type over time in the same location. People also leave clues in the environment that indicate tremendous value or the sacred nature of a place, plant, or geographic feature. For example, it is very common to symbolize prayers by tying a ribbon or an offering like herbs or tobacco to a fence or plant. Sacred features may be obvious like shrines to the Madonna in Europe or they may be more subtle, like sacred stones. However, the presence of offerings, like flowers or candles, is often a clue that an object or feature is important and highly valued.
Carvings or inscriptions on rocks are also excellent indicators of cultural value as are images painted, etched or pecked into rock faces.

Interments of human remains are also marked in a wide variety of ways when considered from a cross-cultural perspective. Tombs and burials can range from extraordinary structures like the rock tombs of Petra Jordan, Pyramids of Egypt, and Mounds of Bin Tepe Turkey, to more humble markers like piles of stones, wooden sculptures and even a simple circular marking made with bits of building debris as noted at Tell Arba’ah Kabiir, Iraq (Siebrandt, 2008). It is interesting to note that sometimes people request to be buried in archaeological sites as a way of creating a physical connection to an ancient and glorious past.

There are also much more formal methods for designating material expressions of cultural value in the landscape. Many communities and nations have designated their most valuable cultural properties by putting them on national lists. If you visit Austria, for example, you will see buildings with red flags designating their importance. There is a United Nations agreement called the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict that also offers a “blue shield” sign as a way of designating cultural property of value. The Blue Shield is intended to work like the Red Cross or Red Crescent as these symbols are recognized to designate protection for medical facilities. In addition, there are lists of world heritage sites where committees associated with the United Nations review applications from local communities and nations to determine if an archaeological site or structure may be of historic value to all the people of the world.

**Risks to Cultural Property**

So at this point, it is reasonable and useful to ask, “What puts cultural property at risk?” If these features are valuable and sacred, and they are clearly marked, why is there concern about their protection and preservation? There is a range of answers to these questions. First of all, natural disasters often claim cultural property. Earthquakes, tsunamis, fires, floods, and severe storms all take their toll, not just on human life but also on the material expressions of cultural value. Once the human toll has been taken, community members look for their own possessions of greatest value, and the community as a whole looks to elements of the places and objects that mattered most to them as they begin to consider how they will rebuild as a corporate and connected group of people. Unfortunately, human conflict also creates disasters for people and property. In situations of ethnic and genocidal conflict, cultural property may be targeted specifically with a goal of demoralizing a community and of physically removing the features and structures that connect a group of people with their territory and connections to the land.

**Role of the Military for Prevention and Preservation**

In an ideal world, we would not need military forces. In our world, military forces should protect the populations that support them and should be providing power that leads to peace and stability. When the US military archaeologists began to teach deploying personnel about the archaeological properties, historic structures, collections of cultural objects, and sacred places in the foreign landscapes where they were headed, these preservation professionals realized that there really needed to be three approaches in order to address the issue in a
comprehensive way. The three approaches are: Military Education and Training; Mapping and Planning; and Setting up Rules, Regulations, and Processes for situations where military personnel encounter cultural property.

Military education and training. This requires education and awareness for all levels of military personnel from the entering enlisted person to the highest ranking officers. Quite often, specialized personnel require specialized knowledge when it comes to cultural property. Heavy equipment operators need to know where archaeological sites are located so that they do not attempt to build new structures on top of them or excavate utilities across them. Fighter pilots need a “no strike” list, a list of buildings and sites that may not be subjected to aerial bombardment unless the opposition has used the property first for military purposes. The very recent example of reports that government forces in Libya are using the Roman site of Leptis Magna to store weaponry would be an example here (CNN, 2011). These same fighter pilots also need opportunities to practice avoiding special places when they are preparing for battle. Military policemen need training to identify objects of antiquity when they are searching vehicles, cargo, and even military baggage so that objects are not removed from their countries of origin. Part of effective military education also includes scenarios where military personnel can practice situations where they encounter cultural property. For example, they may need to practice or at least discuss occupation of an archaeological site so that they learn the necessary skills to minimize their damage and potential impact.

Military education also includes awareness training. Training of this type includes information about how to recognize cultural property in foreign landscapes, the importance of showing respect for property and objects of significance, how to respond appropriately when cultural property is encountered during the course of a military operation, and opportunities to practice these appropriate responses. The US heritage awareness program includes construction of replica archaeological sites for land and air practice, development of the heritage information websites mentioned above, military personnel pocket information cards, the playing cards, and lectures for military personnel. In the US, the Archaeological Institute of America and its former President, Dr. Brian Rose, have been extremely pro-active and supportive, offering lectures to military personnel about archaeology and heritage for Afghanistan and Iraq at no cost to the Department of Defense.

One of the most effective forms of archaeological awareness training has been “on site” training. The military archaeologists have found that when you have the opportunity to take military personnel to an actual archaeological site, the site does all the teaching. It is a numinous experience for the personnel and makes a significant and positive impression. Our experience has been that once we have the opportunity to take military personnel to an authentic and important archaeological site, they are extremely responsive in terms of wanting to learn more and in terms of requesting further guidance for managing a similar property during the course of a military mission. Sir Leonard Woolley had a very similar experience with British military personnel during an on-site training program at Cyrenica in Libya during World War II (Woolley, 1947). It has been our experience that when we have the opportunity to work with military personnel on a site, they indicate tremendous willingness to insure site protection if we can provide them with the necessary maps and information (Rush, 2010; Ziedler and Rush, 2010).
Mapping and planning. During military operations, mapping often begins with a “no strike” list provided for military pilots. The purpose of the “no strike” list is to offer guidance in terms of valuable cultural property that should be protected from aerial bombardment. Given the sensitive nature of the list, since a combatant would be tempted to hide military hardware in a place where there is confidence that it will not be attacked from the air, the “no strike” list is often classified, even when its source is civilian subject matter experts. It could be noted for example, that the National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad had a blue shield painted on its roof, clearly marking it as a structure that should be protected from aerial bombardment. However, as soon as ground operations begin, it is critical for the ground forces to have information, maps, and locations that identify valuable cultural property. Without this information, the ground forces cannot set priorities for site protection and other measures.

It is also critical to note that military forces responding to natural disasters also require information about the location of collections of cultural objects like museums and art galleries. When a building collapses during the course of a disaster, the appropriate emergency response to a museum is much different from the response to perhaps a school with empty classrooms. In the latter case, the rubble from an empty school could be removed and the site cleared for immediate reconstruction. In the case of a museum or library, all of the rubble must be inspected so that artifacts, books, or other critical cultural materials can be salvaged prior to removing debris and clearing the site. The lesson is illustrated beautifully by the experience of Lieutenant Frederick Hartt at the Columbaria Society of Florence, Italy in World War II (Hartt, 1949, pp 52-53). After the Germans destroyed the structure, Hartt insisted on inspection of the rubble, prior to the debris being bulldozed into the Arno River. His actions saved thousands of books, pamphlets, manuscripts, codices, and incunabulae.

There is no question that accurate maps, preparation of lists, and sources of detailed associated information are all critical for potential protection of valued cultural property. However it is critical that the lists are combined with military education and awareness. In every small village and town all over the world, there are going to be features of value in the landscape that will never appear on anyone’s global list. It is vitally important that outsiders realize that these features will be present and that they too will require respect and protection.

Management and response. The United States has powerful historic preservation legislation. As described above, not only do these laws help to protect cultural property within the fifty United States, they also obligate US forces to follow their own laws when they are in positions of responsibility overseas. In addition, when working with the military, archaeologists and preservation professionals have found that the addition of specific military regulations that govern behavior toward cultural property can be an immensely powerful tool when it comes to effective cultural property protection and stewardship. The signature of the Chief of Staff for the Central Command Environmental Regulation 200-2 in 2008 put in place powerful guidance for US forces serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, when a young Soldier at Forward Operating Base Hammer just east of Baghdad, Iraq noticed a military contractor beginning to excavate archaeological material, he was able to use the new Central Command regulation for authorization to not only stop the behavior but to also put up protective signs around the site. Members of the Command Group at Forward Operating Base Hammer quickly discovered that preservation issues gave them common ground for shared goals and interaction with the local
Iraqi community government. Experiences of this nature are beginning to drive the paradigm shift from cultural property protection as a “force multiplier” and as a tool for mission support to an actual potential component of conflict resolution and making peace.

The Paradigm Shift: Peace Making as Opposed to Peace Keeping

The good news is that there are excellent examples of cultural property protection projects and activities that can lead toward stability at the community level and making peace. There are a series of positive examples from US efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the phase of active looting of Mesopotamian City sites in the south of Iraq, US forces expanded the perimeter of Talil Air Base to incorporate the ancient City of Ur. By 2009, when the situation had calmed in the region, the Iraqis expressed interest in resuming responsibility for stewardship of the ancient city. As a result, the US rebuilt the protective fence, dividing the base from the site, and there was a celebration of the return of Ur from US to Iraqi stewardship in May of 2009 with over 300 Iraqi people in attendance. Another example is the Ziggurat at Aqar Quf. A young Lieutenant, Ben Roberts, whose education was in preservation, was on the scene when local officials were showing damage to the tourist amenities. Lt. Roberts suggested to his commanding officer that a small amount of funds could be used to rebuild the café at the site, enabling it to re-open for tourists once more. Access to the site then offered the first step toward rebuilding a portion of the local economy (Roberts, 2010).

In Afghanistan, US military archaeologists in combination with academic subject matter expert colleagues and partners from the Afghan ministry of culture have developed a series of projects to help preserve and protect Afghan culture. Dr. Rush, in 2010, helped to initiate a project where the United States Army Corps of Engineers is supporting construction of an artifact conservation facility where objects being salvaged from the ancient Buddhist City of Mes Aynek, Afghanistan can be stabilized and preserved. Dr. Rush’s team, in partnership with Dr. James Zeidler and GIS analysts from Colorado State University, are also geo-rectifying an atlas of Afghan archaeological sites provided by Dr. Fred Hiebert, analysts from the National Geospatial Administration, and graduate students from around the world. Even though this map was created as a military planning document, the current plan is for this map to become the basis for developing an Afghan list of National Heritage sites.

Turkey and Stewardship for the Future

It is extremely rewarding to have experienced examples in Turkey where partnerships for cultural stewardship are leading the way in terms of long term preservation and our ability to offer heritage to our children and succeeding generations. Çatalhöyük is an excellent example of a place where members of the local community are partnering with professional archaeologists. Not only are they working together to protect this site, which is part of the heritage of the entire world, but also members of the local community are providing expertise and perspectives for explaining and interpreting the features within the site.

Turkey is also very fortunate in that the wisdom of Atatürk resulted in cases where religious and potentially contentious spaces became museums. Hagia Sophia is now a beacon to
the world where members of various faiths may gather to appreciate the art, brilliance, genius, and faith of their forbears in an extra-ordinary structure.

One of the most exciting examples currently being offered by Turkey to the world is the de-mining of the ancient site of Carchemish (Hürriyet Daily News, 2011). How appropriate that members of an international team are removing weapons from the ancient place where the world’s first peace treaty was found. It is hoped that by making the site safe for visitors, it can also contribute to the future of the local community.

Conclusion

We live in a world where one country’s military planning map can become the basis for another country’s new national register of archaeological sites and where removing land mines from an ancient city can open an area for guests from around the world. These are opportunities and examples for paradigm shifts - opportunities for members of local communities, archaeologists, and even members of foreign armies to work together to learn the lessons of the past and work together for a better future, for all of us.
References


Cultural Heritage Training References for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Egypt at http://www.cemml.colostate.edu/cultural/cptraining.html.


Preliminary Findings on the Experiences of Muslims in the U.S. Military: The Importance of Cross-Cultural Competence

Michelle Sandhoff

Abstract

This project examines the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military since September 11, 2001, a time period of international conflict in which a discourse of “us-versus-them” is prevalent. A primary goal of this study is to document the range of experiences of Muslims in the military with a focus on how Muslim service members experience processes of inclusion or exclusion in the military. Data is collected using in-depth interviews with Muslim service members and veterans. This project explores the motivations of Muslims to join the military, their experiences during service, and the decision to leave or reenlist with the military.

Preliminary results suggest that military service may provide a way for Muslim service members and their families to negotiate a divisive social atmosphere that often poses “American” and “Muslim” as mutually exclusive categories. Some use ideals of service and sacrifice to make claims of national belonging; some find protection from a divisive and hostile civilian society and feel accepted and useful in the military while others find that divisive atmosphere more salient in the military. The differences in experience suggest that the role of religious diversity in unit cohesion may differ depending on mission. Preliminary findings also suggest that Muslim service members provide a level of religious and cultural expertise that is valued by other service members. Finally, military service is seen by Muslim service members as a valuable and beneficial experience.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Introduction & Research Questions

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Muslim community in the U.S. was suddenly in the spotlight; violence against Muslims and individuals thought to be Muslim soared\(^\text{13}\). Within a month, the U.S. was leading an invasion of predominantly Muslim Afghanistan and later Iraq; the “Global War on Terror” was on. Although the official rhetoric was that it was not a war of religion, the boundaries that were being activated distinguished between an “us” who was Judeo-Christian and a “them” who was Muslim. Mosques were monitored by the FBI, individuals with Muslim names were put on watch lists, and over a thousand Muslims were detained (Murray, 2004). It is within this context that I am interested in the service of Muslims in the U.S. military. The purpose of this project is to examine the use of military service by stigmatized minorities as a route to fuller national participation. The military more than any other social institution provides a way for excluded “others” to prove their worthiness of being included in the national “we”. By examining the military service of Muslims and by placing these experiences within a broad historical context of military service of other stigmatized minorities, this project has the potential to increase our understanding of how minority groups use institutional structures to mitigate the negative effects of othering and to achieve fuller social citizenship. This project asks the questions: 1) How does the us-versus-them rhetoric of the contemporary period affect the experiences of Muslim service members? 2) Are Muslims using the military as a route to gain fuller social citizenship? 3) What role do Muslims play in military diversity? This project seeks to 1) investigate and document the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military, including motivations to join the military, and the decision to reenlist or separate from the armed forces, 2) examine processes of othering (exclusion and inclusion) within the military, and 3) to place the military service of Muslims within the historical framework of other minority groups using the military as a route to increased social citizenship. Additionally, this project will provide data on Muslims in the U.S., an understudied minority group, and will provide information about integration within the armed forces and enlistment and retention decisions of Muslim service members; crucial information to the maintenance of a diverse and effective military.

Estimates of the number of Muslims in the U.S. military vary wildly; reports range from a low of 3,400 (Azad, 2008) to as high as 15,000 (Amanullah, 2005). The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) collects official data on religious affiliation, and as of March 2009, reported a total of 3,535 Muslims serving in the active forces and 1,503 in the reserves. Table 1 shows the official DMDC reports of Muslim soldiers by branch. These are the estimates commonly used by the media; however, these data have some significant limitations. DMDC collects these data voluntarily upon entry into the military, and so cannot account for individuals who choose not to reveal their religion, those who change their religion during their service, or religiosity of service members.

\(^{13}\) FBI Hate crime statistics show a dramatic increase of Anti-Islamic hate crimes in 2001. From about 30 per year in the late 1990s to a high of 481 in 2001; hate crimes have declined since, but remain about 3 times what they were prior to 9/11.
Theoretical Framework

The experiences of Muslim service members are framed by the intersection of processes of othering along us/them boundaries, the activation of us/them boundaries in times of conflict and identification of Muslims with the enemy, and the use of the military as a route to national belonging.

The Military as a Route to Citizenship

The military has long been used as a means to claim national belonging. In the U.S. there has long been a recognized connection between military service and citizenship rights. In 1862, Congress first passed legislation granting expedited naturalization for immigrants who served in the U.S. military. After World War I the passage of the Nye-Lea Act in 1935 allowed Asian veterans to be naturalized almost 20 years before racial qualification prohibiting Asians from obtaining citizenship were repealed. Military participation involves the potential sacrifice of life or limb in the name of the nation. War has been recognized by historians as providing a means by which individuals could demonstrate their allegiance and seek the benefits of national inclusion (Slayer, 2004).

Military service is a way to demonstrate political loyalty and worthiness to be accepted as members of the nation. Following Burk (1995), citizenship is conceptualized here not just as naturalization, but as the recognition of the worthiness of members of a specific group to be fully included in the definition of the national “us”. Krebs (2006) refers to this as the quest for first-class citizenship\textsuperscript{14}.

The military is a means by which minorities can enhance political and social inclusion\textsuperscript{15}. Burk explains how for African Americans and women, exclusion from military service was connected to a reluctance to recognize them as full citizens. Krebs points to the importance of the military as a site of social and cultural power and a central national symbol. He argues that, “Participation in the armed forces has, at least in the nation-state system, been depicted as a sign of one’s full membership in the political community as well as evidence of one’s worthiness for membership” (p. 17).

In the U.S., military service has been contested for African Americans, Native Americans, women, and homosexuals, among others. The most parallel case to that of Muslims post-9/11 is the service of Japanese Americans during World War II. During this period, the

\textsuperscript{14} I acknowledge, though it is beyond the scope of this project to assess, that the military may serve some groups more effectively as a route to fuller national participation than others. Japanese Americans seem to have successfully leveraged military service along with other national contributions into identification with the national “us”. African-Americans, however, are still not fully incorporated. It is still too early to tell if military service will serve as an effective route in the enfolding of Muslims into the American conception of itself.

\textsuperscript{15} The military is only one route through which stigmatized minority groups may seek to claim national belonging. Another main avenue is through associational activity and interest groups. In the U.S. we can see the development of such groups as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). These routes are not necessarily mutually exclusive and may act complementarily. This is an area for further research, but beyond the scope of the current project which focuses solely on military service.
Japanese in America were subject to the intensification of long-standing us/them boundaries with the onset of military hostilities between the U.S. and Japan. Within this context, some Japanese Americans choose to make claims of social belonging and citizenship through military service. Some Japanese Americans used military service as an explicit claim to national belonging for themselves, their parents, and their future children.

**Othering and the Transformation of Self/Other into Us/Them**

Othering, or the act of identifying the self in opposition to something beyond the self, does not inherently entail a confrontational relationship. However, when considering processes of othering between groups of people competing for resources, the boundary between self and other may become a site of conflict; Self and Other transform into Us and Them.

In times of conflict, the identification of boundaries between “us” and “them” are used to frame the enemy. Schmitt (1927/1976) discusses the use of othering to socially construct the enemy. According to him, the enemy must be other, “existentially something different and alien” (p. 27). In this context, the us/them boundary is not a boundary of neutral differentiation. The enemy is other, defined in contrast to “us” and conceived of as homogenous and static. The construction of the enemy is often based on the perception that the enemy’s nature is intrinsic and immutable and that the conflict is dichotomous and irreconcilable (e.g., good versus evil).

During times of conflict, othering of the group that is identified with the enemy can lead to fears of the “enemy within”. The loyalty of those who look like “them” is questioned and they may be perceived to compose a fifth column. Malik (2009) summarizes literature finding that in European anti-Muslim discourse, Muslims are seen as “incapable of loyalty to liberal democratic states” (p. 207). Suspicion of Muslims in the military can be seen through the highly publicized accounts of arrests of Muslim service members. For example, in 2003, Captain Yee, a Muslim chaplain in the U.S. Army working at Guantanamo Bay was charged with espionage and imprisoned for 76 days. In 2004 all charges were dropped and he was eventually exonerated (Yee, 2005).

In addition to official charges of disloyalty, processes of othering during times of conflict can lead to informal sanctions against those identified with the enemy on the homefront. This can be seen as throughout the U.S. as mosques and other non-Judeo-Christian religious centers were vandalized following 9/11 and more recently following the “Ground Zero Mosque” controversy. Tilly (2003) notes that stigmatization and othering can facilitate and justify harm and destruction. CAIR publishes annual reports documenting anti-Muslim civil rights and hate crime complaints. Both have been increasing since 9/11. While many of the cases have to do with workplace discrimination, lack of religious accommodation, and profiling, there are also reports of vandalism, arson, and physical violence including beatings, stabbings, and shootings.

In this project I am arguing that the conceptualization of us-versus-them is acting as the dominant discourse of the contemporary conflicts. I am not accepting this simple dichotomy as an accurate representation of reality; what I am arguing is that this conceptualization, the belief that the world and the contemporary conflicts can be understood by a simple binary division into “good” and “evil”, “us” and “them” has been the dominant discourse used to frame the conflict at different levels in society.
The official rhetoric of the War on Terror has consistently avoided defining the enemy as Muslim. In the speech that launched the War on Terror, President Bush explicitly disassociated Muslims from the enemy (Bush, 2001). How then did this “other” come to be perceived as the enemy? The official rhetoric was vague in identifying an enemy against which both American military might and public opinion could be brought to bear. Without a clearly defined enemy but given the demographic characteristics of the hijackers and the populations of the countries invaded, existing frameworks for understanding the Muslim Other provided an easy way to frame the conflict. At the same time, the actions that were being taken by the government and military could clearly be seen to be targeting specific populations; populations that centuries of othering had prepared some Americans to see as monolithic and dangerous. Policies requiring the registration of men from countries as diverse as Oman and Somalia, the detention of over a thousand Muslims, monitoring of mosques by the FBI, watch lists full of Muslim names (Murray, 2004), and military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq provided a way to understand who the enemy “really” was. The framework for understanding Islam not just as a neutral other, but as a potentially violent and aggressive threat to the West was pre-existent, and provided an easy, natural-seeming, pattern of thought to fall into.

Reality is complex, and it is grossly oversimplifying matters to suggest that there was only one way in which Muslims and non-Muslims interacted following 9/11. What I am arguing is that the idea of us-versus-them was ascendant. In attempting to deal with a complex conflict centered in a region of the world unfamiliar to many Americans, involving individuals of a faith with which most Americans had no personal contact; it was easy to accept the simplifying dichotomy of us/them. Us-versus-Them became the dominant discourse.

The boundary distinguishing Judeo-Christian “Americans” from the Muslim “Other” was easily accessible. Said (1981) refers to this as “subliminal cultural consciousness” about Islam (p. 6). The stereotypes of Muslims that frame American understandings of the current conflicts can be traced to their development in the middle ages. Since its beginning, Islam was perceived as a threat to predominately Christian Europe. The West viewed Islam as an existential threat. Centuries of warfare honed these negative narratives and embedded them deep within western thought. Western images and understandings of Islam present it as monolithic, static, and antithetical to Western liberal values (Karim, 2000). Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) argue that America inherited from Europe a deeply engrained social anxiety towards Islam. While this anxiety is often latent, in times of crisis, suspicions and fears built on this anxiety come to the forefront. 9/11 crystallized American fears of Islam and made many Americans feel vulnerable to an Islamic threat.

An important caveat is that I am using all of these categories as representations of what popular expectations in the U.S. are, not as analytic tools themselves. In using Us/Them frameworks to approach this study I am not arguing that this is a true lived dichotomization, rather that there is an expectation that the categories of “Muslim” and “American” are incompatible and must be prioritized or selected between. Although individual Muslims in the

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16 Men over age 16 who are nationals or citizens of Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen were required to register at INS in person, and report back annually thereafter.
U.S. may find the identities compatible, the expectation that they should not shapes the experience of being Muslim in the U.S. Muslims may be faced with situations where it is assumed, due to the activation of us/them boundaries, that they must pick between two mutually exclusive identities (Ewing and Hoyler, 2008; Peek, 2005; Sirin and Fine, 2008).

Sirin and Fine (2008) studied how Muslim American youth negotiate identity following 9/11. They found that the Us-versus-Them framework common in the U.S. following 9/11 made Muslim identities salient; “In the fall of 2001, these young people and their families were ejected from the national ‘we’” (p. 7). However, they find that the identities of “American” and “Muslim” are not mutually exclusive for most of these youths, “Contrary to what many have predicted, Muslims in this country have not 'given up' their American identity for the sake of their Muslim identity, despite the many pressures from Muslim fundamentalists and some Western intellectuals, who claim that one cannot be a good American and a good Muslim at the same time” (p. 2).

Theoretical Model

In times of conflict, us/them boundaries are activated leading to processes of othering and exclusion. Definitions of the enemy using the same terms as those used to characterize the stigmatized minority group intensify the us/them boundary and may make it a site of violence. Within this context, members of the othered group pursue routes to resist exclusion and to mitigate the negative effects of being categorized with the enemy. One prominent route is military service. Military service is a way for minority groups to gain recognition and rights. Military service is a route through which dichotomous expectations and distrust can be mitigated.

Because of the framing of the enemy in us/them terms and the ongoing active conflict, the military route to amelioration of us/them tensions is complex. As an institution of national selfhood, the military is a central site where this us/them boundary is framed. The us/them boundaries activated in society at large are also being activated in the military. A prominent example of this was the public anti-Islam comments made by General William Boykin (see Arkin, 2003 for details) which included repeated references to the U.S. as a “Christian nation” and in 2009, after his retirement, the statement that “there is no greater threat to America than Islam” (Montopoli, 2009). Certainly the recent claims of anti-Islam and anti-Muslim biases in FBI training, and among some prominent military analysts (See wired.com’s feature “Danger Room” for examples) may lead us to inquire about how pervasive the idea that American and Islam and Americans and Muslims are inherent enemies is embedded in military culture and education.

Methodology

The data for this project will be collected throughout 2010 and 2011 via semi-structured interviews with Muslim veterans. Given the small size of this group and the impossibility of accessing a comprehensive accounting of this population, the sample will be constructed non-randomly via outreach to relevant organizations. Data collection is already underway with a small number of interviews completed. Preliminary analysis of these data is included in this paper but should be treated with caution as data collection and analysis is not yet complete.
To be in the sample respondents must self-identify as Muslim and have served for any length of time in any branch in the U.S. armed forces since September 2001. The goal is to complete interviews with about 15 respondents.

**Motivation for Joining the Military**

The first substantive area I address is questions of motivation. Why do Muslims join the military in the context of post-9/11 America? I will be placing the motivation of Muslim soldiers within the context of the motivations of youths in general to join the military. The literature on motivations to enlist presents a varied, but fairly consistent, list of reasons to enlist. These include economic motives such as pay, job skills, job security, educational opportunities and money for education; service motives such as a desire to serve the country; an interest in self-improvement and discipline; a chance to escape local economic or social problems and get a new start to life; opportunities for travel and adventure; and equality of opportunity (especially for women and minorities) (Eighmey, 2006).

In addition to these motivations, I am also looking for motivations that speak to the quest for fuller social citizenship. I look to the case of other minority groups for insight. Masaoka (1987) identifies the importance of citizenship claims in the motivation of Nisei service men in World War II. Moore’s (2003) examination of Nisei women in the WAC finds varied motivations. Some Nisei women saw service as a way to prove they were loyal Americans and a way to claim citizenship rights for Japanese Americans. Some saw volunteering as socially responsible because they had needed skills such as language.

I anticipate that Muslim veterans will report motivations similar to those found generally in the literature. However in addition, I anticipate the Muslim service members will also be motivated by direct and indirect claims to citizenship. These claims will likely take varied forms, but may include seeing military service as a way to gain respect, to integrate into American society (to become “American”), and even as a defense against harassment. For example, according to a media report (Kilgannon, 2001), a Muslim West Point cadet reported that his military service had protected his father against harassment in his small Midwestern hometown. I found something similar in my interviews:

“my parents, they told me quite a few times that they have customers coming in and they would say ‘The damn Muslims are ruining the world. What’s wrong with them?’ So [my parents] would say ‘I’m a Muslim and my son is serving in the military.’”

Results from preliminary interviews also support the idea that “giving back” to the U.S., and recognition of useful skills and knowledge are part of the narrative of motivation to enlist.

“I wanted to do my part to serve the country and to utilize my knowledge about Middle Eastern and South Asian cultures [and] languages so I joined the military.”

“As a Muslim I had something to contribute back.”
Experiences during Service

In this section I am interested in the experiences of Muslims while in the military. I focus on both positive and negative experiences of being Muslim in the military. I am interested in how these individuals experience military service during a time of international conflict in which the enemy has been racialized and assigned an identity similar to theirs.

Kiang (1991) examines, largely from existing oral histories, the experiences of Asian and Pacific American soldiers in Vietnam. This population is analogous to Muslims serving during the contemporary conflicts, and so provides a way to contextualize experiences my respondents may report within a larger framework of the military service of minorities categorized with the enemy. Experiences of Asian and Pacific American soldiers in Vietnam included being used to represent the enemy in training exercises. A similar experience was recently reported in The Washington Post, “The worst humiliation came during a field exercise at the culmination of boot camp. For weeks, his commanders had sold it as the decisive test -- a scenario that involved capturing a high-value terrorist in Iraq and using him as an informant. You, his commanders pointed to Klawonn [a Muslim Arab-American soldier], you're the terrorist” (Wan, 2010).

Kiang (1991) also found that in Vietnam, Asian and Pacific American soldiers were mistaken for the enemy; stories include being denied medical treatment and facing “friendly” fire. Their loyalty was often questioned.

The loyalty of some Muslims service members is also questioned. In addition to well-publicized cases such as that of Chaplain Yee, several respondents in my study spoke about the frustrations of being seen as potentially disloyal. Situations ranged from rumors and gossip about them, to formal questioning, to full investigation.

One respondent spend two years under investigation during which time she was removed from her skilled position, lost her security clearance and was given temporary secretarial work. The investigation began after her ex-husband made a false report following a domestic dispute:

“He was upset, he was very angry and then I gave him all this stuff back […] and I gave him back his ring and so he was very angry, and he went in to the commander the next day and said I was a terrorist.”

She was confused and in a state of disbelief as she was accused of treason:

“The investigation was horrible 'cause I didn’t really grasp that they were serious. They were accusing me of funneling information and stuff to the enemy and clearly I'm not doing that. I know that, and they know that I wasn’t doing it”

It is also clear from my interviews that the rhetoric of us-versus-them does play a role in shaping the military experiences of Muslim service members. Many implicitly or explicitly acknowledged the prevalence of this discourse; several explicitly frame the sense of us-versus-them in terms of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror.
“The most negative experience, I felt, was the mindset of the people [...] they do their best to punish that person in order to remind him that he doesn’t really belong to their race, or their skin color, or their life as a child.”

“You were certainly aware that you were Muslim. especially ‘cause of the conflicts. But if the conflicts weren’t happening it would not be an issue at all.”

“It wasn’t bad til September 11th, then they start looking at us different. Generalizing everybody. Even the people who you care for and work with and know you all this time, they start looking at you in a different way, like suspicious for a while. I noticed that a lot of times [...] it seemed like we were watched, we were asked to report to the [security office], and they questioned us [...] A lot of things that make you feel like you’re not part of the unit, not part of the [military] and that’s why I decided I’m gonna retire.”

Another respondent reports explicit discrimination based on concerns about his loyalty. After 5 years as a linguist working on a romance language, he requested a more challenging language, “the commander said ‘I will not give you an Islamic language cause you’re Muslim’. He thought I would use it to communicate with terrorists and things like that.”

With the help of the Equal Opportunities Office he was eventually given a new language, but rumors about his loyalty flourished, “after that people did have rumors about me, like maybe I would be a traitor or whatever because I was helping them with Islamic topics. [...] It wasn’t a problem being Muslim until I started helping them out with Islamic things. For some reason that drew more attention.”

Some respondents also report being called “Taliban” and “Al Qaeda” by other service members. Discomfort with Islamic religious practices was also reported by a few respondents. After being placed under investigation, the respondent previously discussed decided to practice openly

“eventually [I thought] I’m already under investigation, they’re claiming they think I’m a terrorist, what else are they going to do? So I’d pray at work, just get my little rug out and [pray] right there in the middle which upset a lot of people. At the last place I got farmed out to, there was one guy I could tell it really bugged him. I was like whatever I don’t care about you.”

Another respondent who reports no other issues with his religious practice in a 20 plus year career, encountered one commander following 9/11 who prohibited him from praying or leaving to attend prayers.

“[my commander] said ‘No, I can’t let you go to Friday prayer, and I can’t allow you to do this and do that’ so I continued praying but I had to hide it. I pray whenever he goes somewhere, I pray when he’s not around [...] I felt like I’m not even a human being if you can prevent me from praying, and I had to hide myself behind the curtains just to do the prayer. I felt like this is not America, this is not the country I came to, the country I love, the country I respect and [it] made
me have a negative tone about the whole thing. I mean it’s not right. But I can’t do anything because everybody’s looking at us in a different light now.”

In combat theater group cohesion seems to be much healthier. Of the Muslim combat soldiers I have spoken with, none have reported formal or informal questioning of their loyalty. “I never had any problem. [...] I think it’s no matter who you are as long as you perform. [...] you sleep with them [members of unit], train with them, do almost everything with them, so you become sorta a family. You don’t feel like you’re different.”

“You have a mission to accomplish and you focus on that and you come together as really brothers in arms [...] it’s just you and the men or women that you’re working with and you are literally putting your life on the line for the mission and for each other and it forms this bond that is really incredible and you’re literally shedding blood, sweat, and tears for this mission and you’re relying on each other, literally your lives are in the hands of each other and I think that’s just an incredible feeling to have and it’s something you’ll never get anywhere in the civilian world.”

Many respondents, both in combat and support positions, reported that camaraderie with other service members was one of the most positive experiences of their military service. The ability to trust and be trusted so completely defined military service as a unique and meaningful experience for many of the people I spoke with. This perhaps makes the situations where this sense of trust breaks down more traumatic. While experiences of outright suspicion or discrimination were rare, where they occurred they were felt very deeply and often prompted the individual to decide to leave the military.

Muslim service members can also provide the strength of diversity to the military. In her dissertation, Bosman (2008) conducted a study on Dutch-Muslim soldiers who served in peace operations in Muslim societies. She frames this study through “culture switching”, arguing that Muslim troopers may be able to use cultural, historical, and religious knowledge in interactions with locals. Similarly, many of my respondents report being sought out for their religious or cultural expertise, or found being Muslim to be useful in deployments.

“I mean no matter how much you get from the schoolhouse nothing can replace me, you know at that point I’d had 27 years being Muslim, being raised in a Muslim family, understanding things.”

“So I explained to [my fellow soldiers] that it was the Arab culture, and more broadly the Islamic culture. Just give them some details so they have better understanding. [...] And I’d teach my buddies some useful [Arabic] words, so there would be less confusion when we’d go out on missions.”

When I was deployed, occasionally I would have some understanding that they wouldn’t have, so then they’d actually come to me sometimes to ask questions and I would help out.”

A respondent who does research on terrorism sees his background as crucial in his work: “Because of my Muslim heritage [...] I can understand certain nuances of language and looks that non-Muslims probably miss. I’ve spoken to millions of Muslims [...] I’m probably more
Some respondents recognized the importance of being visible symbols of America’s military diversity and religious tolerance. They were walking examples of the ability to be American and Muslim, not just for other service members, but for local civilians and soldiers as well:

“One of the first things we do when we get on the ground is building rapport with your locals and it was instant for me. I mean they recognized my name, me being Muslim. I prayed with them and I met with the local villagers, introduced myself as Muslim [...] and especially when you’re talking about a country where some of the villagers don’t have any access to electricity, no TV, no internet, so you can imagine what their perception of America is. So me coming in and introducing myself as an American, as a Muslim, can have a huge impact. Saying that I understand the religion, I understand the cultural dynamics. It was amazing how much respect they gave when I was there.”

Another reports on an extended relationship with an local Afghani

“After our consolation was over he said ‘Do you mind if I come and chat every now and again?’ For me it was a nice break, I enjoyed speaking Urdu and I was curious about this man. On the third or fourth meeting he said to me something like ‘So what’s it like in America?’ and I said ‘life is wonderful’ and he said ‘How do people treat you?’ And I said ‘Very well’. And he said ‘They do?! They treat you well, but you’re Muslim’. And I said ‘Can’t you see? I joined the military without any problems [...] I’m a Muslim American, I live in a society where nobody messes with my religion, I can practice whatever religion I like, I joined the military, got promoted. I’m neither the general, but nor am I the janitor. It’s a very fair society.’”

Almost all of my respondents were tapped by their commanders to provide information or presentations on Islam. They sometimes faced uninformed or even hostile stereotypes.

“And they [students] were like ‘I heard that you’re actually supposed to kill non-Muslims if you’re Muslim’. I can’t believe [they] got this far learning the language and still think that. I mean all your teachers were from Afghanistan, do you think they would teach you? [laughs] Are you alive right now? I mean they would’ve killed you if that was true. It’s just common sense some of this stuff.”

**Conclusion**

This research aims to address the current lacuna in empirical information about Muslims serving in the U.S. military. It also seeks to place the military service of Muslims into the historical context of the military service of other stigmatized minority groups, such as Japanese Americans during World War II. This research is framed by othering via the activation of us-versus-them boundaries and the use of the military as a route to fuller social citizenship. In addition to exploration of the heretofore unstudied issues of the experiences of Muslims serving in the U.S. military since 9/11, this project also explores issues of resistance to processes of exclusion and claims making to national belonging via military service.
Although results are still preliminary, the data collected so far paints a complex picture of the experiences of Muslim service members. Like any other group, some have great experiences and never want to leave the military; others had terrible experiences and couldn’t get out soon enough. What is perhaps unique about this group is the way their identity as Muslim Americans framed their service, whether negatively by making their military service a time of suspicion and threat or positively as they felt the satisfaction of providing much needed expertise and experience at home and abroad. The next step in the project is a thorough examination of the role of social citizenship in the experiences of Muslim service members.
References


Table 1

*DMDC data on Muslims in U.S. Military, March 2009*

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How Can Higher Education Better Serve its Veterans Once Their Service is Done?

J. Goosby Smith

Abstract

When conceptualizing diversity in U.S. higher education, we most commonly focus on issues of race, nationality, gender, learning ability, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation. However, veterans’ status is often overlooked. Recent events, however, have made higher education administrators more proactively meet veterans’ unique “physical, emotional, mental, and educational needs” (Wise, 2011).

In the Post-9/11 Era, the number of active duty service members and, thus, veterans is increasing. Also, the Post-9/11 GI Bill, which took effect August of 2009 (Hefling, 2009), significantly increased veterans’ financial resources for higher education. These benefits include full tuition and fees at their state university, a book allowance and a housing stipend (Hefling, 2009). As a result, many veterans pursue higher education after their tours of duty. However, there’s a problem. Few, if any, professors are specifically educated on educating service members and veterans in the traditional undergraduate, face-to-face classroom.

After sharing common obstacles to transitioning from a military culture or even combat to the culture of the classroom, nine best practices for integrating service members into the classroom are presented. Implications for pedagogy and classroom management are provided for the professoriate.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Introduction

When operationalizing human diversity in U.S. higher education, we commonly focus on issues of race, nationality, gender, learning ability, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation. We try to diversify our campuses because we seek to go beyond providing students with subject knowledge and skills (Green, 2004). Our goal is add value by enabling students to learn and grow in universities where “students come from very different places, and with widely different notions.” (Newman, 1976).

One often-overlooked and highly valuable dimension of diversity is veterans status. Because many of our veterans served during the traditional college years of 18 to 22 years of age, they come to the classroom with valuable experience. They have often travelled more extensively, had indescribable leadership experiences, and functioned effectively in a variety of environments. In addition to learning in the classroom, they have much to teach their peers and their professors.

In the Post-9/11 Era, the number of active duty service members and, thus, veterans increased. The current waves of veterans are returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (Grimes, Meehan, Miller, Mills, Ward, & Wilkinson, 2011). Additionally, the Post-9/11 GI Bill significantly increased veterans’ financial resources for higher education. As a result, increasing numbers of veterans pursue higher education after their tours of duty. Bound and Turner (2002) found that the GI Bill did, in fact, increase the educational attainment of World War II veterans. I see no reason to expect the Post-9/11 GI Bill to be any less impactful.

However, there’s a problem. While veterans share similar characteristics with civilian non-traditional students (e.g., age, career experience, life experience), they have enough key differences to warrant exploration. For example, some have come from extremely high-stress combat situations. Many have learned through concrete, hands-on experience rather than through abstract theories. Others must now manage psychological issues such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) which resulted from their experiences while serving. All have been in an environment of conformity, clarity, and top-down command. Most are classified as older, “non-traditional” students.

These differences can result in difficulty transitioning to the traditional college classroom. While older and more experienced than their 18- to 24-year old traditional age (Wise, 2011, p. 2) peers, service members, especially combat veterans can lose patience with their younger classmates and become irritable. In fact, the age difference is often the most salient obstacle to engaging with their classmates. While some of their classmates are completing adolescence and living carefree, many veterans have returned to a variety of stressful family, work, and financial situations. Service members’ varied and sometimes misunderstood military experiences, can make it even harder to relate to a majority of their younger, civilian peers (DiRamio, Ackerman, and Mitchell, 2008). Also, student veterans can be seen as being
less relatable by their younger classmates because the veterans are more mature and motivated (Mangan & Wright, 2009).

A second difficulty in transitioning into the classroom is moving from an extremely structured and hierarchical military culture into academe (Kharadoo, 2011), which prides itself on intellectual freedom and as much egalitarianism as is practical. In theatre and other military situations, the day is often regimented by one’s superiors. According to Michael Dakduk, a student Marine veteran at UNLV, “There’s a structure in the military…You know what to do. You wake up at 5:30, train, follow your set schedule for the day, go out and do your mission, and come back and do it all over again. At a university, there’s no commander or structure like that” (Mangan & Wright, 2009).

However, higher education demands one to manage his or her time without input from others. “Veterans accustomed to a clear chain of command can find academic bureaucracy confusing and frustrating” (Mangan & Wright, 2009). Furthermore, while the professor is the “authority figure” in the classroom, decisions regarding time management, majors, course schedules, and study habits are made by college students.

Low ambiguity tolerance (Budner, 1962) refers to a low capacity for handling uncertainty. This presents a third challenge to transitioning. Because the stakes are so high in theatre as in other life-and-death scenarios, ambiguity may be seen as something to be minimized whenever possible. In such high stakes situations, failure simply isn’t an option. However, in the classroom, professors often encourage ambiguity. Many times, service members become frustrated because the professor won’t just tell them the “right” method or answer to a problem with multiple solutions, such as a case study. To broaden students’ capacities for analysis and critical thinking, professors usually encourage students to be creative, be non-conforming, and eagerly embrace the “messiness” and nuance of issues while functioning in an egalitarian learning community. In fact, professors often prefer clear thought processes over “the right answer,” which may not even exist. However, veterans are sometimes afraid of making a mistake. “My biggest fear is the fear of failure…not being successful” (Zinger & Cohen, 2007, p. 45). This fear of making a mistake thwarts learning.

Fourth, particularly for combat veterans, there may be issues of post-combat stress such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in which the service member involuntarily recalls and relives disturbing instances from combat (Khadoroo, 2011). Symptoms of stress and tension include trouble concentrating for long periods, unease in large gatherings, discomfort with silence, and disturbances in relationships with classmates (Lafferty, Alford, Davis, and O’Connor, 2008). These symptoms cannot help but be agitated by well-meaning professors who try to spur their students’ learning by pushing their thinking to the brink, sometimes using high-pressure pedagogical tools.

Fifth, depending upon their rate or Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), some service members have learned primarily through practical, procedural hands-on-experience. Because of us are abstract learners, we often teach students using abstract methods, versus concrete, hands-on methods.
When compounded, these difficulties may negatively impact the service member’s “sense of belonging” on campus, which has been shown to be a major factor in whether or not college students drop out (persistence) and how successful they are in school (Freeman, Anderman, & Jensen, 2007).

This gap between veterans’ needs and the environment of the traditional college classroom must be addressed. While the traditional classroom catches up, for-profit and community colleges are enrolling a disproportionately high number of student veterans (Field, 2008). Citing a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs report, Field (2008) reported that in FY 2007, student veterans used their GI Bill benefits as follows: Community College (38%), Four-year public institutions (36%), For-profit institution (19%), Private institution (6%), Undermined (1%). Veterans cite costs, convenience, and flexibility as their prime reasons for college choices (Khadaroo, 2011). Veterans and service members perceive (primarily online) for-profit and community colleges to better serve their needs (Bradley, 2009): despite the accreditation and credibility issues of online-only institutions.

These statistics emphasize the urgency with which traditional “bricks and mortar” four-year institutions must adjust. We need to better serve our changing student body. In a society in which baccalaureate education is the norm, retaining and ensuring the academic success of our service members is a societal issue, reaching far beyond the walls of academe.

The purpose of this paper is to present best practices in classroom teaching and, where relevant to student learning, veterans’ affairs offices at traditional four-year universities. I am aware that many veterans choose to matriculate at for-profit, on-ship, and/or online universities. However, since this paper is meant to inform face-to-face teaching professors in traditional classrooms and veterans’ affairs offices, these are the institutions upon which I focus.

While the best practices are empirically based and theoretically sound, this paper aims to inform the practice of teaching. Professors reading this paper should learn specific ways to enhance veterans’ learning experiences, and, thus their success in achieving their higher education goals.

**Best Practices**

Next are nine “best practices” used in higher education to improve the transition from the military to the classroom, provide an inclusive and nurturing classroom environment, and increase engagement among students who are service members.

**Best Practice 1: “Think before you speak”**

Loosely paraphrased, there is a saying that it is better to remain silent, than to speak and remove all doubt that one is an idiot. As professors, we must think before we speak. One veteran said his “professor tried to get me to speak out against the war and the Bush administration, knowing that I am a veteran” (Zinger & Cohen, 2010, 45). Another veteran remarked how his professor did not express anything positive after learning that he was a veteran. Granted, liberal social thought and education level are often correlated (Schoon, Cheng, ...
Gale, Batty, and Deary, 2010). However, it is egregiously unprofessional for a professor to let one’s personal or political views impact respecting students.

We also must be role models for the veterans’ classmates. We must use awkward situations as teachable moments. For example, many veterans are peppered with inane questions from some professors and students. Many report being asked “Did you shoot anyone?” or did they kill anyone. Questions like this stem from a professor or classmates’ own discomfort. As such, scholars Lafferty, Alford, Davis, and O’Connor (2008, p. 7) advise managers and educators to “Curb your anxiety”.

Best Practice 2: “Be there”

Many times, student veterans will have questions. But they might not want to ask them during class, or in front of others. It is critically important that professors “be there.” They should hold regular office hours and return their telephone calls and e-mail. This serves two purposes. It allows the professor to help the student with course material and it allows the professor to get to know the student as a person. When a professor interacts regularly with a student, he or she gets to know the student much better, which allows the professor to notice easily when they are struggling or when they enter the classroom differently. Using strong communication skills, such as active listening, are useful for getting to know students. For example, a professor might detect the student’s tension and ask, “Is everything alright?” Lafferty, et al., 2008). Simply being there and showing that one cares goes a long way.

Best Practice 3: “Seek to understand”

Don’t assume you know what’s going on because the student is a veteran. Only by observing the service member and listening to what he or she tells you can you hope to glean what’s going on. For example, because veterans who have enlisted for a four-year term out of high school often leave the service in their twenties, they have more in common with nontraditional students, who are at last 25 years old (Wise, 2011). As such, some of their transition problems may result from attending school while trying to juggle “adult” stressors such as relationships, jobs, children, career pressure, and finances. However, without taking the time to talk to the student, the professor may assume erroneously that the students’ difficulties stem from combat or service-related issues. Simply put, each service member is different.

While college staff needs to understand combat-related stress (Khadaroo, 2011) and other issues, faculty must stay abreast of combat-related issues, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injuries, depression, and anxiety. After learning about these issues, professors need to further understand their symptoms, how they may manifest in the classroom, and what techniques they can use to make the classroom experience more of an effective learning environment for service members. Combat veterans, particularly, do have special needs (Ackerman, DiRamio, and Mitchell, 2009). For example, many have had to deal repeatedly and graphically with issues related to death and mortality (Zinger & Cohen, 2010, p. 42). Given the large amount of time spent in the college by full-time students, there are clearly classroom implications from these needs. As professors, we need to understand these needs and address them open-mindedly and empathetically with our students, should the situation arise.
Best Practice 4: “Be supportive”

Being supportive goes beyond the professor’s classroom conduct with the student. Many in student affairs advocate a stronger connection between the curricular and co-curricular functions of the university. Better educating student-veterans demands that professors and veterans’ advocacy offices work together to create a “closely woven” support net. Many veterans credit such offices with surviving the transition to college student from their prior role of soldier, sailor, airman, or marine (Mangan & Wright, 2009). As a faculty member, one should develop a close working relationship with the veterans’ affairs office. This includes attending functions hosted by that office and doing discipline-specific workshops or seminars with the student veterans’ groups. Being seen as an on-campus advocate for veterans increases student service members’ level of trust an openness once they enter the classroom.

Best Practice 5: “Be flexible”

Many professors make seating charts for students, especially in large classes. However, as a professor, one needs to be flexible. Where and how one is positioned in the room can cause more anxiety than many professors realize. In large course sections, some combat veterans may feel that someone is “sneaking up on them”, so sitting with their backs to the wall (Mangan & Wright, 2009) or so that they can see who enters the room may make them significantly less anxious, and more engaged in the classroom learning environment.

Sometimes this flexibility takes the form of figuring out how students can equitably make up work if they’ve missed classes due to drilling, military exercises, having to leave the classroom because of experiencing flashbacks (Khadaroo, 2011), or even emergency doctors appointments relevant to post-combat stress.

Best Practice 6: “Vary pedagogy”

While they definitely take classes throughout their careers, many service members may be used to learning from hands-on, practical methods. Becoming a traditional full-time college student, however, often means attending hour upon hour of lectures. “Some have a very difficult time being confined to a classroom space. Sitting for an hour or hour and a half can be difficult for some people who have been in very tense situations,” according to Robert Ackerman, a professor at UNLV (Mangan & Wright, 2009).

Pedagogical implications for this are simple. Professors can design their classrooms so that taking an independent, short, well-timed break will not be disruptive. Professors can give a break once an hour. Additionally, professors (granted easier for some disciplines than others), can design their courses using experiential learning techniques--such as simulations, role-plays, class discussions, games, group tasks--which will actively engage students. Such pedagogical adjustments won’t just enhance the learning of veteran students; they should enhance the learning of students in general.
Best Practice 7: “Value contributions”

Student service members often enter the college with more team member, teambuilding, and leadership experience than even their professors. As such, professors (once they have ascertained that the student veteran is willing to share certain experiences), we should invite contributions from our students where they help classroom learning and conceptual grasp.

Reach out and encourage student veterans to bring their experience into the classroom. For example, as a management professor, I teach about topics such as leadership, teamwork, and teambuilding. When I’ve had veterans who were willing to talk about some of their experience I’ve asked the class to give me examples of when they were part of building a team. Asking open-ended questions like this can help to engage veterans who often don’t realize how much they actually have to offer the classroom because they haven’t been in school for a while.

Best Practice 8: “Understand your limits”

Sometimes a student may experience a post-combat stress issues that is, frankly, too involved for the professor to effectively manage in the classroom. It is important to know when one is “in over one’s head.” More importantly, it is critical to know what on-campus resources can be immediately utilized.

Sometimes ordinary campus life can set a veteran on edge. “Over the summer, there was a class a couple of rooms away with a lot of Middle Eastern students…When their class let out, they’d be walking down the hall speaking in Arabic or Farsi, and I was instantly on alert. I’d have a virtual flashback right there in class.” (Mangan & Wright, 2009).

“When I hear the rain I feel like I am being attacked by mortars. Different sights, sounds, and smells can make me feel like I am back in Iraq. Certain things people do, say, or certain emotions can trigger a strong reaction. (Zinger & Cohen, 2010, p. 43).

If the issue is simply one of temporary inattentiveness and a suddenly stressed look, the professor can merely observe and understand what’s happening and proceed with class. However, if the students’ reaction is becoming more severe or frequent as the term ensues, the professor needs to intervene on the students’ behalf to get necessary support offices involved.

Best Practice 9: “Supplement the curriculum”

Universities need to meet veteran students’ needs, ensuring that they have a maximum chance to get a quality education (Wise, 2011, p. 1). Mission Graduation is a grant-funded effort which educates service members on how best to transition to college, provides workshops, and shares best practices used by student veterans’ organizations (Wikehart, 2010).

Some who joined the military straight out of high school may have received GEDs in the military, may not have been stellar students, or may have forgotten much of what they learned in high school. In order to be successful in college, universities (particularly community colleges) offer remedial courses (Mangan & Wright, 2009). Other universities have designed first-year seminars, extended orientations, or life-skills courses for veteran students. For a more complete
summary of such programs, please see the master’s thesis of Amy Wise (2011). The bottom line is that interested faculty may consider teaching some of these seminars. By doing so, they would become more familiar with academic preparedness issues that some veterans may face.

Conclusion

While this is was an exploratory literature review and while much more research needs to be done in this area, there are clear implications for classroom teaching. Nine best practices for professors were presented. 1) Be there, 2) Think before you speak, 3) Seek to understand, 4) be supportive, 5) Be flexible, 6) Vary pedagogy, 7) Value contributions, 8) Understand your limits, and 9) Supplement the curriculum.

By integrating these nine practices into their teaching, professors can enhance the learning environments and outcomes of their student veterans, and often their students at large.

There is question as to whether or not colleges can meet the demands of the increasing population of student veterans (Zinger & Cohen, 2010). Fortunately, veterans’ offices are on the vanguard of helping to transition our men and women who protect and defend our nation. However, until we significantly impact the knowledge, skills, and behavior of professors—those with whom student veterans most frequently interact—we run the risk of failing in our educational endeavors, and thus failing to protect and defend our student veterans’ ability to flourish in inclusive environments.

Future Research

Future research in this area will explore veterans’ perceptions of helpful classroom behaviors by professors. I am at the early stages of collaborating with a colleague of mine who is a Vietnam-Era veteran to convene a series of focus groups consisting of diverse student service members (ROTC, retired, reservists, active duty, etc.). Using a phenomenological, Appreciative Inquiry methodology, it is our goal to a) inductively discover themes in what they feel can increase their engagement, learning, and success in the college classroom, and b) provide the benefit back to them of talking with others who share their experiences. We hope that by exploring the self-articulated learning needs of our soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen we can better prepare the professoriate and higher education in general to better serve them once their service is done.
References


Situating Sexual Harassment in the Broader Context of Interpersonal Violence: Research, Theory and Policy Implications

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Abstract

Although sexual harassment has been discussed as a form of interpersonal violence, little research has systematically examined both the empirical and theoretical links between sexual harassment and interpersonal violence. We review survey research data that establishes sexual harassment as a form of revictimization from earlier instances of interpersonal violence, such as child sexual abuse and intimate partner violence as well as ways that sexual harassment and interpersonal violence can mutually co-occur, such as from dissolved workplace romances or as an escalation from one form of violence to another. Bronfrenbrenner’s (1977, 1979) and Grauerholz’s (2000) ecological frameworks for understanding interpersonal violence and revictimization from several levels of analysis are invoked to understand the many ways that sexual harassment and interpersonal violence are linked. We further discuss organizational theories of sexual harassment (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997) and Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) as frameworks for guiding research in these areas. The review pays particular attention to surveys of multiple forms of sexual victimization, including sexual harassment, documented by the U.S. Military as well as the Military’s efforts to comprehensively address these problems.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
In the opening scenes of the movie *North Country*, which is based loosely on the case of Lois Jenson versus Eveleth Taconite Company (1993), Josie, the heroine, is laying on her kitchen floor apparently having been beaten by her husband. Soon after, as a single mother, she seeks employment at the local mine, which promises the best wages and benefits in the area. After she is hired, Josie and her female colleagues endure a barrage of egregious sexual harassment by male coworkers and supervisors. The case depicts the first sexual harassment class action suit. These scenes clarify that Josie is vulnerable and is seeking escape from one form of abuse only to be trapped into another – workplace sexual harassment, and it touches a chord that resonates with many women and men: violence against women is pervasive and has many manifestations. This paper examines the theory and research to support linkages between sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence.

Sexual harassment has been considered to be a part of the continuum of violence against women since it was recognized (Cleveland & McNamera, 1996; Koss, Goodman, Browne, Fitzgerald, Keita, & Russo, 1994; MacKinnon, 1979), yet there has been little attempt to examine the associations between sexual harassment and other forms of violence, such as child sexual abuse, stalking, and adult sexual assault or to thoroughly review the links between sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence. Understanding the possible connection between sexual harassment and other forms of violence can directly impact policy in the form of organizational practices, therapeutic treatment, and legal doctrine. Our aim is also to inform research, intervention and policy initiatives by articulating descriptive and theoretical frameworks from which to advance our understanding of the spectrum of sexual violence that includes sexual harassment. After reviewing the evidence of empirical linkages between sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence, we examine the theoretical arguments and perspectives that may account for relationships among these forms of violence. In so doing, we raise a number of cautions in interpreting such linkages, including “blame-the-victim” arguments and attributions of emotional damages to past history of abuse instead of to current claims of victimization. Finally, we examine psychological, organizational, legal and broader policy-related approaches to addressing interpersonal violence and its connections to sexual harassment.

**Definitions and Framework**

To begin this review, we lay out working definitions of sexual harassment and interpersonal violence and present a framework for organizing the various ways that these forms of violence can be associated. Definition of many of these forms of violence may differ for research, therapy, activism or legal and litigation purposes. Legal definitions of sexual harassment vary by state and jurisdiction. Elements of the legal definition typically include unwanted sexual advances, requests for sexual favors (quid pro quo), and any other verbal or physical sexualized conduct resulting in a situation where cooperation is used to determine employment-related decisions or unreasonably interfere with a person’s performance including the creation of a hostile work environment (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1980). The most well-known “psychological definition” is described by Fitzgerald, Swan, and Magley (1997) as a three-part definition consisting of gender harassment (“verbal behavior,
physical acts, and symbolic gestures that are not aimed at sexual cooperation but that convey insulting, hostile, and degrading attitudes about women,” Fitzgerald, Swan, et al., p. 10); unwanted sexual attention, such as unwanted, offensive looks, comments, telephone calls, e-mails of a sexual nature; and sexual coercion (“extortion of sexual cooperation in return for job-related considerations,” Fitzgerald, Swan et al., p. 11). Other research has subdivided the category of gender harassment into lewd comments, negative remarks about men, and enforcing the male gender role (Waldo, Berdahl & Fitzgerald, 1998) or has distinguished between sexist hostility and sexual hostility (Fitzgerald, Magley, Drasgow & Waldo, 1999).

Interpersonal violence has been referred to by many names, some of which reflect some form of demographic criteria, such as child abuse (i.e., defined by the age of the victims and sometimes the age difference between the victim and perpetrator), or behavioral criteria, such as rape or stalking (defined by specific acts); whereas other labels reflect attempts to capture broad constructs, such as interpersonal violence or intimate partner violence. There are also labels that may still appear in the literature such as domestic violence or wife abuse that have been replaced with contemporary terms. Researchers at the World Health Organization categorized interpersonal violence into two specific forms: family/partner and community, where each is further classified by the type of target (Krug, Mercy, Dahlberg & Zwi, 2002). Targets of family/partner interpersonal violence may be a child, partner or elder. Targets of community interpersonal violence may be an acquaintance or stranger. The act(s) of violence involve the use of threatened or actual physical force or power and may result in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation (Krug, et al., 2002).

Family/partner interpersonal violence may be further classified as child sexual abuse (CSA) or intimate partner violence. Child sexual abuse has been found to be a consistent problem across cultures and historical periods and affects children from all social levels (Walker, Bonner, & Kaufman, 1988). Pereda, Guilera, Forns, and Gomez-Benito (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of sixty-five studies examining childhood sexual abuse and found that classifications fluctuated on definition and age. Definitions ranged from non-contact abuse such as exhibitionism and sexual requests to non-penetrative contact such as fondling to physical sexual assault (Senn, Carey, & Vanable, 2008). Additionally, the age used to define childhood varies within different jurisdictions within the United States and varies from study to study and country to country. Age discrepancy has also been suggested as a criterion for defining child sex abuse (Senn, et al., 2008). Both legal and academic definitions of childhood sexual abuse make distinctions between childhood abuse and adolescent sexual assault. Finkelhor (1979) defined childhood sexual abuse as any sexual experiences involving children 12 or under with an individual 5 or more years older or involving an adolescent 13 to 16 years old with an adult 10 or more year older.

Intimate partner violence is defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as “physical, sexual, or psychological harm by a current or former partner or spouse [that can] occur among heterosexual or same-sex couples and does not require sexual intimacy” (Centers for Disease Control, nd, paragraph 1). Intimate partner violence may also involve physical violence, threats of physical or sexual violence and psychological/emotional violence in addition to sexual violence. Community interpersonal violence, sometimes referred to as adult sexual abuse (ASA) is often defined as sexual assault and can include coerced sexual contact and
attempted and completed rape (Bachar & Koss, 2001). Sexual assault legal definitions vary by jurisdiction but typically feature elements including nonconsensual sexual contact, the use of force or threat of bodily harm, or sexual contact with someone unable to provide consent (Testa & Dermen, 1999).

Sexual harassment meets the definitional criteria of interpersonal violence (IPV). Sexual harassment involves the use of power in one or more of its many manifestations and commonly results in various forms of harm, including psychological harm, such as depression, somatic complaints and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand & Magley, 1997; Lim & Cortina, 2005; Schneider, Swan, & Fitzgerald, 1997; Stockdale, Logan & Weston, 2009). Sexual harassment may also result in economic deprivation through the withholding of job-related benefits for lack of sexual cooperation (i.e., quid pro quo sexual harassment) or by the common consequence of turnover or constructive discharge for targets of sexual harassment (Fitzgerald et al, 1997). For the sake of this paper, we separate the various forms of IPV from sexual harassment.

Sexual harassment (SH) and other forms of IPV are theoretically linked by common underlying factors including overarching conditions, such as imbalance of power and patriarchy, as well as individual-level perpetrator characteristics, such as misogynist attitudes. SH and IPV are also empirically linked and it these empirical linkages that we explore, elucidate and explain in this paper. As we will demonstrate, these linkages exist at different levels of analysis. First, targets of IPV are also likely to be targets of SH (co-victimization and revictimization). Second, perpetrators who commit IPV may also be more likely than others to also perpetrate SH (co-perpetration). Third, organizational cultures can facilitate or inhibit incidents of both SH and IPV. Although we touch on each of these levels of analyses, the existing literature contains more data on co-victimization and revictimization than on co-perpetration or organizational culture, thus our review more heavily leans on the former. We also recognize the possibility that individuals may differ in their propensity to report experiences of IPV and SH (sensitivity), but we examine and dismiss this perspective in the discussion on victim-blaming cautions below.

Cautions in interpreting co-victimization and revictimization linkages

There is a risk that the research on victim-centered explanations can be interpreted as victim blaming. Finkelhor and Browne (1985) posited in their traumagenic model of revictimization that child abuse survivors develop poor risk perception capabilities and thus may not properly evaluate situations in which abuse is likely to re-occur. It is tempting, therefore, to presume that in the sexual harassment context, individuals with abuse histories may either be overly sensitive to innocuous workplace social-sexual behaviors, such as an appearance compliment. It also seems plausible that abuse survivors may be less sensitive than others to potentially sexually harassing cues and therefore may “allow” such behavior to escalate. Elements of a legal claim of sexual harassment hinge, among other things, on the complainant’s ability to demonstrate that the conduct under inspection was subjectively severe and unwelcome (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1986). The actions that the complainant took to indicate unwelcomeness and evidence of its impact on the complainant’s well-being are used as evidence to assert or challenge these claims. To the extent that trauma produced from previous interpersonal violence renders a person incapable of distinguishing among and reacting
appropriately to an array of social-sexual workplace behaviors that ranges from innocuous to severe may undermine her or his credibility.

The empirical research on this issue, however, has not supported this view. Hyper- or hypo-sensitivity to sexually harassing cues as a function of past trauma or its sequelae (e.g., PTSD) may be demonstrated by correlations (positive or negative) between past trauma severity and reactions to sexually harassing stimuli. Stockdale, O’Connor, Gutek and Geer (2002) reviewed the extant literature reporting associations between measures of past interpersonal violence, including sexual harassment, child sexual abuse and adult sexual abuse, and perceptions of sexual harassment, attitudes toward sexual harassment, acknowledgement of sexual harassment, responses to sexual harassment or related measures. Correlations across the 15 studies reviewed ranged from -.17 to .40, with most correlations being .00. In their own research examining five different samples of students and working adults who rated perceptions of sexual harassment from a fact-based scenario of sexual harassment, there were no significant associations between self-reports of prior interpersonal violence (e.g., prior sexual harassment) and ratings of the harassment depicted in the scenario. In Stockdale and colleagues’ two-panel study of women who had recently received protection orders (Stockdale et al., 2010), no significant associations were found between the severity of any form of interpersonal violence reported in the baseline interview and perceptions of sexual harassment depicted in a scenario rated in the follow-up interview. Also, Fitzgerald, Buchanan, Collinsworth, Magley and Ramos (1999, study 1), provided compelling evidence that abuse survivors’ affective reactions to sexually harassing stimuli are no more or less severe than individuals without abuse histories. A sample of 307 college women, 35% of whom had histories of unwanted sexual touching as a child or adolescent by an older adult, twice viewed four videotaped scenarios of sexual harassment that escalated in severity (the first was a control). There were no significant differences between the abused and non-abused women on their affective reactions to the scenarios, including measures of dysphoria (anxiety and depression) and anger. There were also no significant differences between the groups on measures of how they would have responded to the events depicted in the scenarios if it happened to them. Finally, there was no significant difference between abused and non-abused women on a general measure of attitudes toward sexual harassment.

A related argument may also be made that abuse survivors, as a result of their abuse, develop personality disorders or other forms of psychopathology that disrupt their ability to react appropriately to workplace social-sexual behavior or which fully account for any damages that a formerly abused sexual harassment plaintiff may claim flows from the workplace harassment. Logically, the evidence presented above showing that abuse survivors react no differently to sexual harassment than non-abused individuals precludes the need to test for psychopathology; nonetheless such hypotheses have been examined empirically. Fitzgerald et al. (1999, study 2) conducted in-depth psychological interviews on 56 women involved in sexual harassment litigation, 75% of whom had a history of some form of prior interpersonal victimization (child sexual or physical abuse and/or adolescent-adult sexual or physical abuse). Although about two thirds of the sample met criteria for a PTSD and/or Major Depressive Disorder diagnosis, there were no differences between previously victimized women and those with no prior history on these diagnoses. There were also no differences between these two groups on personality profiles measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2). To counter the
argument that prior abuse accounts for all the psychological damages that sexual harassment victims may be claiming, Stockdale et al. (2009) found significant associations between sexual harassment experiences and current symptoms of PTSD while controlling for prior abuse or PTSD symptoms that occurred before the harassment ensued (See also Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky & Saunders, 1993). Thus, whereas cognitive dysfunctions and trauma reactions may in part account for revictimization, there appears to be no evidence that abuse survivors are hyper- or hypo-sensitive to sexual harassment or that they respond any differently than others to harassing conduct.

Framework for understanding empirical SH and IPV linkages

In our effort to summarize the research that has examined co-occurrences of sexual harassment with other forms of interpersonal violence (IPV) and to elucidate theoretical frameworks that may explain how sexual harassment and IPV may be linked, we present the classification model shown in Figure 1. This model distinguishes between the temporal relationship between sexual harassment (SH) and IPV – where IPV precedes SH or where IPV and sexual harassment are occurring more or less concurrently – and between the type of IPV perpetrator – an intimate partner or family member versus a community member, such as a stranger or other adult. In the following sections, we elaborate on these categories, review relevant empirical research, and examine theoretical explanations.

IPV that precedes sexual harassment: Revictimization

Quadrants I and II represent the phenomenon of revictimization which is broadly documented in the IPV literature (Arata, 2002; Breitenbecher, 2001; Classen, Palesh & Aggarwal, 2005; Messman & Long, 1996) and largely dominated by intimate partner violence or child sexual abuse as the originating source of trauma (Gidycz, Coble, Lathan & Layman, 1993; Mayal & Gold, 1995; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003). It is estimated that two thirds of individuals who have been sexually victimized experience sexual revictimization (Classen et al., 2005; Sorenson, Stein, Siegel, Golding & Burnam, 1987). Experiencing child abuse, both sexual and physical, particularly heightens the risk for sexual revictimization both during childhood and into adulthood (Coid, Petrucevitch, Feder, Chung, Richardson & Moorey, 2001; Desai, Arias; Thompson & Basile, 2002; Gidycz, Hanson, & Layman, 1995; Randall & Haskell, 1995). The recency of the initial victimization, the degree of its sexual invasiveness, being victimized in adolescence, and being victimized by a family member all heighten the risk of sexual revictimization (Classen et al, 2005; Messman-Moore & Long, 2000; Roodman & Clum, 2001).

Most of the revictimization research has measured various forms of adult sexual victimization, such as intimate partner violence or rape, as the form of revictimization with some attention paid to sexual harassment. Rosen and Martin (1998) surveyed 1051 male and 305 female soldiers in combat support or combat service support units in three U.S. Army posts to examine prior history of interpersonal violence and recent experiences of sexual harassment and sexual assault and current assessments of psychological well-being. Although the data were self-reported and collected at one time, Rosen and Martin’s study demonstrated significant associations between reports of prior victimization and various forms of recent sexual harassment among both male and female soldiers. More specifically, among female soldiers, experiencing physical-emotional abuse as a child predicted experiences of sexual coercion forms
of sexual harassment and experiencing child sexual assault predicted experiences of gender harassment. Among male soldiers, physical-emotional child abuse predicted gender harassment unwanted sexual attention, and both physical neglect and sexual abuse predicted sexual coercion forms of sexual harassment. Other retrospective self-report studies have also shown significant associations between prior interpersonal violence and sexual harassment (e.g., Campbell, Gleeson, Bybee & Raja, 2008; Houston & Hwang, 1996; Wyatt & Riederle, 1994).

There are a handful of studies where the measurement of initial victimization is conducted in advance of the measurement of revictimization. Such "prospective" or longitudinal studies increase (but do not guarantee) inferences of causality (e.g., Gidycz et al., 1993; Humphrey & White, 2000). Parks, Kim, Day, Garza and Larkby (2010) examined the relationship between childhood maltreatment and adult violent victimization. Data were gathered from two longitudinal studies regarding pregnant women and substance abuse. The results showed that women who experienced any form of childhood maltreatment were at a higher risk to experience adult violent victimization, even after taking into account the influences of social support, substance abuse, adult household characteristics, and psychological status. We were unable to locate any published longitudinal research on sexual harassment revictimization. Stockdale, Berry and Logan (2010) recently reported the results of a two-wave study of nearly 800 women who were recruited from courtrooms after receiving a protection order against an abusive partner. Participants were interviewed shortly after recruitment with instruments measuring life histories of interpersonal violence, emotional and physical health status and other indices of well-being. A follow-up interview was conducted one year later (94% follow-up rate), and of the 445 participants who reported work experience in the intervening year, 65.6% experienced at least one incident of sexual harassment as measured by a modified version of Fitzgerald and colleagues’ Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ) (Fitzgerald, Magley, et al., 1999). Moreover, experiences of child physical abuse and interpersonal violence from either the partner from whom the protection order was granted or from another adult, all measured at time 1, and were positively correlated with SEQ scores measured at time 2. Although the research on sexual harassment revictimization is sparse, there appears to be sufficient evidence to conclude that sexual harassment can occur as revictimization.

### Theoretical explanations for revictimization

Several researchers have proffered theoretical explanations for revictimization. Finkelhor and Browne’s (1985) traumagenic model suggests that child sexual assault (CSA) victims (a) develop maladaptive sexual behaviors, such as associations between sex and rewards and punishments, promiscuity, and early onset of consensual sexual relations (traumatic sexualization); (b) have difficulty developing trust and have a heightened sense of betrayal; (c) feel stigmatized by the abuse experiences which leads to low self esteem, or (d) in general feel powerless to escape abuse. All of these pathways potentially increase CSA survivors’ risks of further abuse. Other researchers have proposed an ecological framework (Bronfenbrenner, 1977, 1979) for understanding how factors at various levels of analyses impact of sexual violence (Belsky, 1980; Heise, 1998).

Grauerholz (2000) applied an ecological framework to understand revictimization. The ecological model of revictimization situates repeated violence in multi-level framework as a way
to both recognize the importance of victim characteristics as well as the environmental, relational, and perpetrator factors that attach to sexual revictimization (Grauerholz, 2000; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003). The broadest level, the macrosystem, reflects the cultural context in which abuse survivors and abusers are embedded (Grauerholz, 2000; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003), including cultural attitudes toward repeated abuse, such as the tendency to blame the victim, as well as the various social stereotypes of and attitudes toward women (Dunn, 2010). It is well established, for example, that men with a propensity to sexually harass or engage in other forms of sexual victimization possess misogynistic attitudes (e.g., Lee, Gizzerone, & Ashton, 2003; Pryor, 1987; Pryor, Giedd, & Williams, 1995).

At the most fundamental level of analysis is ontogenic factors which reflect the life circumstances of CSA and other abuse victims. These includes familial characteristics (e.g., family structure, family cohesion, parenting style), and effects of early abuse on victim’s self esteem, self concepts, and other factors related to traumatic sexualization (Finkelhor & Browne, 1985; see also Logan, Walker, Jordan & Leukefeld, 2006 for a review).

Microsystem factors are those that characterize the immediate context in which the current abuse occurs. Grauerholz (2000) outlined factors that may increase an abuse survivor’s risk of exposure to further violence as well as those that may trigger potential perpetrators from acting aggressively toward such targets. Exposure risk factors included the various psychopathologies that result from early abuse experiences, such as dissociative disorders and traumatic sexualization, low self-esteem and stigmatization, and deviance behaviors such as alcohol abuse. Factors that may increase perpetrator aggressiveness include their perceptions of the target as easy prey, feeling justified to behave aggressively, and perceiving that the target is unable to respond assertively (Grauerholz, 2000). Unfortunately, there is a potential for vicious circularity among exposure risk factors and perpetrator factors: abuse survivors’ trauma responses and risky behaviors may be the cues that trigger potential perpetrators’ aggressive behavior toward them.

Exo-system factors reflect the broader contexts that influence revictimization through their effects on social structures that facilitate further abuse (Grauerholz, 2000). In particular, abuse survivors may be less likely than others to have economic and educational resources, or other forms of social power that buffer their risk of current abuse. Unfortunately the life trajectories of CSA survivors, for example, result in reduced educational and employment prospects, making them dependent on others for economic well-being (Grauerholz, 2000). Their dependency, in turn, may increase the likelihood of further abuse (Jewkes, 2002).

Research that has examined the potential causal pathways between episodes of victimization and revictimization has largely supported elements of the ecological model of sexual abuse revictimization. Abuse survivors who have a history of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), an ontogenic factor, are more vulnerable than others to revictimization (Campbell et al., 2008; Classen et al., 2005; Filpas & Ullman, 2006; Fortier, DiLillo, Messman-Moore, Peugh, DeNardi & Gaffey, 2009; Krause, Kaltman, Goodman, & Dutton, 2008; Messman-Moore & Long, 2003; Messman-Moore, Brown, & Koelsch, 2005). PTSD and other forms of mental disorders are commonly associated with interpersonal violence early in life (e.g., child sexual assault; Jumper, 1995). Ontogenic factors associated with the development of adult
psychopathology among survivors of child sexual assault include low socioeconomic status in the family of origin, family alcohol abuse, and frequency of the childhood abuse experiences (Katerndahl, Burge & Kellogg, 2005). In their review of the literature on women’s victimization, Logan, Walker, Jordan and Leukefeld (2006) reported that sexually victimized women are more likely than others to develop low emotional stability. Low emotional stability, in turn, increases vulnerability to traumatic events which may in part explain revictimization.

At the microsystem level, research indicates that risk-taking behaviors, including alcohol consumption and drug abuse are positively associated with sexual victimization and revictimization (Dowdall, 2007; Testa, Livingston, Vanzile-Tamsen & Frone, 2003). Logan, Shannon, and Walker (2006) suggest that self-medication (alcohol and drug abuse) may be used to deal with past abuse resulting in greater exposure to higher risk situations for further abuse. Messman-Moore and Brown (2007) found evidence that reduced threat perceptions and poor coping skills are associated with revictimization. Additionally, Messman-Moore and Brown found that women who suffer from revictimization had less positive attitudes regarding dating and had reduced risk perceptions in new situations.

In the sexual harassment context, environments that are high risk for sexual harassment include those that are dominated by men (Dell’Ara, & Maass, 1999; Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997), have a masculinized or sexualized work environment (e.g., Gutek, 1985; Maass, Cadinu, Guarnieri, & Grasselli, 2003), have a working climate that tolerates sexual harassment (Hulin, Fitzgerald & Drasgow, 1996), or in other ways puts abuse survivors in contact with people who have a propensity to sexually harass (e.g., Pryor, LaVite, & Stoller, 1993; DeCoster, Estes, & Mueller, 1999). To our knowledge, however, no research has examined whether abuse survivors are more likely than others to find themselves in these types of work environments or whether they are at higher risk for sexual harassment compared to those not previously abused who work in similar situations. Later in this paper, however, we examine features of work environments that may be associated with experiences of multiple forms of interpersonal violence.

As outlined above, early childhood interpersonal violence may disrupt cognitive information processing. Miller, Handley, Markman and Miller (2010) tested the importance of cognitive processes in predicting self-blame after sexual assault. They reasoned that if abuse survivors could easily call to mind ways they could have prevented an assault they would be more likely to engage in self-blame. Miller et al. (2010) interviewed 149 women who had experienced sexual assault and found that those who had been sexually victimized were more likely than others to engage in self-blame as measured by the ease with which they could produce counter-factual examples of ways they could have avoided harm.

Reduced or inaccurate threat perception and poor coping skills have been advanced as a possible explanation that links ontogenic and microsystem factors to revictimization (Messman-Moore & Long, 2003). In particular, recent research has shown that abuse survivors sometimes develop maladaptive coping strategies, such as avoidance and withdrawal, as a means of suppressing negative emotions that are associated with potentially abusive situations (Fortier, et al., 2009). These coping strategies, in turn, can exacerbate trauma disorders, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD can interfere with functional risk perception and
ability to protect oneself from harm. Fortier et al. (2009) found significant paths between the severity of CSA, avoidant coping, PTSD, and adult victimization in a three-university sample of undergraduate women who had a history of CSA (see also Golding, 1999). In their two-wave longitudinal study of sexual harassment revictimization, Stockdale et al. (2010) examined the extent to which PTSD symptoms measured in their baseline interview mediated relations between baseline reports of interpersonal violence and follow-up reports of workplace sexual harassment. PTSD was found to mediate associations between child sexual abuse, child physical abuse and interpersonal violence in adulthood and sexual harassment.

Co-Victimization: Sexual Harassment that is Concurrent with other Interpersonal Violence

Quadrants III and IV in Figure 1 examine sexual harassment that occurs concurrently with other forms of interpersonal victimization. We use the term “concurrently” because the timing of multiple victimization experiences is not typically precisely measured. Instead, mostly cross-sectional survey research measuring experiences of many forms of interpersonal violence, including sexual harassment is reviewed in this section. Therefore it is difficult to distinguish whether sexual harassment is occurring at nearly the same time that other forms of interpersonal violence is occurring or whether there is a temporal difference in the occurrence of these forms of violence and, if so, what that order may be. A recent, comprehensive survey of sexual assault in the military indicated that of the 4.4% of women who experienced sexual assault (labeled unwanted sexual contact in the survey), 25% reported being sexual harassed or stalked by the same offender (Rock, Lipari, Cook & Hale, 2011). Of the total number of assaulted women, 23% indicated being sexually harassed or stalked before the sexual assault incident and 7% indicated being harassed or stalked after the incident and 25% stated that the harassment or stalking occurred both before and after the sexual assault. These data indicate that sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence do co-occur but that temporal sequences among events may vary. Below we examine the features that might be associated with multiple victimization.

Workplace romance-based victimization

Quadrant III of Figure 1 represents incidences of intimate partner violence as well as sexual harassment. Although some of the survey research reviewed below has documented co-occurrences of intimate partner violence and sexual harassment (Campbell et al., 2008), the form that we focus on here is harassment that follows dissolved workplace romances. We discuss sexual harassment that results from a dissolved workplace romance in this paper because it is possible that the abuse may cross the boundaries between the workplace and away from the workplace (e.g., the home) due to the nature of the relationship between the parties. Therefore the abuse could be classified as intimate partner violence as well as sexual harassment or it may escalate from one form of violence to the next.

A workplace romance is a consensual relationship between two individuals employed within the organization which can include both emotional and physical attraction (Clarke, 2006). These relationships fall within one or more of the following structural categories: (a) lateral or peer romances; (b) hierarchical romances where one partner holds a higher position in the organization than the other partner (e.g., supervisor-subordinate); and (c) a relationship between
employees that was established before employment, such as a married couple working in the same organization (which may be either lateral or hierarchical) (Lickey, Berry & Whelen-Berry, 2009). Surveys by the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) indicate that between 19% and 26% of human resource professionals indicate that sexual harassment claims that result from the dissolution of a workplace romance have been filed in their organizations (SHRM, 1998; 2002; 2006). The nature of the sexual harassment or interpersonal violence that may occur as a result of the workplace romance dissolution varies as a function of the nature of the relationship (Pierce & Aguinis, 2001). A hierarchical workplace romance that may have had a utilitarian motive, for example, is more likely than other types of relationships to lead to quid pro quo forms of sexual harassment. A peer-to-peer romance may see the spillover of behaviors, such as standing in close proximity, that were at one point of the relationship perceived as romantic and desirable are now viewed as unwanted sexual attention and thus constitute a hostile work environment (Pierce & Aguinis, 2001).

Organizational policy makers have demonstrated ambiguity in their stances on workplace romances and their judgments of sexual harassment that follow a dissolved workplace romance. First, very few organizations (12% according to one study) have policies related to workplace romances (Cole, 2009). Second, organizational members who are in a position to judge the veracity of a sexual harassment claim are less likely to find the claim to have violated their sexual harassment policy if the harassment flowed from a dissolved workplace romance than harassment claims that were not connected to a prior romance (Pierce & Aguinis, 2005; Pierce, Aguinis & Adams; 2000; Pierce, Broberg, McClure & Aguinis, 2004). Third, sexual harassment perpetrators are judged as less culpable if the harassment stemmed from a dissolved workplace romance than if it did not (Elkins & Velez-Castrillon, 2008). Finally, organizations’ reluctance to recognize sexual harassment that results from dissolved workplace romances may be due to a widespread belief that policies on workplace romances impinge on privacy issues and that despite the possible risk of sexual harassment, there are documented benefits to workplace romances, such as increased organizational commitment, work motivation, job involvement and job satisfaction (Pierce 1998), let alone benefits related to establishing a long-term romantic relationship (Boyd, 2010).

To date, we have not located theoretical or empirical research that connects dissolved workplace romance-based sexual harassment to other forms of interpersonal violence (IPV), such as stalking or intimate partner violence. Although such a link cannot be assumed to exist without empirical support, the linkages seem logical and the void in both research and organizational awareness on these possible connections is potentially important. For example, IPV that occurs away from the workplace that involves employees involved in a (dissolved) workplace romance may not be noticed by organizational officials and is likely to be outside the purview of organizational policies. Yet such abuse may spillover in the workplace or it may spill from the workplace to other domains. Greater awareness of interpersonal violence that emanates from a dissolved workplace romance on the part of employers and their agents as well as by the courts, law enforcement and social service agencies will help to de-compartmentalize these potentially overlapping forms of IPV so that effective action can be taken to intervene or prevent such abuse in any domain in which it is experienced or witnessed.
Concurrent sexual harassment and IPV: The special case of the military

In Quadrant IV of Figure 1, research showing associations between various forms of interpersonal violence and sexual harassment in cross-sectional survey studies is reviewed. Most, but not all, of this research has been conducted in military or military-related settings (e.g., military service academies) or with such populations. Large-scale survey research has been made possible because of heightened awareness of sexual abuse in the military and the structural features of military or military-related settings, such as the ability to reach a samples of active-duty military personnel stationed in various locations or samples of veterans through VA hospitals. Furthermore, the U.S. Military's willingness to fund large-scale research on these matters has helped facilitate this research.

Reliable sources of information about multiple victimization are surveys conducted by the Department of Defense on active-duty military personnel (e.g., Rock et al., 2011). The surveys focus primarily on estimating incidents of sexual assault, which in these surveys is termed unwanted sexual contact, but information on the extent to which sexual harassment (and stalking) co-occurred with the sexual assault is also gathered.

The 2010 survey of active duty military personnel (Rock et al., 2011) consisted of a probability sample of 90,391 women and men who had at least six months of service at the time of the survey. Sample estimates were weighted to reflect population levels. As reported above, 4.4% of active duty female military personnel indicated experiencing unwanted sexual contact in the 2010 survey, compared to 6.8% reported in the 2006 survey. The 2010 rates were highest in the Marine Corp (6.6%) and lowest in the Air Force (2.3%). The rates for men experiencing unwanted sexual contact were 0.9% in 2010 and 1.8% in 2006. The 2010 rates were also highest in the Marine Corp (1.2%) and lowest in the Air Force (0.5%). Of the 4.4% of women experiencing unwanted sexual contact (sexual assault), 54% indicated that they had also been sexually harassed by the perpetrator either before or after the assault incident. Of assaulted men, 38% also experienced concurrent sexual harassment. Bostock and Daley (2007) analyzed a probability sample of active duty U.S. Air Force women and found that 31.8% of rape victims, 29.5% of victims experiencing other forms of sexual assault, and 33.3% of attempted sexual assault victims also reported sexual harassment from a boss. Similarly, 26.7%, 20.1%, and 25.6% of victims of rape, other sexual assault and attempted sexual assault, respectively, also experienced sexual harassment from a coworker.

Surveys of veterans seeking services from VA hospitals also indicate that incidents of sexual assault tend to also co-occur with sexual harassment. Harned, Ormerod, Palmieri, Collinsworth, and Read (2002) examined survey data of over twenty thousand women in all branches of the military and found that 4.2% reported incidents of sexual assault and 72.4 reported incidents of sexual harassment in the twelve months preceding the survey. Moreover, 99.7% of those reporting sexual assault had also experienced sexual harassment. In a national

18 Defined as “uninvited and unwelcome completed or attempted sexual intercourse, sodomy (oral or anal sex), penetration by a finger or object, and the unwanted touching of genitalia and other sexually related areas of the body” (Rock, et al. 2011(b), p. 1; Cook & Lipari, 2011, p. iii)
19 Stalking is also included in these estimates, but most incidents (91%) were sexual harassment or a combination of sexual harassment and stalking.
sample of women veterans who had served in Vietnam, post-Vietnam and Persian Gulf eras (n=558), Sadler, Booth, Cook and Doebbeling (2003) indicated that 70% reported sexual harassment during military service; 54% reported unwanted sexual contact; 30% reported completed or attempted rapes. Among military rape survivors, the perpetrator was often identified as someone who had sexually harassed them (48.2%).

Although clinical samples of veterans receiving treatment from VA hospitals may logically report higher rates of sexual assault than those not receiving treatment, the patterns of co-occurrence of assault with sexual harassment are similar to the more representative probability samples of active duty military or veterans. Skinner, Kressin, Frayne, Tripp, Hankin, Miller and Sullivan (2000) surveyed over 3600 women veterans sampled from VA hospital records and found rates of sexual assault at 23% and sexual harassment at 55%. Similar to the Harned et al. (2002) study, however, Skinner et al. also found that almost all of the women in their sample who had experienced sexual assault had also experienced sexual harassment (98%). Suris, Lind, Kashner and Borman (2007) measured various forms of sexual assault among a sample of women veterans receiving outpatient treatment at a single VA center. Their survey measured experiences of sexual harassment and various forms of sexual assault that had occurred as a child, as a civilian adult or as an adult on active duty in the military. Unfortunately they did not report specific statistics on what percent of their sample experienced more than one type of sexual assault or co-occurrences of sexual harassment and sexual assault, within or across participants’ life periods, but they did indicate that multiple victimization was common.

We located two studies that conducted surveys of random samples of veterans utilizing VA services or filing some form of VA disability claim(s). Thus the samples are clinical, but representative of such populations. In a fairly small but random sample of female veterans who had utilized services at an urban VA (n=268), Campbell et al. (2008) identified four clusters of women on the basis of their experiences of various forms of interpersonal violence, including child sexual assault, adult sexual assault, intimate partner violence and sexual harassment. Cluster I (36%) was composed of women who scored low on all forms of sexual violence. Women in cluster II (16%), had experienced the highest rates of child sexual assault, adult sexual assault and sexual harassment combined; they were also the second most likely to experience intimate partner violence as well. Cluster III (22%) was composed of women who had fairly high rates of child sexual assault, adult sexual assault and sexual harassment, with slightly lower levels of intimate partner violence; and cluster IV (26%) were women who tended to experience intimate partner violence and sexual harassment. Altogether, 74% of the sample had experienced at least one form of sexual violence, and at least 32% had experienced two or more forms. In a larger random sample of men and women veterans who filed disability claims for PTSD (n=3,337), Murdoch, Polusny, Hodges and Cowper (2006) reported correlations of .58 for women and .42 for men between in-service sexual harassment and in-service sexual assault. Correlations between in-service sexual harassment and post-service sexual assault were .23 for women and .22 for men.

**Theoretical explanations for co-victimization**

Sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence share many underlying causal or precipitating linkages, therefore co-victimization is not surprising. Returning to an
ecological framework for understanding multiple victimization (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), at the macro-level, cultures that normalize sexual violence, sustain power differences between men and women, and encourage victim-blaming belief systems foster many forms of sexual violence, including sexual harassment (Cleveland & Kerst, 1993; Dunn, 2010; Grauerholz, 2000; & Kilmartin & Allison, 2007). Sheffield (2007) suggested that a societal combination of dominance and sexuality along with victim blaming results an environment that desensitizes violence against women. Studies have found support for this theory in both workplace and military populations (Fain & Andertin, 1987; Harned et al., 2002). At the individual level of analysis, research has found heightened propensities to sexually harass among men who automatically link sexual cues with power cues (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 1995) suggesting that there may be common underlying factors connected to power that explain the propensity engage in sexual harassment and the propensity to engage in other forms of interpersonal violence.

Focusing more closely at the micro-system, researchers have identified organizational risk factors for workplace sexual harassment. Fitzgerald and her colleagues articulated an integrative model to explain the occurrence and effects of sexual harassment (Fitzgerald, Gelfand, and Drasgow, 1995; Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand & Magley, 1997; Fitzgerald, Magley et al., 1999). They identified organizational climate for tolerating sexual harassment and masculine job-gender context as the key organizational factors that facilitate sexual harassment. Specifically, climates where employees perceive that leaders do not take complaints or concerns about sexual harassment seriously, where complainants are not likely to be believed, and where perpetrators are not adequately punished have been positively linked to high rates of sexual harassment (Harned, 2002; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997). Additionally, incidents of sexual harassment increase in job contexts where men significantly outnumber women, where a woman is one of the first women to occupy a particular job area, and where the attributes of the job or job environment are masculinized or sexualized (Harned, 2002; Fitzgerald et al., 1997; Gutek, 1985; Sadler et al., 2003).

Military environments supply many of the necessary ingredients to cultivate multiple forms of sexual abuse. Almost all military occupational specialties are male dominated and masculinized; although women have always served in the military, their integration into a broader variety of roles is relatively recent, thus many women in the military are gender pioneers; and until recently many military climates could be described as being tolerant of sexual misconduct and sexual harassment (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, et al., 1999). In addition, the boundaries between work and non-work are often blurred in military settings, especially in deployment conditions. Thus, what may begin as sexual harassment while on duty may spillover to adult sexual abuse in off-duty periods. Other environments that contain many of these ingredients are those where there is a predominance of men and where working (or studying) and living quarters are close: protective services (policing and firefighting), off-shore drilling sites, mines and mining towns, and traditionally male colleges and universities, such as military services academies, to name a few.

General theories of crime offer frameworks for understanding how certain work environments may foster sexual harassment either concurrently with other forms of IPV or as a form of revictimization. The claim of Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979;
Mannon, 1997) is that incidents of crime are predicted by the confluence of motivated offenders, vulnerable victims, and the lack of capable guardians. What makes a potential offender motivated is being in close proximity to potential targets and having the opportunity to get away with the offense, which can happen in environments where the likelihood of punishment is low and with targets who may not be able to effectively resist.

Routine Activities Theory may provide both a viable framework for understanding why sexual harassment and other forms of IPV may occur either concurrently or as revictimization, and it may point to effective ways to shape interventions. As outlined below, survivors of interpersonal violence may have less-effective coping strategies to deal effectively with sexually harassing overtures. Also, such individuals may be more likely than others to find themselves in environments that are high-risk for sexual harassment, such as low-wage jobs in firms that offer little protection against sexual harassment. Moreover, these environments may permit sexual harassment to fester, which may attract individuals with a propensity to sexually harass. Thus, individuals with IPV histories may find themselves in situations where they are both exposed to motivated offenders and unprotected by capable guardians in the form of sound sexual harassment policies carried out by responsible management. Routine Activities Theory, therefore, has the potential for identifying (and hopefully eradicating) those conditions that lead to the “perfect storm” for revictimization and co-victimization: vulnerable victims, motivated offenders, and incapable guardians. We expand on this analysis below.

Sexual harassment occurs most often in male-dominated work environments (potential motivated offenders) that have lax policies on sexual harassment or complacent leadership (lack of capable guardians) (Gruber, 1998). Individuals who have a history of prior sexual abuse are clearly vulnerable victims for workplace sexual harassment (Fitzgerald et al., 1997). Further research is needed to understand why this is so. As noted above, individuals with abuse histories appear to be neither hypersensitive to innocuous cues, nor do they appear to be more psychologically disturbed than sexual harassment targets without abuse histories. But, they are more vulnerable to sexual harassment.

Most research on revictimization has studied the behaviors or psychological status of the victim, noting that PTSD symptomology and ineffective coping strategies may heighten their vulnerability (e.g., Fortier et al., 2009), but looking more closely at motivated offenders may be enlightening. In particular, do potential harassers seek out women who appear to have abuse histories with the thought that they might be “damaged goods” or “easy prey” who will not be able to easily resist harassment? Finally, capable guardians, in the form of trained, responsible and supportive supervisors and coworkers, cohesive work groups, effective policies that outline clear admonition against sexual harassment and procedures for effectively investigating and punishing offenders have been found to positively reduce sexual harassment incidents (Goldberg, 2007; 2011; Offermann & Malamut, 2002; Rosen & Martin, 1997; Settles, Cortina, Malley & Stewart, 2006; Stockdale & Sagrestano, 2010).

However, we know of only a few organizations where their training programs, policies and intervention programs calls attention to the confluence of sexual harassment with other forms of IPV. One is in the private sector (Verizon) and the other in the public sector (U.S. Military). The U.S. military, despite or perhaps because of their history of high rates of multiple
forms of sexual victimization, has taken considerable steps in recent years to address this problem. We review and critique those efforts with an eye toward identifying best practices for organizational approaches to addressing sexual victimization.

Policies, Practices and Interventions

The quadrants depicted in Figure 1 roughly classify the various empirical linkages between interpersonal violence and sexual harassment and therefore provide guidance for policies, practices and interventions that may be implemented by various actors in the ecological network in which interpersonal violence and sexual harassment are embedded. In quadrants I and II (revictimization), attention should be paid to developing effective interventions at the ontogenic level to forestall the onset of damaging developmental and other psychological disruptions that left untreated may lead to re-victimization. At the microsystem level, interventions may focus on identifying those “motivated offenders” who may be likely to target individuals who have histories of prior abuse. This may include adding modules to workplace sexual harassment training programs that debunk myths about abuse survivors as well as raise awareness of their vulnerabilities. At the exo-system level, vocational training programs that prepare displaced workers (and others) for new occupations could include programs on sexual harassment awareness and how to utilize complaint procedures properly.

For quadrants III and IV (co-victimization), firms should first recognize that interpersonal violence and dissolved workplace romances do affect their businesses including the likelihood of spillover to sexual harassment. Second, they should recognize that their own cultures or other characteristics of their organizations may foster multiple forms of sexualized victimization, especially if those cultures are highly male-dominated or otherwise masculinized and if there are permeable boundaries between work and non-work environments. We expand on organizational interventions and models below.

A recent review of the relatively scant literature on organizational approaches to sexual harassment concluded that sexual harassment policies should:
(1) Assert strong disapproval for harassing conduct; (2) clearly define sexual harassment and provide a range of examples; (3) explain sanctions that reflect the severity of conduct; (4) provide procedures for prompt and equitable grievances of sexual harassment; (5) prohibit retaliation against the complainant or his or her witnesses; (6) explain how individuals may obtain legal recourse and direct interested parties to the appropriate state or federal agencies; and (7) be widely and regularly disseminated (Stockdale & Sagrestano, 2010, p. 227).

Policies, however, are only as good as the procedures that back them up and the practices in place to train organizational members how to both respond effectively to incidents of potential sexual harassment and to prevent harassment from occurring. In this article, we have sought to broaden our understanding of the risk factors for sexual harassment by addressing its associations with other forms of interpersonal violence. Sexual harassment training, therefore, should address sexual harassment as a revictimization risk, as a spillover risk or risk-factor for other forms interpersonal violence. Furthermore, such training should debunk myths that sexual harassment complainants who have either in the past or who are currently experiencing other
forms of sexual victimization are less worthy of care and protection than other complainants. We examine some innovative organizational programs and strategies that have been developed to address multiple forms of sexual violence.

Some private-sector organizations have recognized how domestic and workplace violence may interact and influence workplace performance (Pollack, Austin, & Grisso, 2010). Verizon communications is an example of a company that has implemented employee assistance programs (EAP) aimed at intimate partner violence (Bowman & Rich, 2005). EAP programs often include resources, support, and work leave options for victims of domestic and workplace violence. Another leader in integrating support with training and prevention is the U.S. Military.

In 2005, the U.S. Military established perhaps one of the most comprehensive organizational approaches to combating sexual violence, called the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program (Department of Defense, 2011), and they have invested considerable resources in this program since 2007. The SAPR program has developed and implemented a number of strategic initiatives to address five priority areas designed to: (a) institutionalize prevention strategies in the military community; (b) increase the climate of victim confidence associated with reporting; (c) improve sexual assault response; (d) improve system accountability; and (e) improve stakeholder knowledge and understanding of sexual assault prevention and response (SAPR) (Department of Defense, 2011, p. 6).

Among the innovative strategies to increase assault victims’ reporting is a two-pronged reporting system. The first is a traditional “unrestricted” reporting system in which the alleged perpetrator(s) is identified and a formal investigation ensues. The second system, labeled “restricted reporting” permits assault victims to anonymously seek access to medical care and other forms of advocacy services without triggering an official investigation. In monitoring the effectiveness of these and other strategies in the SAPR program, the Department of Defense (2011) noted that 71% of women and 85% of men surveyed indicated experiencing an assault in the context of military duty in the past year did not utilize either the unrestricted or restricted reporting system. Primary reasons for not reporting assaults included not wanting others to know, feeling uncomfortable making a report or believing that the report would not be kept confidential. Therefore, the SAPR program implemented a number of steps to help reduce the stigma of reporting sexual assaults. These include a public service campaign, training programs for investigators and attorneys on the risks of revictimization by the military justice system, and using social networking tools to support conversations about sexual assault. Other elements of the SAPR program include a helpline within the DoD, outreach programs for civilian programs that partner with the military to provide services to assault victims, a training program for responders, and continuous training programs of military personnel including special training programs for commanders that emphasize their responsibility to intervene when they have reason to believe that an assault did or may soon occur.

Surveys conducted in even-numbered years by the Defense Manpower Data Center provide evidence of the effectiveness of SAPR initiatives. Between 2006 and 2010, incidents of sexual assault in the military have dropped from 6.8% to 4.4% for women and from 1.8% to 0.9% from men (Rock et al., 2011). In addition, a strong majority of respondents in the 2010 survey (over 88%) indicate a positive climate toward filing a report of sexual assault without fear
of reprisal; over 90% stated that they had participated in SAPR-related training and of those over 85% indicated that the training was moderately to very effective in preventing or reducing sexual assault (Rock et al., 2011). The Department of Defense (2011) recognizes, however, that problems of sexual assault in the military have not disappeared and that further vigilance is needed. Nonetheless, their multi-pronged and multi-layered approach seems to be paying positive dividends.

The SAPR program distinguishes between sexual assault and sexual harassment. SAPR and the DOD’s survey program refers to sexual assault as unwanted sexual contact which “includes rape, non-consensual sodomy (oral or anal sex), or indecent assault (unwanted, inappropriate sexual contact or fondling) and can occur regardless of gender, age, or spousal relationship” (Lipari, Cook, Rock & Matos, 2008, p iv). The SAPR Office (SAPRO) implements and monitors programs and policies with regard to unwanted sexual contact (sexual assault). Sexual harassment in the U.S. military, on the other hand, falls under the purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity. Sexual harassment includes “crude and offensive behavior, unwanted attention, and sexual coercion” (Lipari et al., 2008, p. vii); and along with sexist behavior comprises unwanted gender-related experiences. Familial sex crimes (crimes against children and family members) are the purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Family Advocacy Program. A component of training programs offered by SAPRO is to help military personnel distinguish between sexual assault and sexual harassment.

Although the DoD's survey program monitors experiences of both unwanted sexual contact and sexual harassment, the fact that sexual harassment is carved out of SAPRO’s purview may warrant reconsideration given that both empirical evidence and theory links various forms of sexual assault and sexual harassment – especially evidence from military surveys showing that a high percentage of sexual assault victims were either sexually harassed or stalked by their perpetrators before the assault incident (Harned et al., 2002; Sadler et al., 2003). For example, SAPRO initiatives that could be broadened to include considerations of sexual harassment are the restricted and unrestricted reporting options and training to military personnel to be vigilant of sexual harassment as a precursor to more serious forms of sexual harassment. Military personnel at all levels would also benefit from understanding the links between prior victimization, such as child sexual assault, and revictimization in the form of sexual harassment as well as adult sexual assault. Commanders and other leaders could be trained to recognize signs of co-victimization or revictimization such as avoidance coping, or risky behavior such as heavy drinking and refer individuals to appropriate services. Leaders should also take appropriate measures to modify the conditions that exacerbate any form of victimization as well as repeat victimization. These include monitoring the environment for sexually derogatory stimuli including graffiti and banter that mock vulnerable populations such as abuse survivors. Leaders should also clarify and support the paths to resources that targets should follow to receive appropriate relief. Such resources should be cognizant of the connections between all forms of interpersonal violence including sexual harassment. All ranks of military personnel should also be trained to understand and recognize the links between interpersonal violence and sexual harassment and be taught how to intervene appropriately when they believe that assaults or harassment have occurred or are likely to occur.
These recommendations are not limited to the U.S. Military. Sexual harassment training programs in all contexts should include a discussion of the links between sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence. This discussion should note the links between prior sexual abuse and sexual harassment revictimization as well as concurrent risks of sexual harassment with interpersonal violence, especially in the context of dissolved workplace romances or in work environments where the boundaries between work and nonwork are fluid. In addition to adding training elements to discuss linkages between sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence, organizations may follow the lead of SAPRO to provide or refer employees to services that may help them deal effectively with intimate partner violence or with the consequences of past abuse. Increasing employees’ mastery over these matters is likely to translate to effective means of confronting potential sexual harassment or other forms of abuse in the workplace (Pearlin & Schooler, 1978).

Litigation practices should also be carefully examined with eye toward discerning the difference between plausible and unsupported connections between sexual harassment, interpersonal violence and the various problems that result from sexual abuse in the past. A tactic used by defense attorneys to mitigate the amount of damages potentially awarded to sexual harassment plaintiffs is to argue that a plaintiff who claims more than garden-variety psychological effects from harassment may not be eligible for compensation if she or he has a prior history of sexual abuse. It is the effects of the prior abuse and not the sexual harassment that is the cause of psychological effects, such as major depression or PTSD, so the argument goes. Prominent defense attorney James McDonald, who specializes in mental health issues in the workplace and author of Mental and Emotional Injuries in Employment Litigation (McDonald & Kulick, 2001), argues this point: claims of mental health damages by sexual harassment plaintiffs with a history of prior sexual abuse are not the result of sexual harassment but instead from the prior abuse (McDonald, 2007; McDonald & Feldman-Schorrig, 1994). Similarly, special masters, who are assigned by courts to sort out case-by-case claims in multi-plaintiff cases, such as class action suits, may also rely on this type of faulty reasoning to exclude particular plaintiffs from receiving their full share of compensatory damages.

This appeared to be the case in the first class action sexual harassment lawsuit on which the movie North Country was based. In the appellate case of Jenson et al., v. Eveleth Taconite (1997), the 8th Circuit made reference to a lengthy report by a special master who was appointed to allocate damage awards to Jenson and her fellow class members. The court found that the special master made egregious errors in collecting and over-relying on evidence of prior abuse and prior mental health problems of class members. The justices’ stated that the special master minimized the amount of damages to be awarded to class members who had experienced prior abuse or prior mental health problems reasoning that their emotional and physical damages were not due to the harassment experienced at Eveleth Taconite but instead due to the prior abuse.

Empirical research does not support the supposition that only the effects of prior abuse accounts for psychological trauma that flows from sexual harassment such as PTSD or major depression. As noted above, Stockdale et al., (2009) found that sexual harassment was related to the onset of PTSD symptoms after controlling for sexual abuse that occurred in the past, including child sexual abuse and interpersonal partner violence, as well as pre-existing symptoms of PTSD. Nonetheless, prior and concurrent forms of interpersonal violence are
associated with experiences of sexual harassment. As demonstrated in this paper there is no single explanation these associations. Litigators and the justice system in general should take an informed look at full circumstances surrounding claims of sexual harassment that include prior or concurrent histories of other forms of interpersonal violence.

Conclusions

Sexual harassment and other forms of interpersonal violence such as childhood sexual abuse and sexual assault are often researched and theorized separately. Because sexual harassment is considered an employment issue and is legally carved out as such, it is often conceptualized outside of the continuum of interpersonal violence and often treated as an unfair work practice, not as a form of violence. The empirical links commonly found in the victimization literatures indicates sexual harassment is not only related to other forms of interpersonal violence, but also firmly positioned in the continuum of violence. Previous abuse not only predicts increased risk for future abuse, but also an increased risk of being the target of sexual harassment.

The sobering statistics of revictimization paints a grim picture of increased risk that spirals with each act of victimization. Initial victimization, especially sexual abuse in childhood and adolescence, is clearly associated with increased risk of future adult sexual victimization including sexual harassment. Empirical longitudinal studies have examined multiple theories to explain this relationship. The strongest support for a potential cause for revictimization is the development of maladaptive coping styles and a decreased sensitivity to early warning signs. The stress and trauma of victimization often leads to risky coping behaviors including substance abuse that further increases the likelihood of future victimization. Additionally, those previously victimized, partly due to risky life behaviors, may also be less sensitive to dangerous situations. Reduced social support and financial insecurity may further limit an individual’s ability to avoid or respond to potential future threats. The cycle starts with an initial act of victimization which leads to increased risky behavior thus further reducing personal, financial and social resources and increasing exposure to future threats. This same pattern could easily result in past victims occupying jobs with an increased likelihood of experiencing sexual harassment.

The defining factor between other forms of sexualized violence and sexual harassment is one of context. Sexual harassment from hostile environments to coercive quid pro quo sexual assault occurs within the workplace, a context which carries its own set of laws and legal obligations. Other forms of interpersonal violence usually occur outside of work. This work/non-work divide has contributed to the theoretical and legal separation of sexual harassment from non-workplace sexual abuse.

The U.S. military’s success with interventions focused on reducing all forms of interpersonal violence including sexual harassment is encouraging. The substantial improvement in reducing reported assaults in the military suggests such programs may be successfully adapted for use in other types of organizations. However, the military has the advantage of targeting programs that affect both work and non-work (family) arenas, which may be beyond many organizations’ abilities or legal rights. Organizations need to recognize that an important part of any sexual harassment policy or plan must recognizes that harassment lies in a continuum of violence that both exceeds the work boundaries and is affected by employee’s non-work life. We
hope we have provided fodder for future research on the connections between multiple forms of victimization including sexual harassment and for developing sound policies and practices that take this comprehensive approach.
References


Fitzgerald, L. F., Swan, S., Magley, V. J. (1997). But was it really sexual harassment?: Legal, behavioral, and psychological definitions of the workplace victimization of women. In


Appendix

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<td>IPV Precedes SH</td>
<td>I. REVICTIMIZATION-INTIMATE (e.g., CSA by family member; Intimate Partner Violence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPV Concurrent with SH</td>
<td>III. CO-VICTIMIZATION-INTIMATE (e.g., Dissolved workplace romance; Intimate Partner Violence)</td>
<td>IV. CO-VICTIMIZATION – OTHER (e.g., Harassment and violence-prone organizational cultures)</td>
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Figure 1. Framework for classifying structural relationships between IPV and Sexual Harassment (SH)

Note: IPV=Interpersonal Violence; SH=Sexual Harassment; CSA=Child Sexual Assault; ASA=Adult Sexual Assault.
Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA) Effectiveness: Barriers and Enablers of Performance

Carol Paris

Abstract

The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) is currently sponsoring an effort to identify factors that influence the performance of DOD Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOAs) and the effectiveness of the DOD Equal Opportunity (EO) Program. The EOA is a critical component of the DOD EO program because the EOA is the primary advisor to senior leaders on EO issues. By ascertaining what barriers stand in the way of exemplary performance for EOAs, it might be possible to determine what improvements can enhance their performance.

This research is leveraging work conducted by both industry and the military in the field of Human Performance Technology (HPT). The HPT community utilizes Thomas Gilbert’s (1978) Behavioral Engineering Model (BEM) to identify and categorize root causes of performance problems. This model proposes that there are two primary categories of influencing factors. These are “Environmental Supports” and “Person’s Repertory of Behavior.” The former is under control of the organization and the latter is under control of the individual. HPT studies have found that approximately eighty percent (80%) of performance problems can be attributed to organizational or environmental issues such as manpower, systems, and processes. In addition, about sixty percent (60%) of performance problems are related to lack of clear job definition or lack of sufficient tools and resources, which are both under control of the organization. It is yet to be determined whether the current research, which includes surveys and interviews from EOAs and Commanding Officers (COs) across Services, will validate such findings. This paper presents findings to date and implications they may have for the DOD EO program.

Keywords: Equal Opportunity Advisors, EOAs, Performance Effectiveness, Performance Barriers, Performance Enablers, Behavioral Engineering Model

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA) Effectiveness: Barriers and Enablers of Performance

The FY2010-12 Strategic Plan of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness identified Strategic Goal 1.3 as the need to strengthen advocacy of diversity in the forces. The goal placed special emphasis on the effectiveness of Equal Opportunity Advisors (EOAs) and senior DOD leadership. EOAs are critical components to ensure overall DOD EO program effectiveness because they are the primary advisors to senior leaders on all EO issues. To accomplish Strategic Goal 1.3, it is necessary to establish a baseline of EOA and EO program effectiveness across Service-specific EO programs and to determine what measures and improvements can enhance the effectiveness of Service EOAs. DEOMI is sponsoring an effort to identify factors—barriers and enablers—that influence the performance effectiveness of EOAs.

This effort is leveraging work conducted by both industry and the military in the field of Human Performance Technology (HPT). HPT utilizes several models to identify the root causes of performance problems. The most popular model is that proposed by Thomas Gilbert (1978), i.e., the Behavioral Engineering Model (BEM) (see Figure 1). Within this model, there exist two primary categories of influences—“Environmental Supports” and “Person’s Repertory of Behavior.” “Environmental Supports” includes factors that influence the work environment, are considered external to the individual, and are primarily under the authority, support, and control of the organization. These include data (e.g., expectations, guides, and feedback), resources, and incentives.

Data include the following:
- Relevant and frequent feedback about the adequacy of performance
- Descriptions of what is expected of performance
- Clear and relevant guides to adequate performance

In other words, does the performer have a clear understanding of what is expected from him/her? Resources are tools, time, and materials designed to match performance needs. Does the worker have the right resources to perform the job?

Incentives address the following:
- Adequate financial incentives made contingent upon performance
- Non-monetary incentives made available
- Career-development opportunities
- Clear consequences for poor performance.

In summary, are appropriate incentives in place to motivate individuals to perform?

“Person’s Repertory of Behavior” includes factors primarily under the control of the individual, such as knowledge, capacity, and motives. Knowledge is defined in two ways: (a) systematically designed training that matches the requirements of exemplary performance, and
placement. In other words, has the correct person been placed in the job and did he or she receive the proper training to become an exemplary performer?

Capacity is defined as follows:

- Flexible scheduling of performance to match peak capacity
- Prosthesis or visual aids
- Physical shaping
- Adaptation
- Selection

If the performer has sufficient capacity, he/she has the intelligence, physical ability, and other necessary skills to perform a specific task. He/she can learn and adapt to in order to perform well.

Motives include an assessment of people’s motives to work, as well as the recruitment of people to match the realities of the situation. Individual motives need to be aligned with the work environment so that individuals will have a desire to work and excel.

HPT practitioners, from industry (e.g., researchers such as Edward Deming, Geary Rummler, and Alan Brache) and the military (e.g., U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy), have demonstrated that approximately eighty percent (80%) of performance problems are attributed to organizational or environmental issues such as manpower, systems, and processes (see Figures 2 and 3). Moreover, at least sixty percent (60%) of performance problems are related to lack of clear job definition or lack of sufficient tools and resources—both under the control of the organization (see Figures 2 and 3). In summary, organizational issues are more likely to present a barrier to effective human performance than individual-focused issues, such as knowledge and training. As Rummler and Brache (1995) state, “If you pit a good performer against a bad system, the system will win almost every time” (p. 13).

Method

The current effort entails collecting and analyzing survey and interview data from both EOAs and Commanding Officers (COs) to ascertain what barriers stand in the way of exemplary performance for EOAs. The interviews and surveys are being used to help establish the current state of training and operations for EOA, as well as recommendations for improving both. They should also support the development of performance metrics to monitor and increase effectiveness of individual EOAs and the EO program.

The survey is web-based and is being administered via Survey Monkey. DEOMI is responsible for identifying and recruiting all participants (via emails). Survey participants are those graduates of the DEOMI EOA course offerings from 2008 through 2010. Since there are three course offerings each year, graduates of nine courses are being tapped for the survey. A separate survey is being circulated to Commanders of EOAs to obtain their perspectives on the same types of issues. It is important to achieve a fair representation of EOAs and Commanders from each Service, dependent upon that Service’s proportionate share of the total military EOA population. As of the time of this writing, approximately 161 survey responses have been
received. Demographic percentages are still in flux; however, to date, the primary response characteristics are as follows: Army, active duty, enlisted, male, Caucasian, have some college or bachelor’s degrees, and have between one and two years of experience. Most respondents to date graduated from DEOMI’s 2010 EOA course offerings.

For the interviews, which will supplement the surveys to some extent, experienced EOAs are being queried to validate Service-specific system models that have been created to describe the internal and external organizational relationships and responsibilities that EOAs have within each Service. These models are not presented in this paper; however, throughout the interviews these subject matter experts are providing additional data regarding barriers and enablers that they have personally experienced.

EOA-Identified Barriers to Performance

The data presented is very preliminary, and will be presented in the following order: barriers first, followed by enablers, then actions that EOAs can take to improve performance effectiveness. For the barriers and enablers, the data will be categorized according to the BEM model, as a means of organization. We start with the Environmental Barriers and then follow with the Individual Barriers. We briefly summarize the response data and present just a few of the survey comments as samples of the data received.

Environmental Barriers

Data. For survey respondents, almost half of the EOAs indicate that there are no information barriers. For the others it seems that lack of feedback, information sharing, and continuity with the previous EOA are important issues. Additionally, lack of support from senior leadership is repeatedly mentioned.

Examples include:

- Expectations and feedback: “Senior leaders are not providing feedback.” Almost half (45.6%) of the respondents indicate that when they began their rotation, their commanding officer (CO) or supervisor did not even convey his/her expectations for them in terms of EO goals for the command.

- Information sharing: “There are no lessons learned. There is no ‘best practice’ sharing.”

- Continuity with the previous EOA: “There was no turnover binder, no road ahead in terms of the who, what, when of the command structure. It was more like sink or swim.” More than half of respondents (55.6%) indicate that they were not debriefed by the prior EOA.

- Lack of support from senior leadership: “CDRs don’t care about the program period. Some do but most have better things to do.” About one third (29.6%) of the respondents feel as though their interactions with their COs are not sufficient (frequent or helpful enough) to perform their job in an optimal manner.
Interview data corroborate some of the above barriers. Specifically, lack of leadership understanding and advocacy, as well as lack of face time with the CO, were mentioned. Most interactions are with others lower in the chain of command. Continuity with the previous EOA, in conjunction with too little information sharing, also surfaced in the discussions. There is typically no handover or transfer of lessons learned, particularly if the role remains vacant for some time before a replacement arrives. With respect to performance feedback, for one Service at least, there are no standard performance evaluations for EOAs.

Resources. About half of the respondents indicate that they don't really have a resource problem. Those who do indicate a resource problem seem to identify funding and staffing as the most important resource problems. Examples include:

- Funding: “No funds set aside for the program. It is difficult to get funding and it limits the program from its full potential”; “Without a budget I have to constantly and literally beg for money to use for the program”; “[If] you want EO to be taken seriously, then force it to be funded with the same zeal as the motor pool or weapon training.”

- Staffing: “Undermanned to accomplish all the goals of the EO program…."

Again, interview data corroborate some of these barriers. Lack of funding for education programs, command assist visits, and assessments of subordinate commands was mentioned. Other resource shortfalls that emerged include competing priorities, with associated lack of time to perform, EOA vacancies awaiting replacements, and the fact that the EOA role is a collateral duty of short duration for some Services.

Incentives. The majority of respondents do not see incentives as an issue. Others state that: 1) there are no incentives associated with the job (e.g., “no incentive at all” and “only evals”) or with maintaining a positive EO climate (e.g., “a part of the issue with the EO program is there are no incentives for maintaining a positive EO climate”). Some respondents assert that the job itself is rewarding because EOAs are helping others (e.g., “I don't need any of that. Doing my job is rewarding enough”).

According to the interviews, incentives are impacted by the lack of leadership advocacy and face time. It is hard to be incentivized when superiors don’t support the role. One interviewee noted the potential for EOA/CO role conflict. For that interviewee’s particular Service, the EOA role can influence promotion. Since EOAs’ superiors influence their promotions, there is a natural tendency for EOAs to avoid acting in a manner inconsistent with their superior’s wishes. Thus there may be a conflict: does the individual do what is required of him (“what is right”) or do what pleases his/her CO? This is a built-in incentive problem that can only be addressed by the organization.

Organizational culture. In addition to the BEM categories, we looked at Organizational Culture as a whole within the survey. About half of the respondents think that there is no problem with
organizational culture. For the rest, teamwork, leadership, and respect are perceived to be problematic. Again, the examples include:

- Teamwork: “Teamwork and teambuilding are not necessarily taught and the competitive nature of our organization actually hurts rather than helps unit cohesion.”

- Leadership: “Lack of access to the commander…should be able to have immediate access to the commander but this does not always happen.”

- Respect: “It seems that rank means ability and competence. No one truly sees diversity in the people in the workforce.”

Person’s Repertory Barriers

In general, when asked whether their own knowledge, skills, attitudes, interests, and motivation are aligned to the EOA job requirements, 92.2% responded “yes.” In this sense, most survey respondents do feel as though they are well-suited to the job. We continue with a discussion of sub-categories under Person’s Repertory.

Knowledge. Many of the respondents indicated that there is really no Knowledge/Training problem (e.g., “sufficient training received” and “DEOMI training was outstanding, the resources that are continually provided are very helpful”). However, some respondents indicated that more training is needed in the DEOMI portion of the course, the service specific portion (e.g., “Service specific needs to be longer and more focused”), and that more training after graduation is needed—continuing education and local training. For example, “I would like to receive supplemental training and professional development throughout my tour as an EOA. I know I didn't learn everything there is to know about human relations/factors/group dynamics that could help me do my job better. Even if it is just a monthly article emailed to me that highlights a topic of use to me - it's better than nothing...If there were a mentorship program developed after students leave DEOMI - that might be helpful. There is not any structured on the job training with exception of trial by error in most cases. The job aids available - none unless I make them myself, get them online, or have the unit fund them. It's pretty much when you leave DEOMI, good luck!” Another respondent stated, “Make it mandatory for EOAs, while on EO duties, to attend Continuing Education courses at DEOMI because once you are assigned to the unit they do not want to release the EOA for additional training. The entire EO community would benefit from such a move in that (1) it reminds the EOAs of their purpose within the organization (Change Agent), (2) it creates a forum besides the EOAs’ Conference for EOAs to collaborate and share experiences and challenges they have encountered in the field, and (3) commands will be reminded that the EO program is serious business.”

For the interviews, the comments to date seem to be more Service-specific. One Service, in particular, notes that the “whole system is run by individuals with minimal training” (although they are overseen by EOAs).
Capacity. Many of the EOA survey respondents indicated that they have no barriers in this category (e.g., “I am no different than any others, I have some limitations, but not enough to overshadow the hard work I put in and the positive results I get out of helping the command and soldiers”). A few seem to have self concept/self efficacy issues (e.g., “I feel like a counselor but without all the tools and skills of one. What are the right questions, how should they be asked, how do I break in and redirect without being insensitive…”). Some also seem to be frustrated with their personal situation (e.g., “The physical space between units greatly affects my ability to do this job”).

Motives. A large number of the respondents do not perceive that there is a problem with motivation (e.g., “I love my job, it is important, and needed”) and self-concept (e.g., “I'm a very good EOA”) although a few did (e.g. “It is easy to lose motivation when people don't appreciate what we do” or “I get frustrated because I can't make the difference I thought I could or hoped I could”). The lack of leadership support impacted individual motivation (e.g., “The only limitation I have is how much failure in support I can handle…I have voiced my opinion on several occasions about leadership failing to support or not allowing the process of the program”).

For the interviews, one Service EOA noted that it is usually not an advantage to become an EOA, that is, to pull away from one’s Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and lose touch with one’s MOS skills. So it can be a disadvantage to be an EOA; in fact, it carries a negative stigma. Individual motivation is affected. Since this barrier could also fall within the purview of the organization to address, it might be more of an issue under the Environmental Incentives category.

**EOA-Identified Enablers to Performance**

Data collected to date for the environmental enablers comes from the interviews, while the data to support enablers at the individual level is derived from the surveys. Again, these data are preliminary and will be fleshed out as data collection continues.

**Environmental Enablers**

Data. Suggestions from interviewees include three items: (a) a comprehensive assessment tool, (b) a good screening process in place to recruit the best—to get the right person for the job, and (c) a mechanism in place, with set processes and standards, to ensure that the program runs smoothly.

Resources. We only have one suggestion to date, i.e. to have EOAs at every major base.

Incentives. Again, we have only one suggestion to date, i.e. leadership understanding/advocacy/face time or access.

Person’s Repertory Enablers (Knowledge, Capacity, Motives). For these categories, we refer to the next section, which describes exemplary EOA performance and explains what enables EOAs to perform at their best.
Exemplary EOA Performance/What should be Measured?

One purpose of the survey was to understand what performance skills should be measured for EOAs. We asked what constitutes exemplary performance for an EOA. There are some interesting themes in the data—visibility, communication skills, commitment, proficiency, setting the example, etc. Listed below are exemplary characteristics brought to light by respondents.

- **Case Management:** Cases are managed effectively and efficiently. There are no long standing EO cases. There are no formal complaints due to a good working environment.

- **Training:** EOAs conduct annual training as required. They seek to continuously educate themselves. They are able to facilitate relevant and realistic training and are able to disseminate EO information.

- **Communication Skills:** EOAs possess the following skill sets: good speaking and writing skills, good listening skills, good problem solving skills, good interpersonal skills (to include understanding human nature), accurate record-keeping skills, and excellent teaching skills. They also exhibit self-confidence, because it is very easy to get steam-rolled by other people in the chain of command and because the program can easily get side-tracked if the EOA is not confident.

- **Cognitive Skills:** EOAs have critical thinking skills. Commanders and senior leaders ask them for recommendations to solve complex issues. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the operating environment requires that EOAs are agile enough to perform outside of the doctrine they are taught.

- **High Visibility:** EOAs are sought after for advice by leaders at all levels. They are also sought after to conduct training. This shows confidence in their abilities. Leaders know them and are comfortable coming to them. EOAs command people’s attention when speaking. They are proactive in the job. They are social with all members and groups, regardless of race or gender. They get out of the office and walk around. Finally, they go above and beyond by representing their Service in the local community.

- **Job Commitment/Diligence:** EOAs have commitment and dedication to getting the job done.

- **Job Proficiency/Skills:** EOAs are able to run an effective EO program and establish rapport with the command. They are viewed by the command as someone who is genuinely concerned about the climate of the command and the welfare of the crew. They are great trainers. They have self-confidence. They are not motivated solely by good evaluations. They have the ability to talk to people and write well. They must be willing to seek information and take action in the absence of orders. They are self starters and are able to think ‘outside the box.’ Finally, they are good at ‘selling’ the program and how important it is to the overall readiness of the command.
• Setting a Good Example: EOAs live by example every day, making on-the-spot corrections when experiencing or overhearing inappropriate conduct or expressions. In other words, they address such behaviors as they occur rather than walking away and giving the wrong impression of their position.

• Flexibility/Resourcefulness/Independence: To quote one respondent, “When an EOA can plan, coordinate, and execute a world class special observance without spending a dime—you can do this if budget is not available and you have a passion for what you do, you will go out of your way and maximize all other resources available.”

There were many excellent ideas in the data set, and these will be refined as more data is gathered. We would like, however, to present one response that was particularly poignant in driving home the EOA ideal:

The ability to have true Personal Courage when confronted with EO issues that START at the command level. The ability to communicate with ALL Soldiers—not just the ones that share a similar cultural background as the EOA. The compassion, empathy, and desire to do what’s right because it’s the right thing to do. The ability to LIVE the Values regardless of personal image perception or the fear of being considered a ‘goody two shoes.’ Actually following the regulatory guidance and then DOING something to improve the climate of the unit. Most importantly, having the command NOTICE and APPRECIATE that the EOA has the ability to do all of the things mentioned above.

EOA Actions to Improve Effectiveness

We asked the EOAs what they felt they could do to improve effectiveness and it appears that the responses tend to fall under three topics: leadership actions, resource actions, and training/education/knowledge actions. Under leadership actions, a common response was to try to talk to leadership about the issues, although there was an underlying thread that such actions were a waste of time. The respondents mentioned getting leaders trained (especially taking the leadership courses at DEOMI), working with leaders on the DEOCs, and ensuring that they are included at meetings, when applicable. With respect to resource actions, the respondents pointed to establishing relationships with other EOAs and command sections to get materials needed, talking to the CO and comptroller about budgetary restraints, and working around the budget to maximize all available resources. Last, with regard to training/education/knowledge actions, one respondent stated that he/she conducted a professional development session for 2 hours and provided an open forum to discuss the program, requirements, issues, and challenges. It was very effective in identifying some of the barriers and ways to address them. Other actions mentioned include writing issue papers and being a good observer/listener to pick up on things where they could provide help.

Take-away from the interviews regarding proactive actions that EOAs can take to improve effectiveness are limited to date. However, we can point to one recommendation that has been made: an EOA should maintain high visibility with the CO and the command.
Recommended EOA Program Changes and Facilitation of Those Changes

We asked survey respondents for their ideas in terms of recommended EOA program changes. Our discussion here is very high-level and limited. We would like to flesh out these data more, and will present them in our final report. Briefly, however, the responses were related to changes in staffing, training, organizational culture, leadership, and resources. We also asked what EOAs, their COs, or their respective Services could do to facilitate those changes. The most common response of the EOAs is that they would use training and education to facilitate the changes to the program that they recommended. They would create awareness, continue to educate, and continue to communicate. Regarding COs, there is a clear theme that CO endorsement and support is an important factor in making the program work. This dovetails with other answers which suggest that leadership problems are a major barrier for the EOAs. Regarding the Services, it seems that the Services need to look more closely at staffing, assignment, and training. There is also an underlying theme which suggests that there are program process issues that need to be addressed by the Services. The ongoing data collection should contribute more insight into these issues.

Next Steps

Data collection is ongoing and will continue until adequate representation is achieved for each of the Services. Validation of the Service-specific system models via subject matter experts will also continue until all Services are satisfied with the models. As a preview of the current effort, four work phases have been identified. The surveys and interviews discussed in this paper represent focused efforts from Phase 1. Data obtained should provide inputs to Phase 2, which is to develop measures of performance for EOAs and measures of effectiveness for EOA programs. As is clear, we are only beginning this journey.

- **Phase 1:** *Determine EO and EOA Requirements and Organizational Level Relationships* - specifically, determine Service Specific requirements, barriers, and potential measures, documented in a framework linking relationships between EOA and other roles in the organization.
- **Phase 2:** *Develop EO Program Effectiveness Indicators and EOA Performance Indicators* - specifically identify measures of performance (MOPs) for individual EOAs and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for Service EOA programs
- **Phase 3:** *Develop Prototype Assessment Model* – to include researching commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software, developing the prototype, and determining whether the EO/EOA measures are sufficient to identify program and training changes that are necessary to improve effectiveness.
- **Phase 4:** *Testing and Transition of Prototype*—to include testing and assisting DEOMI in transition of the prototype.
Conclusion

To summarize, this effort is identifying enablers of successful EOA performance, prospective measures of EOA performance, as well as potential actions that EOAs can take to improve their individual and organizational effectiveness. This paper presents the preliminary findings to date and the implications they may have for the DOD EO program. One remarkable finding that has emerged from the data collected thus far is that there are many very dedicated and committed EOAs operating in the field. They admit that they face many barriers in the execution of their daily duties. Specifically, when asked if they encountered any organizational conditions or issues that prevented them from providing exemplary performance, more than two-thirds (68%) of the respondents replied that they had. When asked to what extent such barriers had interfered with their job performance, more than one-third (37.8%) indicated “somewhat” to “very much.” As one respondent put it:

I think this job is so important and so valuable that it drives me every day. It is the first job I've had in my career that I haven't minded getting up in the morning and staying late in the evenings for. I think my own personal desire to do this job and make a difference reflects as being a genuine EOA. I find myself frustrated when system and processes in place don’t support the execution of this job.

It is the objective of this effort to uncover those issues that impede the effectiveness of the EOA and the EOA program and based upon those findings, to make recommendations to the Services and DOD.
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</table>

Figure 2. Industry Findings: Percentage Distribution of Root Causes. A meta-analyses of “Human Performance Improvement” (HPI) projects conducted by Industry. Graphic from ProofPoint, Inc., 2004, based upon research of E. Deming, G. Rummler, & A. Brache (multiple citations- examples in reference list).
Figure 3. U.S. Coast Guard Findings: Percentage Distribution of Root Causes. A meta-analyses of “Human Performance Improvement” (HPI) projects conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Performance Technology Center. Source: Quiram, T. J. (2008, October). A meta-analyses of Human Performance Improvement (HPI) projects conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Performance Technology Center. Paper presented at the U.S. Coast Guard Human Performance Technology Workshop, Yorktown, VA.
Latent Profile Analysis of an Equal Opportunity Climate Measure

Aaron Watson and Marinus van Driel

Abstract

Equal Opportunity Climate (EOC) measures provide assessments of organizational climate associated with equity and fairness as perceived by organizational members. This study used a statistical methodology called latent profile analysis (LPA) to identify subgroups of respondents who showed similar response profiles across multiple facets of EOC. We found experienced discrimination and respondent demographics related to respondents’ EOC response profiles. Also, job-related attitudes, such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment, differed across subgroups. This analytic approach is novel to the study of EOC perceptions.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
Latent Profile Analysis of an Equal Opportunity Climate Measure

Within the military context, Equal Opportunity climate (EOC) is a topic of long standing interest. This interest is the product of the military’s concern about diversity-related issues, spurred initially by both the civil rights movement and the realization that diversity was an operational reality in the Armed Services (Estrada, Stetz, & Harbke, 2007). Today a variety of Equal Opportunity (EO) initiatives are present within the U.S. military services. Among these is the assessment of EOC via widely deployed surveys such as the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Equal Opportunity Climate Survey (DEOCS).

EOC is a concept that is focused on equity and fairness within organizational contexts (Estrada et al., 2007), overlapping considerably with what Cox (1993) and others (e.g., Van Knippenberg, & Schippers, 2007; Kossek, & Zonia, 1993) refer to as diversity climate. Diversity climate is typically assessed in terms of individuals’ evaluations of methods for managing workplace diversity (Kossek & Zonia, 1993; McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2009; Mor Barak, Cherin, & Berkman, 1998; Van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007), whereas EO climate focuses more specifically on perceptions of the opportunities and potential favoritism afforded to groups of employees defined in terms of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin (Dansby & Landis, 1991).

Based on these observations, the assessment of EOC is inherently dependent on perceptions of inequities. Such perceptions are the products of an idiosyncratic (i.e., person-centered) process dependent on the personal demographics and experiences of a person. For instance, if a person with membership in a particular demographic group (e.g., females) perceives inequities in regards to the opportunities afforded to individuals of another relevant demographic group (e.g., males), lower EOC perceptions may result. These types of between group differences in EOC perceptions have been addressed in a variety of studies. For instance, Truhon (2005) indicated that EOC perceptions are typically higher for Whites. Similarly, Truhon and Parks (2007) indicated that facets of EOC are lower for women than men and higher for Whites than non-Whites.

Much like diversity climate, (e.g., Hicks-Clarke & Iles, 2000; Hopkins, Hopkins & Malette, 2001; McKay et al., 2007), EOC has been linked to a variety of organizational outcomes, such as organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and perceived workgroup efficacy in active duty military personnel (e.g., Estrada et al., 2007; McIntyre, Bartle, Landis, & Dansby, 2002). Research has also indicated that aspects of EO climate (e.g., racist behaviors, and sexual discrimination) are significant predictors of organizational outcomes including job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and work group effectiveness (McIntyre, 2002; Truhon & Parks, 2007).

Within all of these approaches, EOC has traditionally been approached from a nomothetic or latent factor based perspective. The relationships between facets of EOC and relevant correlates have been examined, as well as quantitative differences between groups of respondents on various aspects of EOC. However, to our knowledge, no published empirical studies have approached EOC from an idiographic, or person-centered analytic approach. Such an approach may enhance understanding of the EOC construct because different configurations of EOC perceptions may emerge in distinct subgroups of respondents. The present study
explores EOC from an idiographic perspective using latent profile analysis (LPA) to determine whether distinct subgroups of respondents with similar profiles (i.e., patterns of response) of EOC perceptions could be identified. Furthermore, we examine whether respondent characteristics, specifically experienced discrimination and demographics, predict the EOC response profiles respondents exhibit. Finally, we investigate whether or not respondent groups that show different EOC response profiles also exhibit different job-related attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational commitment).

**Applying LPA to EOC**

LPA is a person-centered data analytic approach that helps create a holistic assessment of a person’s response pattern derived from a psychometric assessment (Magnusson & Stattin, 1998). LPA differs from traditional nomothetic, or variable-centered approaches (e.g., regression, factor analysis), in that it identifies subgroups within a population that share similar patterns of response (Marsh, Trautwein, & Morin, 2009). LPA is used to cluster individuals who share a similar response patterns on continuous variables (for a computational overview, see Muthén, 2001), similar to the way in which factor analysis is used to cluster variables that show common variance (Lubke & Marsh, 2005; Pastor, Barron, Miller, & Davis, 2007). Said another way, “The common factor model decomposes the covariances to highlight relationships among the variables, whereas the latent profile model composes the covariances to highlight relationships among individuals (Pastor et al., 2007, p.6).”

Meaningful subgroups of respondents to a multi-faceted EOC measure who share similar climate perceptions may be detected through LPA. LPA seeks to detect unobservable subgroups (or latent classes) within larger populations (Marsh et al., 2009). These latent classes are assumed to differ from one another quantitatively, qualitatively, or both. Quantitative differences are represented by mean level differences between classes for specific indicators or variables (e.g., differences in the perceived degree of racial favoritism within an organization). Qualitative differences are revealed by different configurations of responses across variables. For example, one class might show uniform positive EOC perceptions, while another class shows positive perceptions of some aspects of EOC and negative perceptions of other aspects of EOC.

Empirically establishing respondent groups who share common EOC perceptions within a diverse respondent population could enhance understanding of the EOC construct in three ways. First, it would reveal the unique configurations of multi-faceted EOC perceptions and their prevalence organizations. Second, identifying these subgroups will allow us to examine the individual and organizational factors that contribute to EOC profiles. For instance, prior experience of discrimination is expected to influence the specific EOC profile a respondent exhibits. Likewise, respondent demographics (e.g., race, gender, etc.) are also expected to relate to EOC response profiles. Third, identifying subgroups with specific EOC profiles will allow us to test whether or not these groups differ on job-related attitudes that have been linked to EOC, such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment (e.g., McIntyre, 2002; Truhon & Parks, 2007).
As the research literature is arguably too young to support specific predictions regarding potential latent profiles and their relationships to correlates and outcomes, we examine these issues in the form of the following research questions:

*Research Question 1:* Will a latent profile analysis of Equal Opportunity Climate measures detect multiple latent profile classes?

*Research Question 2:* Will experienced discrimination and respondent demographics predict latent profile class membership?

*Research Question 3:* Will the latent profile classes show differences in job-related attitudes?

**Method**

**Sample and Procedure**

The sample consisted of 14,323 U.S. military personnel employed across 200 military organizations (e.g., units, agencies) who responded to the DEOCS in 2008. When requested by a military commander or leaders of a civilian federal organization, all members of an organization are asked to complete the DEOCS. While the DEOCS can be administered via paper-and-pencil, only responses to the web-based version were used in this study. An invitation to complete the DEOCS containing a web link (URL) to the online instrument was distributed to all organizational members. Organizational members receive instructions regarding the purpose of the DEOCS and are assured that data they provide will be strictly confidential.

The 200 organizations included in the current study were randomly selected from a database of over 14,000 military and federal organizations and over one million respondents. A summary of demographics for the final sample is provided in Table 1. The sample consisted of predominantly White males, age 22-30, who were enlisted personnel. However, females and other ethnicities and age groups were also represented. Respondents also reported whether or not they had personally experienced specific types of discrimination in the workplace in the past 12 months. Reports of experienced discrimination are summarized in Table 1. Discrimination due to race, national origin, or color was most frequently reported (12%), followed by gender and age discrimination.

**Measured Variables**

Equal Opportunity climate. The DEOCS was used to assess five facets of Equal Opportunity climate. The facets included *racist behavior* (three items including, “Offensive racial/ethnic names were frequently heard”), *gender (sex) discrimination* (four items including, “sexist jokes were frequently heard”), *age discrimination* (three items including, “An older individual did not get the same career opportunities as did a younger individual”), *religious discrimination* (three items including, “A demeaning comment was made about a certain religious group”), and *disability discrimination* (three items including, “A worker with a disability was not given the same opportunities as other workers”). Respondents indicated the likelihood each behavior could have occurred at their duty location in the 30 days prior to taking the survey. Responses were provided using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (there is a
very high chance that the action occurred) to 5 (there is almost no chance the action occurred). Scale scores for each climate facet were computed by averaging item responses. Internal consistency reliabilities are presented in Table 2.

Job-related attitudes. *Job satisfaction* was assessed using five items. Responses used a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*very satisfied*) to 5 (*very dissatisfied*). A sample item is “How satisfied are you with [your] job?” We also measured *workgroup cohesion* (four items including, “My workgroup works well together as a team”), *workgroup effectiveness* (four items including, “The quality of output of my work group is very high”), *leadership cohesion* (four items including, “Top leaders in my organization pull together to get the job done”), *organizational commitment* (five items including, “I am proud to tell others I work for this organization”), and *organizational trust* (three items including, “This organization is loyal to its members”). Respondents indicated their level of agreement with each statement ranging from 1 (*total agreement*) to 5 (*total disagreement*). All scale scores were reverse-scored, such that high values indicated more positive attitudes. Internal consistency reliabilities for these scales are presented in Table 2.

Analysis

To evaluate Research Question 1, we conducted an LPA using Mplus (version 5.2). A diagram of the LPA model estimated is presented in Figure 1. Observed scores for the five DEOCS subscales were specified as indicators of latent profile (or class) membership. These indicators were not allowed to correlate within class, satisfying the local independence assumption of classical latent profile as described by Muthén (2001). Under local independence, all covariances among the five DEOCS subscales were modeled through the categorical latent variable $c$. Indicator means were freely estimated across groups. Indicator variances were estimated, but constrained to equality across groups.

The number of latent classes was first set to $k = 2$, with additional classes specified in subsequent models. As convergence on a local maximum can result in inaccurate model estimates and classification with LPA (see Hipp & Bauer, 2006), multiple random sets of starting values were employed. We used between 50 and 1,000 sets of random starting values with between 10 and 30 of the highest log-likelihood values selected for final-stage optimizations (depending on the number of classes specified). Two or more of the highest log-likelihood values should replicate to provide evidence that a global maximum was achieved (Hipp & Bauer, 2006).

Evaluating the goodness-of-fit for each mixture model involved fit indices and a content-oriented evaluation of the utility of the model. Based on recommendations from prior research (Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007), the fit indices evaluated included the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the sample size-adjusted BIC (aBIC). Models with lower BIC and aBIC values are considered better fitting than those with higher values. We also used the Lo-Mendell-Rubin (LMR) likelihood ratio test and the bootstrap likelihood ratio test (BLRT) to determine the correct number of classes. A low $p$-value resulting from either the LMR or BLRT indicates the $k-1$-class model should be rejected in favor of a model with at least $k$ classes (Muthén, 2003). Models were also evaluated based on a content-oriented perspective. We
considered the both the utility of adding additional classes in subsequent models and the theoretical interpretation of within- and between-class response patterns.

To evaluate Research Question 2, a set of correlates representing experienced discrimination and demographic information was included in all models. Latent class membership was regressed onto each correlate, representing a multinomial logistic regression. We included these correlates in the estimation model for the LPA (as opposed to conducting a post-hoc analysis for statistical relationships) because the inclusion of correlates has been shown to improve the accuracy of latent group classification (see Lubke & Muthén, 2007). When a theoretical rationale exists suggesting a causal relationship between correlates and latent class membership (as is the case in the current study), it is generally recommended to include those correlates in the estimation model (e.g., Muthén, 2006).

To evaluate Research Question 3, we compared the latent group means on the six job-related attitude scales using the auxiliary (e) function in Mplus (see Muthén & Muthén, 2007). This method provides a statistical significance test of the equality of group means on the outcomes across the latent groups.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations for the DEOCS subscales and job-related attitude scales are presented in Table 2. Summary results from all LPA models estimated are presented in Table 3. For all models, the highest log-likelihoods replicated providing evidence that a global maximum was achieved. BIC and aBIC values decreased as the number of classes increased. Both BLMR and LMR LRT p-values were significant for the two-, three-, and four-class models, suggesting at least four classes should be considered. The LMR p-value for the five-class model was not statistically significant, suggesting the four-class solution should be retained. Entropy was high (.90) for the four-class model, indicating the model classified individuals fairly well (Lubke & Muthén, 2005).

We also estimated six- and seven-class models\(^1\). The six-class solution showed both BLMR and LMR LRT p-values to be significant and had lower BIC and aBIC values compared to the four-class model. However, we retained the four-class model as our final model for two reasons. Primarily, findings from LPA Monte Carlo studies suggest not increasing the number of classes once the LMR p-value first becomes nonsignificant (Nylund et al., 2007). Additionally, the six-class solution resulted in two relatively small classes (each less than 9% of the sample) that shared a very similar response profile to two groups in the four-class model, which limited the utility of the six-class solution. Therefore, we retained the four-class model for subsequent analyses.

The latent response profiles from the four-class model are presented in Figure 2. The box plots display the 25\(^{th}\), 50\(^{th}\), and 75\(^{th}\) percentiles (represented by the bottom of the box, the horizontal line in the middle of the box, and the top of the box, respectively) for all five DEOCS subscales. The response profiles show Class 4, comprised of 58% \((n = 8,217)\) of the sample, had the most positive overall climate perceptions, which were generally consistent across subscales. Classes 2 (27%, \(n = 3,914\)) and 3 (12%, \(n = 1,753\)) showed similar response patterns to one
another across subscales, though Class 2 respondents showed more negative climate perceptions overall. Class 1 (3%, \( n = 438 \)) was in the minority, showing fairly uniform negative climate perceptions across subscales. A notable trend across all classes was that the \textit{racist behaviors} and \textit{sex discrimination} subscales tended to show the most negative ratings while the \textit{religious} and \textit{disability} subscales showed the most positive ratings.

In evaluating Research Question 2, the results indicated both experienced discrimination and respondent demographics significantly predicted respondents’ most likely latent class. Results are presented in Table 4. Table 4 presents the relative odds of belonging to Classes 1, 2, and 3 (as opposed to Class 4) as a function of experienced discrimination and demographic characteristics. All effects statistically control for all other variables in the model. Respondents who reported experiencing discrimination of any type were much more likely to belong to Classes 1, 2, or 3 than Class 4 (i.e., the positive climate group). This was particularly true for discrimination due to race. For a typical respondent having experienced racial discrimination, the odds of belonging to Classes 1 or 2 were 17 and 9 times greater (respectively) than a respondent who had not experienced discrimination. The results presented in Table 4 indicate that respondents who had experienced discrimination were much more likely to show negative or moderate EOC profiles (i.e., Classes 1, 2, and 3) compared to a positive EOC profile.

Results also revealed respondent demographic characteristics predicted their most likely latent class (see Table 4). Black and African American respondents were more likely than White respondents to belong to Classes 1, 2, and 3. Females were less likely than males to belong to Classes 1 and 2. Respondents who were 31 to 50 years-old were less likely to belong to Classes 1 and 2 than those ages 22-30. Finally, type of employment showed a strong relationship to class membership. Respondents who were lower in rank (e.g., Enlisted) or civilians were more likely to belong to Classes 1, 2, and 3 than those of higher rank (e.g., Officers).

In evaluating Research Question 3, the results showed significant differences in job-related attitudes across all latent profile groups. Scale means for each latent group, as well as the statistical comparisons across groups, are presented in Table 5. For all job-related attitudes, respondents in Classes 1, 2, 3, and 4 held the most negative to most positive (respectively) attitudes towards their jobs and organizations.

\textbf{Discussion}

All three research questions investigated in this study were affirmed, illustrating that the idiographic exploration of EOC can contribute new insights that complement those produced by nomothetic approaches previously employed in this area. In regards to Research Question 1, we found evidence of four distinct subgroups whose EOC response profiles differed both quantitatively and qualitatively (see Figure 2). The quantitative differences are visually apparent, with EOC scale means covering the full range of the possible values across the latent classes. Qualitative differences were also found. For example, Classes 1 and 4 show somewhat more uniform response profiles across the five subscales compared to Classes 2 and 3. To our knowledge, prior research has never before established the nature and prevalence of such EOC response profiles in organizational settings.
We also found theoretically consistent relationships between respondent experience with discrimination, demographics and EOC profiles (Research Question 2). Discrimination due to race (i.e., the most frequently reported type of discrimination) was most strongly associated with belonging to the least desirable latent class (i.e., Class 1). This type of discrimination may be particularly damaging to all facets of EOC, as members in Class 1 had generally uniform negative climate perceptions across facets.

There were several notable findings that arose from assessing the unique influences of experienced discrimination and demographics on EOC profiles. For instance, women were less likely than men to be in the lower (i.e., least desirable) classes unless they had experienced discrimination. This finding runs contrary to findings of Truhon and Parks (2007), who found women had uniformly lower EOC perceptions. Our findings suggest that EOC perceptions are not related solely to gender, but rather the interplay between gender and experiences of discrimination.

A second notable finding was that Black or African American respondents were more likely than White respondents to fall in the lower classes, regardless of whether or not they had experienced discrimination. This is consistent with prior research (e.g., Truhon, 2005; Truhon & Parks, 2007). This finding may be attributable to the increased likelihood that Black or African Americans had witnessed or heard about race discrimination within their organization, as this was the most frequently reported type of discrimination. A third notable finding was that regardless of having experienced discrimination, respondents’ type of employment was strongly linked to their most likely EOC profile. Enlisted military were more likely to belong to the lower classes than Officers, suggesting job context or status may play a role in the formation of EOC perceptions.

The findings also linked EOC profiles to job-related attitudes (Research Question 3). Response profiles appeared more related to attitudes targeted towards organizations relative to the self or respondents’ workgroups. This finding is consistent with previous research illustrating EOC perceptions are impacted by pervasiveness of equity and fairness issues at the organizational level rather than the workgroup (Peterson, Van Driel, Crepeau, & McDonald, 2008). Furthermore, EOC profile group differences in workgroup cohesion perceptions were more pronounced than differences in perceived workgroup effectiveness. This finding is intuitive, as the cohesiveness construct is more proximally related to EOC than workgroup performance. Respondents may also be in a better position to reliably judge workgroup cohesion than workgroup or organizational performance.

The current study is not without limitations. A primary limitation of this study is the reliance on employees within the Department of Defense (DoD) community. While a large number (i.e., 200) of separate organizations were randomly sampled from the larger DoD community to provide more generalizable findings, respondents from the military and other government organizations may exhibit different EOC response profiles than those employed in private organizations. Therefore, future research should attempt to replicate the current findings in other organizational settings.
Footnote

1 A satisfactory model could not be obtained for the seven-class model, as convergence between log-likelihood values could not be achieved. Therefore, results from this model are not presented.


Table 1

Descriptive Statistics for Experienced Discrimination and Demographics (n = 14,323)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experienced Discrimination (in past 12 months)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial/national origin/color</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (sex)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>3%</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish/Hispanic</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amer. Indian/Alaska Native</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (compared to Age 22-30)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age 18-21</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 22-30</td>
<td>42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 31-40</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 41-50</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age 51+</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employee</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Civilian</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Civilian</td>
<td>&lt; 1%</td>
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Table 2

Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
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<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EO Climate</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Racial Behaviors</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sexual Harassment</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Religious Discrimination</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Age Discrimination</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Disability Discrimination</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.86</td>
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<td><strong>Job-related Attitudes</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Org. Commitment</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Org. Trust</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Workgroup Effectiveness</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Workgroup Cohesion</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.32</td>
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<td>.53</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Leadership Cohesion</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.41</td>
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<td>.35</td>
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<td>.69</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* \( n = 14,221-14,323 \). All correlations are statistically significant \((p < .001)\). Internal consistency reliabilities \((\alpha)\) reported on the diagonal.
Table 3

*Latent Profile Analysis Model Comparisons*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>No. parameters</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>aBIC</th>
<th>LMR (p)</th>
<th>BLRT (p)</th>
<th>Classes with &lt; 5% of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 classes</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>158631.08</td>
<td>158519.85</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 classes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>147558.76</td>
<td>147368.08</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 classes*</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>143253.72</td>
<td>142983.60</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 classes</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>138927.59</td>
<td>138578.02</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 classes</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>136704.00</td>
<td>136274.98</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>&lt; .0001</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), sample size-adjusted BIC (aBIC), Lo-Mendell-Rubin likelihood ratio test (LMR), Bootstrap likelihood ratio test (BLRT). (*) indicates the final model selected for subsequent analysis.
Table 4

*Relationships between Experienced Discrimination, Demographics, and Latent Class Membership*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experienced Discrimination (compared to No Experience)</th>
<th>Odds Ratio (Odds of class membership vs. Class 4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/national origin/color</td>
<td>17.761*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (sex)</td>
<td>9.034*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>7.584*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>11.359*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>10.665*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race (compared to White)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish/Hispanic</td>
<td>1.214</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>2.000*</td>
<td>1.405*</td>
<td>1.146*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>1.251</td>
<td>1.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>1.274</td>
<td>1.547*</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amer. Indian/Alaska Native</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>1.241</td>
<td>1.192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender (compared to Male)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.541*</td>
<td>0.777*</td>
<td>0.895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (compared to Age 22-30)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (18-21)</td>
<td>0.730*</td>
<td>0.908</td>
<td>0.828*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (31-40)</td>
<td>0.474*</td>
<td>0.493*</td>
<td>0.628*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (41-50)</td>
<td>0.496*</td>
<td>0.430*</td>
<td>0.416*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (51+)</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>0.495*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employee (compared to Officer)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>2.380*</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>5.328*</td>
<td>3.743*</td>
<td>1.966*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD Civilian</td>
<td>4.807*</td>
<td>2.895*</td>
<td>1.829*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-DoD Civilian</td>
<td>7.721</td>
<td>7.265*</td>
<td>2.812*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Odds ratios greater than 1.00 indicate a higher likelihood of belonging to the target class compared to the reference group. Ratios less than 1.00 indicate a lower likelihood. All variables were dummy-coded such that the reference group represented respondents who had not experienced discrimination, were White, male, age 22-30, and were Officers.

* p < .05
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude Scale</th>
<th>Group Mean</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Class 1</td>
<td>Class 2</td>
<td>Class 3</td>
<td>Class 4</td>
<td>Chi-square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>1060.950*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup Cohesion</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>1201.982*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup Effectiveness</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>694.027*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Cohesion</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>1513.257*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Commitment</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1947.185*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Trust</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1442.487*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. The chi-square test represents an omnibus test for equality of means across all four classes. All follow-up pairwise comparisons between classes were also statistically significant (p < .01, df =1). * p < .001 (df = 3)
Figure 1. Diagram of Latent Profile Model
Figure 2. Latent Profiles for the Four-Class Model

*Note.* Boxes represent 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles (represented by the bottom of the box, the horizontal line in the middle of the box, and the top of the box, respectively) for each group.
Does Unit Cohesion Really Matter To Mission Readiness?

L.A Witt

Abstract

Both leaders and scholars have long considered cohesion as a critical success factor for intact units. That is, cohesive units are more viable than and outperform low-cohesion units, and they yield higher levels of both job and personal satisfaction among their members. Cohesion impacts effectiveness through both capability and motivation. In terms of capability, cohesive groups more efficiently utilize group resources than low-cohesion groups because they have high levels of team mental model convergence, efficiency of language behavior, etc. In terms of motivation, cohesive groups create a desire on the part of unit members to exert effort to promote the well-being of the unit. Two studies examining cohesion and EO/diversity issues reinforce their importance in the DoD. Study 1 (11,921 sailors on 45 U.S. Navy ships) reveals the link between both cohesion and the level of the ship’s hostile work environment with the performance of the ship. Study 2 (28,526 uniformed DoD personnel) presents a latent variable, structural equations model showing that leader behavior determines the level of cohesion in the unit, which affects hostile work environment, which in turn affects two important outcomes – job satisfaction and the decision to recommend enlistment to personal friends of different races.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
We hypothesized that ship-level cohesion and hostile work environment have both main and interactive effects on ship performance. Data collected from 11,921 sailors on 45 U.S. Navy ships and archival Navy performance data revealed that their joint effects on ship performance are additive rather than interactive.

The implicit assumption underlying a considerable body of work investigating organizational climate is that facets of an organization’s climate affect performance-related outcomes (e.g., James & Jones, 1974; Mayer, Ehrhart, & Schneider, 2009). A sizeable literature has also focused on the construct of unit cohesion as a facet of climate at the level of a group, team, or business unit (e.g., Mullen & Copper, 1994). An emerging research area has also examined hostile work environment as another facet of climate (e.g., Johnston, 2008). With the present study, we investigated their joint effects on unit performance operationalized as the effectiveness of operating ships in the U.S. Navy. Specifically, we argue that while both cohesion and hostile work environment have main effects on performance, their joint effects are interactive. That is, the relationship between cohesion and performance is moderated by hostile work environment, such that the relationship is positive (negative) among ships with low (high) levels of a hostile work environment.

**Unit Cohesion**

Festinger (1950) described cohesion as the total field of forces that act on members to remain in the unit. Similar definitions suggest that cohesion is the extent to which units are unified, coherent, and organized (Lickel, Hamilton, Lewis, Sherman, Wieczorkowska, & Uhles, 2000), and the extent to which unit members are attracted to the unit and the task, are bonded to one another, and desire to retain unit membership (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Mullen & Copper, 1994). Summarizing these definitions, Carron, Brawley, and Widmeyer (1998) described unit cohesion as “a dynamic process that is reflected in the tendency for a group to stick together and remain united in its pursuit of instrumental objectives and/or for the satisfaction of members’ affective needs” (p. 213). Most scholars have viewed cohesion as a unitary construct, although some have argued that it is multidimensional (Carron, 1982; Carless & De Paola, 2000) and explored links between its components – interpersonal attraction, group pride, and task commitment – and performance (e.g., Carron, Widmeyer, & Brawley, 1985; Mullen & Copper, 1994).

Scholars have long considered cohesion as a critical success factor for intact units (e.g., Sánchez & Yurrebaso, 2009). That is, cohesive units are more viable than (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998), and outperform low-cohesion units (e.g., Mullen & Copper, 1994; Hausknecht, Trevor, & Howard, 2009), and yield higher levels of both job and personal satisfaction among their members (McGrath, 1984).

Cohesion impacts effectiveness through both capability and motivation. Pointing out that cohesive groups have high levels of team mental model convergence (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000), efficiency of language behavior (Mickelson &
Campbell, 1975), and use of transactive memory systems (Hollingshead, 1998; 2000), Beal, Cohen, Burke, and McLendon (2003, p. 991) noted that cohesive groups more efficiently utilize group resources than low-cohesion groups.

Unit cohesion also has been observed to have positive effects on an individual's contribution to a unit via motivation (Carron, Colman, Wheeler, & Stevens, 2002). Put another way, an attachment to the unit and its members creates a desire to exert effort to promote the well-being of the unit (Sluss, van Dick, & Thompson, 2011; van Knippenberg, 2000). Cohesion also yields adherence behavior (i.e., behavior that supports group functioning; Prapavessis & Carron, 1997), assuming responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g., Brawley, Carron, & Widmeyer, 1987), collective efficacy (e.g., Paskevich, Brawley, Dorsch, & Widmeyer, 1999), conformity to unit norms (e.g., Shields, Bredemeier, Gardner, & Boston, 1995), tolerance of the negative impact of disruptive events (e.g., Brawley, Carron, & Widmeyer, 1988), and performance (Prapavessis & Carron, 1997).

Furthermore, in reporting results of their meta-analysis, Carron et al. (2002), concluded that the link between cohesion and performance is reciprocal; that is, cohesion increases the unit’s performance, and effective performance increases cohesion. The historical record in regards to the relationship between unit cohesion and performance differs somewhat from the findings of Carron et al. (2002). Surprisingly, empirical assessments of the relation between unit cohesion and unit performance have been inconsistent, causing some scholars to question the effect (Steiner, 1972; Tziner, 1982). More recently, scholars have approached the issue in at least three ways. One of these ways has been to argue that unit cohesion sometimes has a negative impact on unit performance-related outcomes because of pressure to conform, groupthink, and social loafing (e.g., Hoigaard, Säfvenbom, & Tonnessen, 2006). In the other, scholars have employed meta-analytic techniques to identify situations in which the effect is strong or weak (e.g., Beal et al., 2003; Carron et al., 2002). Findings from this body of work suggest that moderators of the cohesion-performance relationship include group size, group reality, level of analysis, task type, and group interdependence. The third approach, based on the Categorization Elaboration Model (CEM) (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004) operates from the standpoint that all diversity factors affecting unit cohesion may impact group performance positively or negatively depending on situational characteristics. CEM also proposes that high levels of task motivation may have a positive impact on performance (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004).

Based on these theoretical observations, we argue that operational military organizations typically require considerable interdependencies, particularly combat naval vessels that function in high-preparedness/mission-ready or operational modes. Hence, unit cohesion is likely critical to mission readiness and effectiveness (i.e., unit performance). In line with meta-analytic results (e.g., Beal et al., 2003), we anticipated that cohesion would be related to effectiveness. Cohesive ships feature sailors who are committed to their tasks and identify with their ships Consequently,
they should be more highly motivated to perform and capable of effectiveness in task execution than low-cohesion ships.

*Hypothesis 1:* Ship-level perceptions of unit cohesion are positively related to ship-level performance.

**Hostile Work Environment**

A hostile work environment refers to one in which verbal or physical behavior is pervasive enough to create an abusive climate that interferes with work performance (Bell, McLaughlin, & Sequiera, 2002). Importantly, coworker or manager behaviors that are violent, offensive, or discriminatory can contribute to a hostile work environment regardless of whether one is the target of such behaviors (Hulin, Fitzgerald, & Drasgow, 1996; Sorenson, Mangione-Lambie, & Luzio, 1998). For example, Sorenson and colleagues (1998) found that both bystanders and victims of sexual harassment reported heightened negative affect and motivation loss. In addition to sexual harassment, perceived discrimination based on race, national origin, age, religion, disability, or sexual orientation can also contribute to a hostile work environment. Concern over hostile work environments is warranted because the host of deleterious outcomes with which such environments are associated includes decreases in both individual and organization-level performance (Goldman, Gutek, Stein, & Lewis, 2006; Jensen & Gutek, 1982; Willness, Steel, & Lee, 2007).

Diversity climate—“perceptions about the organization’s diversity-related formal structure characteristics and informal values” (Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009, p. 24)—and equal opportunity (EO) climate—perceptions of the opportunities and potential favoritism afforded to certain groups of employees (Dansby & Landis, 1991)—may serve as key indicators of hostile work environments. Indeed, Naff and Thompson (2000) identified the elimination of hostile work environment behaviors as an integral component of high diversity climate perceptions in the Federal Aviation Administration, and researchers investigating hostile work environments in military settings have predominantly done so under the rubric of equal opportunity (EO) climate (e.g., Estrada, Stetz, & Harbke, 2007; Knouse & Dansby, 1999). The unfair policies and tolerance of discrimination typical of an organization with a low diversity climate or EO climate likely send a message to employees that procedural justice is not the rule and that psychological contracts are not being upheld (Roberson & Stevens, 2006).

Linking hostile work environment and performance – The relationship between hostile work environment perceptions and performance can be at least partially viewed through the lenses of social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and psychological contracts (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). Individuals enter an organization with ideas regarding the mutual obligations between the organization and themselves, thereby forming psychological contracts. If they perform all their task duties and remain committed to the organization, they can expect a number of benefits in the form of tangible and intangible support resources (Organ & Konovsky, 1989).
Hostile work environments may represent a breach in psychological contracts, particularly among women and minorities that are most affected by the hostile work environment (Chrobot-Mason, 2003). Employees may reciprocate this lack of expected support in the form of reduced effort and withdrawal, leading to lower aggregate performance of the organization (McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2009). As Gibney, Zagenczyk, and Masters (2009, p. 667) argued, individuals “who believe that treatment provided by the organization is negative should reciprocate by behaving in a manner that harms the organization.” Boswell and Olson-Buchanan (2004) found a direct link between perceived mistreatment at work and withdrawal behaviors. Of note, previous research found that diversity climate impacted firm revenue the most when the population was demographically diverse (Gonzalez & Denisi, 2009).

Research on hostile work environments, including proxies of hostile environment in terms of diversity and EO climates, suggests that such environments yield low levels of performance. Hostile work environments violate psychological contracts and thereby, reduce individuals’ motivation to exert effort on behalf of the organization. As not only the targets of discrimination or harassment experience angst as the result of the discrimination and/or harassment (Hulin et al., 1996; Sorenson et al., 1998), a hostile work environment in a work unit is likely to yield pervasive low levels of performance among all members of an organization. Moreover, hostile behaviors create distractions from tasks, which reduce an organization’s capability to perform. Accordingly, we proposed:

Hypothesis 2: Ship-level perceptions of a hostile work environment are negatively related to ship-level performance.

Joint Effects of Cohesion and Hostile Work Environment

The joint effects of cohesion and hostile work environment may be additive or interactive. If the former postulate is true, cohesion and hostile work environment combine additively to predict performance. That is, both cohesion and hostile work environment have significant relationships with performance, and these relationships are independent of each other. If the latter postulate is true, levels of cohesion have differential effects on performance at different levels of a hostile work environment. In other words, hostile work environment moderates the relationship between cohesion and performance.

We argue that cohesion is likely to have either negative or non-significant associations with performance in units that manifest dysfunctional behaviors that harm minority unit members. Accordingly, we examined hostile work environment as a moderator of the relationship of the cohesion-performance relationship. Below, we discuss the relationship between cohesion and performance at low and high levels of hostile work environment.

Low-Hostile Work Environment. Despite having few problems associated with a hostile work environment, low-cohesion work units are likely to perform at relatively low levels. Based on the CEM (Van Knippenberg, et al., 2004) as discussed previously, members of such units likely
have little motivation to exert considerable effort on behalf of the unit, and their efforts to perform would be limited by internal operating inefficiencies. However, high-cohesion and low-hostile work environment units are likely to achieve high levels of performance because their members interact with each other efficiently and are highly motivated to exert effort. Hence, we anticipated that the cohesion-performance relation is positive among work units having low levels of a hostile work environment.

High-Hostile Work Environment. With many problems associated with a hostile work environment and low levels of cohesion causing internal operating inefficiencies and weak motivation to perform, low-cohesion, high-hostile work environment units are likely to perform at very low levels. High-cohesion, high-hostile work environment units are likely to perform poorly as well, but for different reasons. High-cohesion, high-hostile work environment units in some ways may be similar to dysfunctional families in that bad behavior may be tolerated to maintain unity. Members in high-cohesion, high-hostile work environment units may therefore tolerate and, or avoid intervening when discriminatory/harassing behaviors occur in order to maintain group harmony. Hence, the pressure to maintain group pride, a focus on the task, and a collective harmony may be dysfunctional in that unit members knowingly behave in ways that yield a hostile work environment and those behaviors not only create distractions from the tasks but also reduce motivation to perform. Therefore, we anticipated that the cohesion-performance relation is either negative or non-significant among work units having high levels of a hostile work environment. Accordingly, we proposed:

Hypothesis 3: The relationship between ship-level perceptions of unit cohesion and ship-level performance is moderated by ship-level perceptions of a hostile work environment, such that the relationship is positive (negative) among ships with low (high) levels of a hostile work environment.

Method

Sample and Procedure

We collected data from 45 ships in the U.S. Navy (M sample size = 253, SD = 157.71; range = 56 to 887). The commanding officer of each ship sent a memorandum to ship personnel requesting participation. Depending on the availability of access to the Internet, participants were provided with either a confidential unique access code with which to complete the survey online or a paper copy of the survey and a response sheet. We collected cohesion and hostile work environment survey data from 11,921 (91% enlisted and 92% on active duty) of an estimated 19,835 (60.1%) sailors. Of these, 58% completed paper-and-pencil versions of the survey, and 42% completed it online. The sailors classified their race/ethnic background as follows: 48.6% white, 19.5% African-American, 10.2% Hispanic, 8.2% Asian, 1.4% as Native-American, 1.1% as Pacific Islander, 8% as multiracial; 3% of the sailors did not indicate their background. They classified their gender as follows: 87% men and 13% as women. They classified their age
categories as follows: 6% between 18 and 21 years, 49% between 22 and 30 years, 18% between 31 and 40 years, 21% between 41 and 50 years, and 6% over 50 years of age.

Measures

Cohesion. We measured cohesion with the four-item Landis, Dansby, and Faley (1993) unit cohesion scale that focuses on both task and interpersonal dimensions of cohesion. The response scale ranged from 1 = “Totally agree with the statement” to 5 = “Totally disagree with the statement.” High scores reflect high levels of work group cohesion.

Hostile Work Environment. Following Landis, Dansby, and Faley (1993), we measured hostile work environment with five items (e.g., “Someone made sexually suggestive remarks about another person”). The response scale ranged from 1 = “There is a very high chance that the action occurred” to 5 = “There is a very low chance that the action occurred.” High scores reflect high levels of a hostile work environment.

Ship Performance. We measured ship performance in terms of the number of three available ship performance awards for the time period in which the survey data were collected. The awards were the (a) “Golden Anchor,” which is awarded for retention of personnel, (b) “Battle E,” which is awarded for winning a battle efficiency competition, and (c) “Meritorious Unit Commendation,” which is awarded for either meritorious or valorous achievement considered outstanding when compared to other units performing similar functions. High performance scores reflect a high number of awards.

Aggregation Statistics and Data Analysis

Although scholars have argued that the overall level of mean unit-level cohesion may be more important than the level of agreement regarding cohesion (e.g., West, Patera, & Carsten, 2009), we assessed the appropriateness of aggregating cohesion and hostile work environment scores to the ship level. Specifically, we computed \( r_{WG(J)} \) (Lindell & Brandt, 2000) using the rectangular distribution, which yielded a mean \( r_{WG(J)} \)'s of .71 for hostile work environment and .68 for cohesion. Based on LeBreton and Senter’s (2008) standards for interpreting agreement estimates, our results suggest that the \( r_{WG(J)} \) for hostile work environment suggested reasonable within-group agreement, whereas the \( r_{WG(J)} \) for cohesion approached the typically accepted minimum justification for aggregation (i.e., \( r_{WG(J)} \geq .70 \)). We also calculated ICC(1) and ICC(2) for both predictors. For both hostile work environment and cohesion, the ICC(1) was .02, a small effect (LeBreton & Senter, 2008); the ANOVA on which this values were based was significant \((p < .0001)\), indicating significant ship effects for both hostile work environment and cohesion. The ICC(2) values for hostile work environment and cohesion were .84 and .83, respectively, suggesting moderate group-mean reliability (Bliese, 2000).
We evaluated the factor structure of the cohesion and hostile work environment scales using confirmatory factor analysis on the individual-level data. The two-factor model fit the data well (CFI = .93, TLI = .91, RMSEA = .09; SRMR = .05).

**Results**

We present in Table 1 descriptive statistics, reliability estimates, and the intercorrelation matrix. As shown there, sailor perceptions of the ship’s cohesion \((r = .39, p < .01)\) and hostile work environment \((r = -.47, p < .01)\) aggregated at the ship level were significantly related to ship performance.

To test the hypotheses, we conducted hierarchical moderated multiple regression analyses using centered predictors. As shown in Table 2 and consistent with Hypothesis 1, cohesion predicted ship performance at the first step \((\beta = 2.1, R^2 = .15, \text{both } p < .05)\) but not at the second step \((\beta = .76, ns)\) of the regression analysis. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the addition of hostile work environment \((\beta = -1.98, p < .05)\) at the second step contributed unique variance \((\Delta R^2 = .08, p < .05)\). Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3, the cohesion x hostile work environment cross-product term did not contribute unique variance \((\beta = 2.60; \Delta R^2 = .005, ns)\) at the third step.

**Discussion**

We hypothesized and found that ship-level perceptions of both cohesion and hostile work environment have main effects on ship performance. However, the data did not support our hypothesis that the relationship between ship-level perceptions of unit cohesion and ship-level performance is moderated by ship-level perceptions of a hostile work environment. Hence, we learned that both cohesion and hostile work environment are related to performance, but these relationships are independent of each other.

Based on these results, it is evident that both cohesion and hostile work environment have an impact on ship performance. The mechanisms by which these linkages operate are speculative; however, it is likely that both cohesion and hostile work environments may affect motivation and capability to perform. Cohesive ships are therefore likely to feature sailors who are committed to their tasks, and identify with their ships. Sailors on these ships are likely to be more highly motivated and capable of executing their tasks than low-cohesion ships. Similarly, hostile work environments likely reduce motivation and distract sailors from tasks.

**Limitations**

We emphasize four limitations of our study. First, the sample size of 45 ships was small. Research with much larger samples is critical to further this area of study and increase confidence in the observed effects.

Second, the low ICC(1) values indicate relatively low between-unit variance in both cohesion and hostile work environment. As noted by Hausknecht et al. (2009), ICC(1) values reflect non-
zero group-level variance, and such low values are typical of field data (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Scholars have noted that small effect sizes can have an important practical influence (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005). Moreover, the $r_{WG(J)}$ values using a rectangular null distribution indicated within-group agreement for hostile work environment approaching agreement for cohesion, and the ICC(2) values suggested that the means are relatively stable. However, we emphasize the low ICC(1) values and urge caution in the application of our results until these findings have been replicated using larger samples across additional military services as well as civilian organizations.

Third, representativeness is a possible issue. We were able to assess the response rate across all ships but unable to assess the representativeness of the sample at the ship level. Accordingly, we emphasize that missing sailor data might have biased our results, and we encourage future researchers to make efforts to collect response rate data from each unit whenever possible.

Fourth, the items assessed cohesion at the workgroup level, and we aggregated scores at the ship level. As our samples were large, it is unlikely that all of the respondents were necessarily thinking of the ship, per se, in responding to items. Moreover, we did not specify work group or ship, per se, in assessing hostile work environment. Whereas we found significant effects, we urge caution in interpreting these results until aggregation operationalized at the appropriate levels have replicated the observed effects.

Implications and Future Research

Anecdotally, cohesion has long been considered important to military mission readiness, and human resources and legal officials have traditionally called for increasing efforts to minimize levels of hostile work environments. With the present study, we empirically demonstrated that both unit cohesion and hostile work environments have an impact on ship performance. This finding reinforces the position that commanders pay particular attention to issues that affect the development of cohesion and a hostile work environment. Clearly, these two facets of the command climate matter. We encourage future researchers to not only replicate our findings but also apply a multidimensional approach to cohesion and assess the links of cohesion and hostile work environments with a variety of unit levels of performance (e.g., re-enlistment rates, safety reports) across the services.
References


### Table 1
*Descriptive Statistics, Alpha Reliabilities, and Correlation Matrix*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cohesion</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hostile work environment</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.66**</td>
<td>(.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ship performance</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>-.47**</td>
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</table>

*Note. N = 45 Naval ships. Scores presented reflected mean scores aggregated at the ship level. Internal consistency (α) reliability estimates derived at the individual level are displayed in the diagonal. *p < .05; **p < .01.*
Table 2. *Hierarchical Moderated Multiple Regression Results Predicting Ship Performance*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Total $R^2$</th>
<th>$\Delta R^2$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
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<tr>
<td><em>Step 1:</em></td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Step 2:</em></td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>.08*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile work environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.98*</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Step 3:</em></td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohesion</td>
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<td>.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hostile work environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-2.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohesion x hostile work environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.60</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.*
Diversity Competency Model

Renée Yuengling

Abstract

As part of the three part project, DEOMI requested the development of a diversity competency model for general population mid-level civilian and military managers in the Department of Defense. The resulting competency model is the set of rigorously researched competencies for general population managers, NOT diversity practitioners. It covers the personal leadership competencies necessary to effectively manage diversity in the workplace, and can be scaled from entry to senior executive levels. The model is based on rigorous methodology and grounded in the current relevant research on diversity including the social psychological processes related to diversity in organizations and other relevant related disciplines. Additionally, while representational diversity is important, the competencies focus on the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to create an inclusive diversity climate, which supports the presence of representational diversity. The competencies for diversity management also map to the DoD/DLO cross-cultural competencies (3C) to the extent possible. This is a reasonable and appropriate requirement as from the earliest research works on diversity the link to culture has been generally understood. The research discusses the particular limitations presented by the development of diversity competencies, most specifically development of an objective measure of superior performance; as well as identification of a “successful job incumbent” or “advanced experts.” To date, this is the most carefully and fully researched set of diversity competencies available to diversity practitioners.
The purpose and objective of this document is to frame and develop an initial diversity competency model for general population mid-level civilian and military managers in the Department of Defense. The model is based on rigorous methodology and grounded in the current relevant research on diversity including the social psychological processes related to diversity in organizations and other relevant related disciplines. The purpose of the model is to provide competencies and objectives from which to develop diversity training for mid-level Department of Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard service members and civilian employees.

It is important to stress this competency model is for general population managers, NOT diversity practitioners. The competencies required in each of these cases are different, and the current task is to develop a model for general population managers. Additionally, the competency model developed here is notably a model restricted to individuals - much of the literature on diversity competency covers both individual (or interpersonal) skills, and also discusses the necessary organizational climates or outcomes (Cox, 1993, Griggs, 1995; McKay, Avery, 2007; Morrison, 1992; Rice, 2009; Rowe & Gardenschwartz, 1997; Guillory, 1994). In this case, we are interested only in the personal competencies necessary to effectively manage diversity in the workplace. Additionally, while representational diversity is important, the competencies will focus on the knowledge, skills and abilities needed to create an inclusive diversity climate, which supports the presence of representational diversity. It is also necessary that these competencies for diversity management map to the DoD/DLO cross-cultural competencies (3C) to the extent possible. This model is detailed in “A Framework for Cross Cultural Competencies and Learning Recommendations,” published by the Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division (NAWCTSD) and the Defense Language Office (DLO).

It is somewhat problematical to develop a competency model that is restricted to successful behaviors for working with, managing, or leading a diverse workforce. Historically, due to the development of the discipline, diversity skills have been perceived as an “add-on,” that is, not core behaviors. This perception is entirely incorrect, and as our workforces become ever more diverse, as we learn more about leadership and leadership competencies, we have begun to understand that the effective management of diversity is a fundamental leadership skill. Therefore, the competencies outlined below should not be developed in isolation from basic leadership competencies, but should be integrated into, and be a seamless part of those leadership competencies. However, the general understanding of diversity as a leadership competency is not yet fully embraced by the general population, and until it is, separate competency models for diversity have a place and are useful and necessary to set objectives for training.

To facilitate understanding as well as to limit confusion - in this document diversity is specifically defined as comprising the generally accepted dimensions of diversity:

Human – age, race, ethnicity, physical ability, sex, and sexual orientation
Cultural – including but not limited to all aspects of culture such as language, religion, nationality, background, learning styles, etc. This dimension of diversity can be considered to be almost infinite in its variations.
Organizational – including but not limited to such aspects as unit, grade, rank, status, sector, and organizational location.
In this way, the term diversity should be understood to encompass all the characteristics and attributes of individuals, with no group excluded.

**Background on Competency Modeling**

There is voluminous research on competencies and competency modeling, and very little actual agreement and consistency. There are also wide variations in approaches to competency modeling that are relevant to examine before addressing the particular challenges of developing a diversity competency model. In addition there are several significant and serious challenges to developing a diversity competency model that also must be clearly understood prior to the development or adoption of any set of competencies. These will be discussed in a separate section below.

Competency. The definition of the term “competency” appears to vary widely, even among professionals (Schippmann, et al., 2000). Competencies are typically defined as a combination of knowledge, skills, abilities and other individual characteristics (often called KSAOs; including but not limited to motives, personality traits, self-concepts, attitudes, beliefs, values, and interests) that can be reliably measured and that can be shown to differentiate performance (Curnow, 2006; Mirabile, 1997; Schippmann, et al., 2000; Spencer, McClelland, & Spencer, 1994). The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) defines a competency as "a measurable pattern of knowledge, skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics that an individual needs to perform work roles or occupational functions successfully." Competencies specify the "how" of performing job tasks, or what the person needs to do the job successfully (Shippmann et al., 2000). Competencies represent a whole-person approach to assessing individuals (http://apps.opm.gov/ADT/Content.aspx).

Competency modeling. Competency modeling is typically defined as the identification, definition, and measurement of the KSAOs that are needed to perform successfully on the job (Curnow, 2006; Bartram, 2004; Schippmann, et al., 2000). How success is defined is not generally addressed, and is the first challenge in the development of a diversity model. Competency modeling uses several different approaches: the two most common being the individual job level and the organization level (Mansfield, 1996). The individual job level competency model identifies the characteristics (i.e., KSAOs) that are necessary to be successful in a particular job (similar to job analysis), whereas the organizational level modeling takes into account organizational objectives, vision, and strategy and attempts to develop a set of competencies that are applied to the entire organization, a department within the organization, or a job family within the organization (Curnow, 2006; Lawler, 1994; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).

Job analysis: Broadly defined, job analysis involves collecting data about observable job behaviors and delineating the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics needed to perform the job (Cascio & Aguinis, 2005; Curnow, 2006; Harvey, 1991). This broad definition is typically broken into two separate approaches to job analysis: worker-oriented job analysis and task-oriented job analysis. Worker-oriented job analysis is often referred to as job specification and deals with the necessary KSAOs for successful completion of the job. Task-oriented job analysis identifies what gets done on the job (i.e., the job-relevant behaviors) and how the job is
conducted (including the tools, machinery, information, and people with which the incumbent typically interacts). This approach is often referred to as a job description, as it details the necessary behaviors for successful completion of the job (Cascio & Aguinis, 2005). In both cases, input from the successful job incumbent is necessary for identification and validation of the correct KSAOs. This again raises the significant challenge in the development of a diversity competency model.

Cognitive Task Analysis: As competency modeling becomes more pervasive and the complexity of the tasks confronting workers increases, there is increasing interest in cognitive task analysis (CTA), that is, the identification and analysis of cognitive processes that underlie task performance, which has been offered as a supplement to traditional task analysis (Chipman, Schraagen, & Shalin, 2000; Curnow, 2006; Sackett & Laczo, 2003). Cognitive task analysis (CTA) uses a variety of interview and observation strategies to capture a description of the knowledge that experts use to perform complex tasks. Complex tasks are defined as those where performance requires the integrated use of both controlled (conscious, conceptual) and automated (unconscious, procedural or strategic) knowledge to perform tasks that often extend over many hours or days (Yates, 2007). CTA is a valuable approach when advanced experts are available who reliably achieve a desired performance standard on a target task and the goal is to capture the “cognitive” knowledge used by them (Clark & Estes, 1999). While CTA would logically be a strong methodology for the development of diversity competencies, the need for “advanced experts” underlines the challenge in the development of a diversity competency model.

Reliability of Competency Models

In order for competency models to be useful, they must be valid and reliable. An important part of the validating models is to have incumbents or subject matter experts or the job analysts themselves rate the importance of each competency. Ideally, across raters, there will be agreement on the importance of each of the characteristics, demonstrating a high level of inter-rater reliability. A recent meta-analysis of job analysis reliability examined the levels of inter-rater and intra-rater reliability from forty-six studies (Curnow, 2006; Dierdorff & Wilson, 2003) and found that incumbents had the lowest reliabilities compared to analysts or technical experts. Recent work by Lievens, Sanchez, and DeCorte (2004) found that the overall inter-rater reliability of competency modeling judgments is quite low. However, just as the meta-analysis by Dierdorff and Wilson (2003) found, ratings made by subject matter experts (SMEs) are considerably more reliable across raters as compared to inexperienced incumbents. The question of the reliability of competency models will not be resolved here, but current findings that subject matter experts provide the greatest reliability provide some support to the recommended methodology described below.

Benchmarking Competency Models in the Private Sector

While it is beyond the scope of this project to complete a benchmarking analysis of the private sector, an informal analysis was conducted. Most major organizations with mature diversity initiatives have been using some form of diversity "competencies" for quite some time. However, these competencies are, once again, not generally researched based, nor are they
validated. Furthermore, in many cases they take the form of lists of very general behaviors, expectations, or accomplishments as they are typically used for accountability purposes. They also are often not used with lower and mid level managers, but more generally for senior leadership.

Additionally, neither the Society for Human Resource Managers (SHRM) nor Diversity, Inc., a firm well known for benchmarking and ranking organizations, could provide any additional information on the existence of diversity competencies in the sense of a validated model. SHRM reconfirmed that most of the KSAOs that would be included in a competency model are generally found in the ubiquitous lists from advanced experts, or would be "add-ons" to leadership or cultural models, if they existed at all. This is not meant to imply there are no organizations using researched-based and validated diversity competency models; it just means if they are, the models may be closely held as proprietary information. This is quite common in the private sector around some areas of diversity management, most notably the financial analysis around business cases. As these lists of behaviors are used for accountability of their executives, which then have significant financial implications for the size of the executive bonus, it seems quite likely the specific measurements may be withheld from public scrutiny.

Methodology

Limitations and requirements

As noted above, there are several serious and significant challenges to the development of a diversity competency model for general population managers. According to Boulter, et al (1998), there are six stages involved in defining a competency model for a given job role. These stages are:

Step 1. Performance criteria – Defining the criteria for superior performance in the role
Step 2. Criterion sample – Choosing a sample of people performing the role for data collection
Step 3. Data collection – Collecting sample data about behaviors that lead to success
Step 4. Data analysis – Developing hypotheses about the competencies of outstanding performers and how these competencies work together to produce desired results
Step 5. Validation – Validating the results of data collection and analysis
Step 6. Application – Applying the competency models in human resource activities, as needed.

In the development of competencies specifically related to diversity, the challenges arise immediately, in both Step 1 and Step 2:

Step 1 — There is no objective idea of what constitutes superior performance in the role; thus, there is no clear idea of what “success” in the function actually is. We all can conceive of
managers who are inclusive, fair, unbiased, and skilled at managing culturally diverse populations. But in the complexity of managing on a day-to-day basis, what does that objectively look like? For every potential measure developed, there is the possibility that some other process is at play. If success looks like what is known as representational diversity, with diversity in the organization at all levels from top to bottom, such a situation may not necessarily be due to the diversity competency of managers; it could equally be due to malicious compliance with Affirmative Action regulations. If it is measured by employee satisfaction surveys in an effort to measure diversity climate or inclusion, a highly cohesive and effective work group equally could be due to the basic managerial skills of the manager or the self-efficacy of the employees.

However outcomes are measured, there is always the possibility of an alternative view of the behaviors causing the outcome. For example, a fair and unbiased manager may in fact be one with several EEO complaints against them- would that be considered to be successful? This is compounded by the reality that bias, in all of its forms, is a universal human behavior, a survival behavior, and we are in essence developing a model that requires individuals to behave in a way that is counter to human instincts.

**Step 2** — The development of a competency model requires access to a “successful job incumbent” or “advanced experts.” Even if it were possible to define objectively success in the function, it is still necessary to determine with accuracy who is a successful job incumbent or an advanced expert. One possible resolution to this challenge has been to ask women and minorities themselves to identify fair, unbiased, and culturally skilled managers (Yuengling, 2005). However, the limitation to this approach is that the relative success of female and minority workers may be due to other elements unknown to them (their own efficacy, the match of skills to needs in a work unit, value match with managers, etc) - leading them to identify individuals who appeared to them to be unbiased and fair, but may have actually been acting out of completely different managerial skill sets. Additionally, there are significant political ramifications in trying to identify “successful job incumbents” for those who are not identified as successful.

One route around the challenge of finding a “successful job incumbent” would be to use “advanced experts” to develop a set of agreed-upon competencies. There are many diversity practitioners who have developed and published lists of KSAOs that are in some form or another, essentially the building blocks of competencies. Using these KSAOs would be one way of resolving the problem of finding successful job incumbents, but it also presents a different challenge. There is no credentialing authority in the diversity field, and no licensure. Any individual who chooses to call him or herself a diversity expert can do so, and can publish a list of KSAOs disconnected from any research or reality. In fact, many of the best-known diversity experts are self-published, with little or no scrutiny or peer review of their work. This is not to say that their work is meaningless or useless, it just means that caution must be observed in evaluating it.

Another requirement placed on the development of this specific competency model may provide a pathway out of these challenges that are created by the nature of diversity in organizations. Part of the task is to map the diversity competencies to the cultural competencies developed by McDonald et al. during DEOMI’s chair of the RACCA working group in 2008.
and to incorporate the subsequent refinement of these competencies into the framework by DEOMI and NAWCTSD in 2010. Part of the task is to map the diversity competencies to the cultural competencies developed by the NAWCTSD and DLO in conjunction with DEOMI (McDonald et al, 2008; NAWCTSD, DLO, 2010). This is a reasonable and appropriate requirement as from the earliest research works on diversity the link to culture has been generally understood. That diverse populations are, in fact, cultural groups within the domestic US culture is accepted and has begun to be documented in the social psychology literature (Cox, 1993; Chávez-Guido, 1999; Dovidio, 2001; Garrett, 1999; Helgelson, 1999; Jackson, 1975). This is based on the idea that a cultural identity group can be based on physical distinctiveness but also share a socio-cultural identity. That is, they share a subjective culture (Triandis, 1976), meaning value preferences, norms, formation of worldviews, and goal priorities that distinguish one cultural group from another.

Due to our history, the United States has had segmentation between racio-ethnic group culture and national cultures (Cox, 1993). Many Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, African Americans and European Americans have understood and identified with both their American culture and their heritage culture. There is also a growing body of research indicating that gender represents a cultural category, based on the significant socialization of human beings on the basis of gender (Hegelsen, 1990; Tannen, 1994). Taylor Cox thoroughly discusses the premise that gender, racio-ethnic and nationality groups differ culturally by a specific examination of six areas of cultural orientations and how they play out in organizations. These six areas are generally accepted as cultural dimensions and include: 1) time and space orientation, 2) leadership style orientation, 3) individualism versus collectivism, 4) competitive versus cooperative behavior, 5) locus of control and 6) communication styles (Cox, 1993).

In fact, much of the research work on diversity explicitly discusses the fact that diversity work in organizations is cultural work. Rowe and Gardenschwartz (1997) note several “diversity variables” that affect both teamwork and conflict resolution: egalitarian culture versus hierarchical or authoritarian culture; direct communication style versus indirect styles; individualistic culture versus group or collectivistic culture; task-oriented focus versus more social or relationship-oriented focus; and change oriented cultures versus traditional cultures. The dynamics of intercultural contact in organizations are echoed in the nascent cultural research on demographic groups (Gelfand et al, 2007; Punkett & Shankar, 2007; Sanchez-Burkes, 2000). Several research studies also are able to discern significant cultural differences between the groups using the government-mandated EEO categories (Guillory, 1994; Trompenaars, 1998).

With regard to this body of work, it is consistent with sound research principles to approach diversity competencies as overlapping with cultural competencies. In fact, diversity competencies are explicitly included as cultural competencies in the Department of Defense Cross-Cultural Roadmap (DoD, 2010), a study designed to support the DoD in the development of cultural competencies:

“There are many different definitions of 3C depending on the context, but they all have the same essential outcome, i.e., 3C is broadly defined as the ability to operate effectively in any culturally complex environment. It is based on a set of knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes (KSAAs) developed through education, training and experience that promote cross-cultural
competence and enhance that ability. The KSAAs offer a conceptual framework for learning about and understanding a particular culture or cultural group, which can range from a unit’s own cultural diversity to the various cultures in joint, interagency, coalition and multinational contexts.” (DOD 3C Roadmap, pg1).

Based on this need, and grounded in the research to date on diversity, approaching the competency model in connection to cultural competencies would appear to be both valid and useful.

**Proposed methodology**

It follows that a rigorous methodology for the development of a diversity competency model must meet two requirements:

1) Address the challenges to the standard methodology detailed above presented by the unique nature of diversity in organizations;

2) Map and align the competencies as closely as possible to the cross-cultural competencies (3C) developed by the Department of Defense.

Fortunately, the inherent coherence of the second requirement provides an elegant solution to the challenges presented by the first requirement. The proposed methodology for the development of the diversity competencies is to collect and synthesize the work of the acknowledged “advanced” diversity experts, both practitioners and researchers in the field, and map those results against the cultural competencies developed by the Department of Defense. While acknowledging that the “competencies” developed by the advanced experts are not validated, and may be not much more that thoughts and lists of ideas for successful behavior, they constitute the best practices in the field to date. Mapping them against the core competencies developed from more rigorously researched cultural competencies to examine overlap and additional areas of interest may lend credence to their validity and permit the identification of common areas of behavior. In this way we can develop diversity core competencies and core enablers based on the expert knowledge of advanced diversity practitioners and grounded in both diversity and cultural research. Figure 1 shows a proposed diversity competency model based on the existing framework of 3C Core Competencies and 3C Core Enablers. It should be noted that the core competencies and core enablers remain virtually the same in both models, with only two additions: Leading Others as a core competency, and Integrity as a core enabler. However, the descriptors and measures are different in many, but not all respects. In addition, the core competencies are divided into two categories, thinking factors and connecting factors. Thinking factors are those that are cognitively laden, and rely on the individual’s acquisition of the competency. The connecting factors are those that place emphasis on interaction with other individuals. There is some level of overlap of the three competencies in the connecting category: communication, interpersonal skills and cultural adaptability. The descriptors are categorized where they seem to be the most applicable. In addition, because diversity competencies require both the management of individuals and management of groups of individuals, those competencies related to individuals fall under interpersonal skills, and those
related to management of groups and ultimately climate appear under cultural adaptability. Figure 1: (located after References)

**Core Competencies**

Cognitive – Thinking Factors

**1 - Applying Cultural Knowledge**

Applies knowledge of factual information about the history of the racial, ethnic, and gender groups in the United States, and the past and current (a) social, (b) political, (c) cultural and (d) economic situation recognizes the impact of the historical development of civil rights and diversity in the United States differentiates between representational diversity, inclusion, diversity climate, and employee engagement.

**2 - Organizational Awareness**

Understands the mission and functions of one’s own organization, and how diversity connects to the mission

Comprehends the regulatory requirements of EEO/EO and distinguishes both the differences and linkages with diversity

Operates effectively within the organization by applying knowledge of how the organization’s programs, policies, procedures, rules, and regulations may either enhance or create barriers for representational diversity and inclusion

**3 - Cultural Perspective-Taking**

Demonstrates an awareness of one’s own cultural assumptions, values, preferences, and biases, and understands how their own identity group is viewed by members of other identity groups

Applies perspective-taking skills to detect, analyze, and consider the point of view of others and recognizes how the other will interpret his/her actions

Understands the formation of social identity, privilege, and bias structures, and can identify when they may be at play in organizational processes

Analyzes the cultural context when interpreting environmental cues

Connecting Factors – Interactions

**4 – Communication**

Recognizes and manages both verbal and non-verbal cues about personal attitudes towards diversity in general and racial, ethnic, and gender groups specifically
Distinguishes the impact of racial, ethnic and gender culture on communication behaviors, and can identify when they may create conflict of misunderstanding among work groups

Listens carefully to others, paying close attention to the speaker’s point of view

Communicates thoughts and ideas in a way that is relevant to the listener

Adjusts communication style to meet expectations of audience

Seeks additional clarifying information when necessary

5 - Interpersonal Skills

Develops and maintains positive rapport by showing respect, courtesy, and tact with others
Interacts effectively with a variety of people
Relates and adjusts well to people from varied backgrounds in different situations
Engages in self-management when personal biases are activated or present

6 - Cultural Adaptability

Understands the implications of one’s actions and adjusts approach to maintain positive and bias free relationships with individuals or groups of other racial ethnic or gender cultures
Gathers and interprets information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about how to interact with others

Integrates well into situations in which people have different values, customs, and cultures
Shows respect for others’ values and customs

7- Leading Others

Creates an inclusive environment
Takes a multicultural versus colorblind approach when interacting with others
Sets, communicates, and maintains standards for all

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20 As noted earlier, we have begun to understand that the effective management of diversity is a fundamental leadership skill. Therefore, the competencies outlined here rather than being developed in isolation from basic leadership competencies, should ideally be integrated as a seamless part of those leadership competencies. However, the general understanding of diversity as a leadership competency is not yet fully embraced by the general population, and most particularly, not by leadership competency modelers, and until it is, the related leadership competencies for diversity have a place here and are useful and necessary to set objectives for training.
Seeks and accepts feedback on diversity related issues
Creates focus on super ordinate identity (team) and task
Recognizes the diversity issues present in cross-dyad mentoring
Focuses on performance results, not performance style
Ensures decisions and behaviors reflect fairness
Develops direct reports and fosters talent throughout organization.

Core Enablers

Resilience Factors

**Cognitive bias resilience**

Tolerance of Ambiguity – Accepts, or does not feel threatened by, ambiguous situations and uncertainty. Manages uncertainty in new and complex situations where there is not necessarily a “right” way to interpret things

Low Need for Closure – Restrains from settling on immediate answers and solutions, and remains open to any new information that conflicts with those answers

Suspending Judgment – Withholds personal or moral judgment when faced with novel experiences, knowledge and points of view. Perceives information neutrally and withholds or suspends judgment until adequate information becomes available

Inclusiveness – Tendency to include and accept things (including people) based on commonality of commitment to mission

Multiculturalism – Understands and adopts a multicultural approach rather than a “colorblind” approach.

**Emotional resilience**

Stress Resilience – Avoids adopting stress-induced perspectives that overly simplify culture; demonstrates tendency for positive emotional states and to respond calmly and steadfastly to stressful events; acts as a calming influence

Emotion Regulation – Regulates/controls one’s own emotions and emotional expression to support mission performance.

**Self-identity resilience**

Self-Confidence – Believes in one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet situational demands
Self-Identity – Demonstrates ability to maintain personal values independent of situational factors
Reciprocity – Understands that others have different social identities, cultures, and values that are not threats to one’s own identity or values
Optimism – Views problems as solvable challenges and as exciting learning opportunities.

**Engagement Factors**

**Learning motivation**

Learning through Observation – Gathers and interprets information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about own treatment and how to treat others. Is motivated to make sense of inconsistent information about social rules and norms; continually learns and updates own knowledge base as new situations are encountered

Inquisitiveness – Is receptive towards, and takes an active pursuit of understanding ideas, values, norms, situations, and behaviors that are new and different. Demonstrates curiosity about different countries and cultures, as well as interest in world and international events.

**Social interaction**

Social Flexibility – Presents oneself to others in a manner that creates favorable impressions, facilitates relationship building, and influences others. Is able to modify ideas and behaviors, compromise, and be receptive to new ways of doing things

Willingness to Engage – Actively seeks out and explores unfamiliar cross-cultural interactions and regards them positively as a challenge

Integrity – Demonstrates adherence to moral and ethical principles, soundness of moral character, honesty.

**Learning objectives**

Based on the competencies detailed above, it is possible to identify learning objectives linked to the competencies and supported by current research. These learning objectives will ensure that the diversity training is in alignment with the competencies and also in accordance with the research literature.

With reference to the seven competencies identified, learning objectives by competency are listed below, with research literature supporting each objective listed to the right:

**Table 1: (located after References)**

**Validation of model**

This initial set of diversity competencies and learning objectives represents a synthesis of “advanced expert knowledge” of the competency, if not the descriptor level, and maps one-to-one to the Department of Defense Cross-Cultural Competency (3C) model. The diversity
competencies can be used as the basis for the training objectives for a rigorous, research-based diversity training plan of instruction. In the face of continuing existing challenges to a more traditional competency model methodology, one method of validating these competencies would be to train a pilot class to the competencies, and follow up with a longitudinal analysis of their performance as effective managers of diversity.
References


Appendix

Figure 1. Core Competencies and Core Enablers Model
Table 1

**Learning Recommendation 1: Applying Cultural Knowledge**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning Objective</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 State the definition and distinctions between EEO/EO, diversity, inclusion, diversity climate, and employee engagement.</td>
<td>Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Discuss the history and importance of the various rights movements and the criticality of the regulations stemming from them (EEO/EO). Recognize the history of different racial, ethnic and gender groups, including social context, geographic, religious language, legal and policy implications.</td>
<td>Conference Board 2006; Adler, 1997; Cox, 1993; EEOC, 2003; Moskos, 1996; Thomas, 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Describe the dimensions of diversity- human, cultural, and organizational and the impacts on interaction, behaviors, teamwork and mission accomplishment. Identify the existence and relevance of multiple layers of cultures (e.g., own, work group, team, military, civilian, contractor) in an operational environment</td>
<td>Ang, 2007; Chao, 2005; Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Review the cross-cultural aspects of the military and Federal populations.</td>
<td>Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 Discuss the critical diversity concepts: social identity theory, privilege, implicit bias, impact on individual and group performance, and importance of inclusion and diversity climate</td>
<td>Banji, 1994; Dovidio, 2002; Fiske, 1998; Foschi, 2000; George et al, 2010; Harrison, 2002, 2007; Homan et al 2007, 2008; Steele, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 Analyze subtle and complex diversity issues (both representational and inclusion) and how they relate to specific marginalized groups</td>
<td>Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Page, 2007; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Steele, 2010; Thomas &amp; Ely 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001; Vendantam, 2010</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Yuengling, 2005</td>
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### Learning Recommendation 2: Organizational Awareness

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<tr>
<td>2.5 Analyze how programs, policies, procedures and practices of the organization can either enhance diversity or function as a barrier to diversity.</td>
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<td>2.6 Describe how to adhere to one’s own organizational requirements while dealing with conflicting requirements within and outside the organization.</td>
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<td>2.7 Examine the mechanisms of institutional bias.</td>
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Learning Recommendation 3: Cultural Perspective Taking

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<tr>
<td>3.1 Describe how social identity development and culture form values, preferences, and bias mechanisms.</td>
<td>Case, 2007; Chávez, 1999; Cross, 1991; Helms,1993; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Hong et al, 2001; LaFleur, 2002; Logel et al, 2009; Luhtanen, Crock, 1992; McDermott, 2005; Parker, 2002; Rubin et al, 1998; Rudman, 2001; Scott, 2001; Sellers, 2003; Stewart, 2006; Payne, 2008; Taijfel, 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Discuss cultural models, such as Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, and long vs. short-term orientation.</td>
<td>Ang, 2007, Chao, 2005; Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Hong et al, 2001; Thomas, 2006; Trompenaars, 1998; Triandis, 1994; Tsui, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Assess one’s own cultural assumptions, values, and biases, and how they may be viewed by other identity groups when evident.</td>
<td>Ang, 2007; Chao, 2005; Case, 2007; Chávez, 1999; Cross, 1991; Helms, 1993; Hofstede, 1997; Hong et al, 2001; LaFleur, 2002;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.4</strong> Analyze how one’s own cultural assumptions, values, and biases differ from</td>
<td>Logel et al, 2009; McDermott, 2005; Parker, 2002; Rubin et al, 1998; Rudman, 2001; Scott, 2001; Sellers, 2003; Tajfel, Turner, 1986; Thomas, 2006; Tsui, 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>other value systems (e.g., understanding how one’s own social identity is viewed</td>
<td>by members of social identity and culture).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3.5</strong> Analyze how another’s cultural values and social identity affect their</td>
<td>Aronson, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Carli, 2001; Devine, Montieth, 2002; Dovidio, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Garrett, 994; Haddock, 1993; Park, 2005; Richeson, 2001; Rudman, 2001, Ryan, 2007; Sanchèz-Burke et al, 2000; Steele, 2010; Valian, 1998; Vendantam, 2010</td>
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<td>behavior.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.6</strong> Describe the formation of privilege and bias structures (stereotypes,</td>
<td>Allport, 1954; Aronson, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Carli, 2001; Devine, Montieth, 2002; Dovidio, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Garrett, 1994; Haddock, 1993; Park, 2005; Richeson, 2001; Rudman, 2001, Ryan, 2007; Sanchèz-Burke et al, 2000; Valian, 1998; Vendantam, 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>prejudice and discrimination) as well as attitude formation (how attitudes</td>
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<td>develop and how they change) and attribution formation (how attributions are made</td>
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<td>about others’ behavior).</td>
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<td><strong>3.7</strong> Compare the mechanisms of implicit and aversive racism, stereotype threat</td>
<td>Banji, 1994; Brown, 2005; Carter et al, 2006; Fazio, 1995; Pettigrew et al, 2008; Richeson, 2001; Steele, 2010; Sue, 2010; Watson, 2008; Ziegert et al, 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>and identity threat and how they have an impact on performance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.8</strong> Detect situational cues that indicate a particular cultural schema or</td>
<td>Abbe, 2007, 2008; Adler, 1997; Ang, 2007; Aronson, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Carli, 2001; Case 2007; Chao, 2005;</td>
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<td><strong>3.11</strong> Apply sensitivity to individual diversity by managing both explicit and aversive bias—avoiding stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination—and respecting differences</td>
<td>Aronson, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Carli, 2001; Devine, Montieth, 2002; Dovidio, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Garrett, 994; Haddock, 1993; Osland, Bird, 2000; Sanchêz-Burke et al, 2000; Valian, 1998;</td>
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Learning Recommendation 4: Communication Skills

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<tr>
<td><strong>4.1</strong> State the importance of forming, articulating, and modeling a philosophy of leveraging diversity, and creating inclusion is critical to the organizational missions, whether unit, group, team, or other organizational element. Understand this philosophy is articulated both verbally, and non-verbally, and will be “read” by other identity groups.</td>
<td>Aronsnon, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Carli, 2001; Devine, Montieth, 2002; Dovidio, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Garrett, 994; Haddock, 1993; Osland, Bird, 2000; Park, 2005; Richeson, 2001; Rudman, 2001, Ryan, 2007; Sanchêz-Burke et al, 2000; Valian, 1998; Vendantam, 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Explain how personality and diversity cultures can result in different methods of verbal and non-verbal communication, acceptable behaviors, and display rules, world views, and explanations for events.</td>
<td>Sanchèz-Burke et al, 2000; Stewart, Payne, 2008; Valian, 1998; Vendantam, 2010; Ang, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chao, 2005; Dickens, 1982; Early, 2003; Gelfand, 2007; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Landis, Baghat, 2001; Livers, Caver, 2003; Luke et al, 2000; Matsumoto, 2001; McDonald et al., 2008; Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Pratto, et al, 2001; Punkett, 2007; Ross et al, 2010; Russell et al., 1995; Selmeski, 2007; Tannen, 1994; Thomas, 2006; Tsui, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Interpret and communicate thoughts and ideas in a way that is relevant to the listener or adjust communication style to meet expectations of audience. Recognize that others may communicate in a style different from yours.</td>
<td>Ang, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chao, 2005; Dickens, 1982; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Landis, Baghat, 2001; Livers, Caver, 2003; McDonald et al., 2008; Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Tannen, 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 Recognize the non-verbal messages sent by behaviors and how they may be interpreted by different groups.</td>
<td>Agyris, 1999, 2003; Aronson, Steele, 2005; Bargh, 1999; Dovidio, 2002; Fazio, 1990; Dovidio, Gaertner, 1986; Logel et al, 2009; McDermott, 2006, Steele, 2010; Sue, 2010; Ziegert, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Recognize micro-aggression and its function in maintaining privilege in organizations.</td>
<td>Sue, 2010; Jaffer, et. al., 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.6 Interpret and use a range of acceptable behaviors and display rules, and understand how different methods of verbal and non-verbal communication (e.g., facial expressions and gestures, personal distance, grooming and apparel standards, sense of timing) are relevant in different contexts.</td>
<td>Ang, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chao, 2005; Dickens, 1982; Early, 2003; Gelfand, 2007; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Landis, Baghat, 2001; Livers, Caver, 2003; Luke et al, 2000; McDonald et al., 2008;</td>
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<tr>
<td>**4.7 Communicate effectively in groups and in one-on-one conversations, taking</td>
<td>Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Pratto, et al, 2001; Punkett, 2007; Ross et al, 2010; Tannen, 1994; Thomas, 2006; Tsui, 20007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>audience and type of information into account.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>**4.8 Listen carefully to others, paying close attention to the speaker’s point</td>
<td>Ang, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chao, 2005; Dickens, 1982; Early, 2003; Gelfand, 2007; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Landis, Baghat, 2001; Livers, Cavers, 2003; Luke et al, 2000; McDonald et al., 2008; Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Pratto et al, 2001; Punkett, 2007; Ross et al, 2010; Tannen, 1994; Thomas, 2006; Tsui, 20007</td>
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<tr>
<td>of view, thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. Develop active listening skills to</td>
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<td>enhance communications in multi-cultural contexts or to prevent, solve, or mediate</td>
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<tr>
<td>problems when interacting with non-native speakers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>**4.9 Seek additional clarifying information when necessary.</td>
<td>Carli, 2001; Dickens, 1982; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Livers, Cavers, 2003; Luke et al, 2000; McDonald et al., 2008; Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Pratto et al, 2001; Punkett, 2007; Ross et al, 2010; Semleski, 2007; Tannen, 1994; Thomas, 2006; Tsui, 20007; Valian, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**4.10 Use appropriate terms, examples, and analogies that are meaningful to the</td>
<td>Carli, 2001; Dickens, 1982; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997;</td>
</tr>
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<td>audience and help to build rapport. Do not use analogies or examples from a</td>
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<td>narrow personal experience that may have no meaning to audience.</td>
<td>Livers, Cavers, 2003; Luke et al, 2000; McDonald et al., 2008; Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Pratto, et al, 2001; Punkett, 2007; Tannen, 1994, Valian, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11 Act as a voice for perspectives, levels, and cultures within the organization that are not otherwise represented.</td>
<td>Conference Board, 2006; Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1999; Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001</td>
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Learning Recommendation 5: Interpersonal Skills

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<th>Learning Objective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Assess one’s own personal strengths and weaknesses in interpersonal skills to interact more effectively in cross-cultural and diverse contexts.</td>
<td>Banji, 1994; Cox, 1993; Dovidio, 2002; Fiske, 1998; Foschi, 2000; George et al, 2010; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; Harrison, 2007; Homan et al, 2007; McDonald et al., 2008; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Page, 2007; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Steele, 1999, 2010; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001; Vendantam, 2010; Yuengling 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.2 Assess self-awareness about one's own biases, preferences and cultural norms, and understand the organizational and interpersonal implications.</td>
<td>Banji, 1994; Cox, 1993; Dovidio, 2002; Fiske, 1998; Foschi, 2000; George et al, 2010; Griggs, 1995; Guillery, 1994; Harrison, 2007; Homan et al, 2007; McDonald et al., 2008; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Page, 2007; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Steele, 1999, 2010; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Engage in self-management when biases are activated. Recognize when these are activated by interpersonal or other organizational actions.</td>
<td>Aghazadeh, 2004; Basset Jones, 2005; Bradley et al, 2005; Carli, 2001; Combs, 2006; Cox, 1993; DeWitt, 2008; DiTomaso, 1994; Frink et al, 2003; Homan, 2008; Horowitz, 2007; Jayne, 2004; Kearny, 2009; Kirkman, 2005; McKay, Avery, 2010; Page, 2007; Ng, 2008; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Vendantam, 2010; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4 Describe basic communication, influence, and conflict management techniques that are consistent with social and organizational norms and role expectations, as well as others’ ways of thinking and operating.</td>
<td>Ang, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chao, 2005; Dickens, 1982; Early, 2003; Gelfand, 2007; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Hofstede, 1980, 1997; Landis, Baghat, 2001; Livers, Cavers, 2003; Luke et al, 2000; McDonald et al., 2008; Nkomo, Bell, 2001; Parker, 2002; Pratto, et al, 2001; Punkett, 2007; Tannen, 1994; Thomas, 2006; Tsui, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5 Demonstrate and maintain positive rapport by showing respect, courtesy, tact, and openness. Positive rapport is defined as good working relationships.</td>
<td>Conference Board, 2006; Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillery, 1994; McDonald et al., 2008; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al,</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Interact effectively with a variety of people. Interact effectively means the ability to accomplish the mission through good working relationships.</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>Relate and adjust well to people from varied backgrounds in different situations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Assess and respond appropriately within a work place context to the emotional and psychological needs of others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>Engage - communicate and interact – with others from diverse cultures.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>Create and manage interpersonal cross-cultural relationships.</td>
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<td>5.12</td>
<td>Ensure all members of all demographic groups have equal access, and equal ability to engage on work-related issues.</td>
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Learning Recommendation 6: Cultural Adaptability

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<th>Learning Objective</th>
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<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Adapt own behavior when working with other cultures. Adjust behavior as necessary and as appropriate within a DoD setting, to comply with or show respect for others’ values and customs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Gather and interpret information about people and surroundings to increase awareness about how to interact with others. Understand the implications of one’s actions and adjust behavioral approach to maintain positive relationships with other groups or</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.3 Integrate into situations in which people have different values, customs, and cultures.</td>
<td>Aronson, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Case, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chavèz, 1999; Cross, 1991; Devine, Montieth, 2002; Dovidio, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Garrett, 1994; Haddock, 1993; Helms, 1993; Hofstede, 1997; Hong et al, 2001; LaFleur, 2002; Logel et al, 2009; McDermott, 2005; Park, 2005; Parker, 2002; Richeson, 2001; Rudman, 2001; Ryan, 2007; Rubin et al, 1998; Sanchèz-Burke et al, 2000; Scott, 2001; Sellers, 2003; Valian, 1998; Vendantam, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 Demonstrate respect for others’ values and customs.</td>
<td>Aronson, Steele, 2005; Banji, 1994; Bargh, 1991; Case, 2007; Carli, 2001; Chavèz, 1999; Cross, 1991; Devine, Montieth, 2002; Dovidio, 2001; Fiske, 1998; Garrett, 1994; Haddock, 1993; Helms, 1993; Hofstede, 1997; Hong et al, 2001; LaFleur, 2002; Logel et al, 2009; McDermott, 2005; Park, 2005; Parker, 2002; Richeson, 2001; Rudman, 2001; Ryan, 2007; Rubin et al, 1998; Sanchèz-Burke et al, 2000; Scott, 2001; Sellers, 2003; Valian, 1998;</td>
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Learning Recommendation 7: Leading Others

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<tr>
<td>7.1 Create an inclusive environment. Be a role model for inclusion and culturally adaptive behavior.</td>
<td>Conference Board, 2006; Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; McDonald et al., 2008; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2 Use a multicultural approach in work groups where differences are acknowledged, versus a &quot;colorblind&quot; approach where differences are ignored.</td>
<td>Markus, Steele, 2002; Norton, 2006; Richeson, et al, 2004; Ryan, 2007; Wolsko et al, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3 Set and communicate performance standards, evaluate workers on results not style</td>
<td>Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4 Demonstrate attention to a relevant super-ordinate identity when working in diverse work groups.</td>
<td>Homan, 2007, 2008; Rink, 2007; Van der Vegt, 2005; Vorauer et al, 2009; Watson, 2002; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5 Recognize the racial, gender and ethnic cultural issues in mentoring.</td>
<td>Allen, 2001; Butler, 1999; Cohen, Steele, 1999; Foschi, 2000; Hargrove, 1995; Hegelson, 1990; Livers, Caver, 2005; Moskos, 1996; Parker, 2002; Sanchète, 2008;</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.6 Seek and use feedback from diverse sources. Provide constructive feedback to all team members</td>
<td>Sellers, 2003; Tannen, 1999; Guillory, 1994; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7 Set and communicate performance standards, evaluate workers on results not style</td>
<td>Guillory, 1994; Morrison 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8 Select team members based on task related abilities, not on ethnicity.</td>
<td>Guillory, 1994; Morrison 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Yuengling, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9 Ensure all decisions and behaviors reflect a commitment to fairness, understanding the difference between process fairness and outcome fairness.</td>
<td>Conference Board, 2006; Brockner, 2006; Cox, 1993; Griggs, 1995; Guillory, 1994; McDonald et al., 2008; Morrison, 1992; GAO, 2005; Rice, 2009; Rowe &amp; Gardenschwartz, 1997; Thomas &amp; Ely, 1996; Thomas, 1991; Van Knippenberg et al, 2001; Yuengling, 2005</td>
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Poster Session

This session was designed to display research which allowed face-to-face conversation between authors and viewers. Eighteen posters were presented on a variety of topical areas to include: equal opportunity, equal employment opportunity, veteran’s issues, and cross-cultural competency.
Technical Applications for Improved Training for EO & Diversity Professionals

Elizabeth Culhane and Mike Guest

The DEOMI Simulation Lab was opened in 2009 in order to establish a center of excellence for simulation research and development in the areas of Military Equal Opportunity and Equal Employment Opportunity (EO/EEO), Diversity, and Cross-Cultural Competence (3C). The lab conducts and promotes fundamental research, while providing a transition environment for emerging technologies, as well as delivering training solutions within DEOMI and across the military in support of mission readiness. The lab provides three product channels: basic experimental research, applied testing and assessment, and simulation and training delivery.

Currently, DEOMI researchers are investigating online training of nonverbal behavior (NVB) as a potential enhancement to DEOMI’s EO & Diversity curriculum. This program provides training on the following five modules: facial expressions of emotion, gestures, change detection, aggression detection, and credibility assessment. Overall, this program aims to increase skills and knowledge in overall effectiveness in cross-cultural situations; such as, cultural awareness, perspective taking, increased communication and interpersonal skills.

Additionally, the DEOMI Simulation Lab is investigating the application of virtual environments as a platform for EO & Diversity professionals. Virtual technologies have the potential to greatly increase outreach efforts, deliver highly efficient online collaboration, and provide new methods of training to EO & Diversity professionals. This poster session will be interactive—we will have a laptop computer set up next to us with demonstrations.

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed to represent the official position of DEOMI, the U.S. military services, or the Department of Defense.
The Trainability of Cross-Cultural Competence and the Examination of the Affective Component

Elizabeth Culhane and William Gabrenya

Today’s globalized economy requires leaders and their employees to focus on cultural awareness in order to succeed in this international business environment. Military leaders in some nations must also be highly culturally aware. The term “cultural competence” refers to “a set of cultural behaviors and attitudes integrated into the practice methods of a system, agency or its professionals, that enables them to work effectively in cross cultural situations,” (National Center for Cultural Competence, p. 9). Several models of culture competence have been proposed, but a missing component in these models is affect (emotion and emotion regulation), which has received little attention.

The present study examined the trainability of the affective component of culture competence. Emotion regulation is defined as the ability to manage and modify emotion reactions while achieving goal-directed outcomes (Gross, 1998). Affective events theory (AET) and training methods designed to enhance emotional intelligence were used to develop a training intervention to reduce negative affect in response to unpleasant, novel cultural stimuli. The focal emotion was disgust.

Traditional cognitive based training and emotion regulation training were compared in a pre-post control group experimental design. Participants were given emotion regulation, cognitive training or a no-training control experience. Following the disgust and emotion literature, affective responses to unusual foods were employed as the focus of the training.

Individual difference constructs that have been found to affect, moderate or mediate training effectiveness and culture competence measures, including Five Factor Model personality constructs, emotion regulation skill, and disgust sensitivity were assessed. Affective response to novel cultural stimuli (food items) was assessed before and after the experimental training manipulation. The dependent variables were affective response and emotion regulation skill. Affective response was assessed using explicit self-report measures and an Implicit Association Test (IAT) measure.

The study was conducted online utilizing undergraduate students and U.S. military members from all service branches. Undergraduate participants were recruited from Introduction to Psychology classes and several types of online classes. Military participants were invited to participate in the experiment through a personal email that was sent to them by the primary researcher. The majority of military members recruited were from a DOD agency located in Florida. All participation was voluntary.

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The following relationships were hypothesized. Participants who received the emotion regulation training would have more positive affective responses than those that received traditional cognitive training and those that received cognitive training would have more positive affective responses than those in the control group. Disgust sensitivity was hypothesized to have an inverse relationship to positive affective responses across all conditions and those low in disgust sensitivity were expected to benefit more from emotion regulation training than those high in disgust sensitivity. Emotion regulation skill was hypothesized to be related to positive affective response. Openness to experience and conscientiousness were expected to moderate the effect of training on affect. Openness to experience, extraversion and neuroticism were hypothesized to be related to affective responses across all conditions.

This study found that a short, web-based training manipulation reduced both explicit and implicit negative effect, albeit inconsistently across explicit and implicit measures. Cognitive training was found to be most effective, although other implementations of emotional regulation training might prove fruitful. The potential for training the affective component of culture competence was demonstrated, suggesting that future research on culture competence, and the design of training programs for overseas work, should attend to affective as well as cognitive and behavioral skills.
You Say You Want a Revolution: Militancy and Millenarian Movements

Jacqueline Brundage DelVeccio

How does narrative shape identity? Identity evolves in response to experiences and memories, impressions and perceptions, forming a web of interconnectedness from individual to group to nation to world. Group identity can be constructed through repeated social interactions, which occur over time; narratives, the stories which unfold during those interactions, develop accordingly. A successful narrative creates a history by incorporating selected words and images into our shared consciousness. Imagery and action are enactive. Narrative is thus the genesis of, and acts as a catalyst for, all social actions. The language and imagery of a particular narrative can be adjusted in order to reshape a group’s perception of the political status quo. A shift in narrative occurs in response to disequilibrium in a society. If language and imagery becomes impassioned, the level of violence escalates. Narratives require a change in the identity and thinking of a populace in order to initiate enough action to propel a resistance. How individuals experience and legitimize violence—especially in religious movements—is dependent on the formation of their identities in a fragmented state. The construction of a national identity—of nationalism—occurs in response to a struggle for power and new political order.

In “You Say You Want a Revolution: Militancy in Millenarian Movements” the relationship between the narrative and violence in The Taiping Rebellion, The Mau Mau Rebellion, and The Russian Revolution is explored. By knitting the commonalities of the separate millennial revolutions from three continents together, I proved the overwhelming impact narrative has on martiality.

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Conspicuous Diversity or Diversity-Display’s Dividends for Defense: Military Maximum Diversity as a Costly Signal of Deep-Power and a Super-Diversity-Simulation Training Game

Boris Goesl

This future-oriented critique of a facile cost-benefit calculation concerning diversity management clarifies the effects of maximum diversity as an outward signal to global awareness. BUSH et al. criticized that “diversity efforts within the US government” were inadequate due to “approaching diversity more as a personnel program than a critical mission element imperative to national security” (in PARCO/LEYV 2010, 387). My contribution illustrates why conspicuously/openly displaying costly maximum diversity is a potent security strategy. KNOUSE distinguished: “good diversity management focuses upon maximizing the benefits of diversity, while minimizing the costs” (2008, 16). This neglects the counter-intuitive benefit of exhaustive diversity precisely because it is costly. According to the ‘Costly Signaling Theory’/‘Handicap Principle’ (ZAHAVI/ZAHAVI 1997)—originally describing animals ‘paradoxically’ signaling fitness by displaying energy waste—for being effective, communication signals must be reliable/honest, and for being reliable they must be costly to the signaler—also in the broader sense of spending resources, vitality, and time/opportunities (see VOLAND in VOLAND/GRAMMER 2003, 257). Therefore precisely not the integration itself, but rather the displayed fear of supposed complications of an affirmative integration of alleged ‘risk groups’ (e.g. homosexuals: see DONELLY in PARCO/LEYV 2010, 249) weakens military power because it displays potential vulnerability. On the contrary demonstrating that one can easily afford the ‘additional costs’ of radical diversity, honestly signals underlying power: psychological ‘soft deterrence’.

Furthermore a computer game could train internal diversity coping readiness by simulating added fictional diversity dimensions (‘hyper-/superdiversity’/mental overload): visible surface-level dimensions (age/gender/race) would be augmented by ‘x-ace’/‘y-ender’; ‘x-ness’/‘y-ality’ would enhance deep-level diversity’s non-observable traits.

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The Issue of Sexism as Relates to Women Veterans Accessing Benefits

Kimberly J. Hamilton-Wright

The White House and the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] continue to publicize their strides toward serving military veterans. Yet, the high placement of initiatives such as The Center for Women Veterans [CWV] on the Veterans Affairs Organizational Chart, acknowledges that key segments of the military veteran community wane in identifying and accessing benefits. Research by the VA and other entities, as well as continued mainstream media coverage confirm, sexism during the military woman’s career, haunts her as a barrier, when identifying and accessing veterans’ benefits. The impact of unaccessed and under accessed benefits can devastate any military veteran, whether male or female. Repercussions also often trickle down to family members and their respective communities. Equal access to benefits for women veterans also presents the opportunity for equal acknowledgement of her military service as being valued and appreciated. This term paper will look at sexism as an underlying issue that leads to disparities regarding equal access to benefits for women veterans. Further exploration of this topic will include related history, discussions of how sexism permeates the military, as well as current and future efforts to address this issue.

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Strides in Planning and Evaluations toward Benefits for Women’s Veterans

Kimberly J. Hamilton-Wright

Women have been perpetually passionate about serving in the military. Yet, for centuries, the U.S. government and our society have waned in embracing and respecting them as soldiers. Women veterans have also struggled more fiercely in obtaining benefits comparable to those of male veterans. Silver linings, however, are becoming clearer and more common. The high placement of the Center for Women Veterans [CWV] on the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] organizational chart, and the reality that the Center’s director is an immediate advisor to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs regarding women veterans’ issues, both indicate that this topic is garnering increasing attention. This term paper will take a historical look at women’s involvement and service with the military, as well as how well they fare in accessing veterans benefits. The planning and evaluation methods used to develop specialized benefits – particularly health care – for women veterans will be examined. Whether those planning and evaluation methods have or will continue to connect women with veterans’ benefits are also explored.

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Fostering Organizational Effectiveness through Equal Opportunity and Perceived Organizational Justice: A Theoretical Approach

Stephanie Miloslavic, Christen Lockamy, Rana Moukarzel, and Marinus van Driel

The business world has been experiencing many changes in the structure of its operations and/or in the geographical areas it is located, in which adaption is essential. Changes of this nature do not come without challenges. As powerful contributors to the business world, government institutions are strongly impacted by this evolution. Empirical research has demonstrated that creating a fair and supportive climate increases organizational effectiveness in highly unstable situations. However, research surrounding organizational climate and effectiveness within the government realm has not been a common focus. A goal of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) is to actively explore variables that influence organizational climate and organizational effectiveness within the armed forces. This paper proposes looking at civilian and military personnel’s perceptions of justice (POJ) as predictor of both organizational climate (i.e., EO/EEO) and organizational effectiveness (OE). We provide a review of the theoretical background to support this proposed relationship. Additionally, we suggest EO/EEO as being a precursor of OE, such that EO/EEO is expected to mediate the relationship between POJ and three sub-dimensions of OE (i.e., Organizational Commitment, Trust, and Satisfaction). That is, we expect that positive EO/EEO is necessary to explain the relationship between POJ and OE. Contributions of this proposed theoretical approach will be further discussed.

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Exploring the Criticality of Cross-Cultural Competence in Moderating Relational Demography Effects on Workplace Microaggression

Felicia O. Mokuolu

In recent times, the turbulent nature of our global economy has highlighted the crucial need for organizations to transcend geographic and time limitations, in order to gain or maintain a competitive edge in their respective industries. In their quest to harness the benefits of a diverse workforce, a number of organizations have grasped the criticality of cross-cultural competence in enhancing workplace productivity in multinational or multicultural settings (Nicholls et al., 2002; Jackson, 2002, Abbe et al., 2007). Although the notion of cross-cultural competence has been examined in variety of contexts (Ruben, 1989; Stening & Hammer, 1992; Nicholls et al., 2002; Jackson, 2002), including military settings (Abbe et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2008), no study to date has explored the moderating role of cross-cultural competence, in the potential relationship between relational demography and microaggression in the workplace. Consequently, this theoretical paper aims to address this gap in the literature, by offering propositions based on past empirical research and theories, regarding the role of cross-cultural competence in reducing the probable effects of relational demography in the manifestation of microaggression in organizations. Given the scant research in this area, this paper intends to provide recommendations for future research, and spur discourse on the criticality of cross-cultural competence in reducing workplace microaggression, and improving multilevel organizational outcomes.

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Sexual Assault Perceptions in the U.S. Navy: Results of the 2010 Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Quick Poll

Carol E. Newell, Kimberly P. Whittam, and Zannette A. Uriell

Sexual assault in the military continues to receive media and high-level Navy leadership attention. In 2004, 2005, and 2008, Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) Quick Polls were conducted by NPRST to determine Sailor awareness and perceptions of sexual assault and the SAVI program. In October 2009, the name was changed to the Sexual Assault Prevention & Response (SAPR) program. The 2010 SAPR Quick Poll, sponsored by OPNAV (N135), was conducted to re-assess sexual assault perceptions, to determine awareness of the SAPR program, and knowledge of the difference between restricted and unrestricted reporting.

Poll questions were adapted from the SAVI Quick Polls or developed with program sponsors. A stratified, random sample of 11,800 active duty Navy officers and enlisted was selected for this poll. Officer/enlisted status and gender served as the strata. Standard Navy Quick Poll procedures were used to administer the poll. Commands of selected participants were contacted via the Naval Message System, and asked designate that the Command Career Counselor serve as the Point of Contact, and notify those selected and request that they complete the poll on the Internet. The poll was completed by 3,475 individuals, for a 32% response rate. The returns were statistically weighted to match the pay group and gender distribution of the Navy. Overall, the results were generally positive and mirrored findings on the previous SAVI Quick Polls. The results, including a comparison to the previous SAVI polls where appropriate, will be presented.

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Sexual Assault Climate Factors: A Commander’s Perspective

Chaunette Small

Commanders are responsible for monitoring and maintaining the climate within their command. Sexual assault is a major threat in the military and has negative repercussions for mission success. To aid commanders in reducing the risk of sexual assault within their unit they need to be aware of the sexual assault climate within their unit. In order to provide commanders with this tool, developers need to understand what information regarding sexual assault climate is most useful to commanders. To accomplish this, an online focus group was conducted that asked commanders about what information they would find most useful regarding the sexual assault climate in their unit. The questionnaire consisted of 10 items designed to tap a wide variety of sexual assault issues that may be of concern to commanders, including: bystander intervention climate, prevention and response training, and the sexual assault reporting processes. These items aimed to identify what information regarding sexual assault climate commanders find most useful. Three open-ended items are included in the questionnaire to receive feedback regarding whether commanders received any sexual assault prevention and response (SAPR) training prior to assuming command. Results demonstrated that commanders find preventative initiatives (e.g., bystander intervention), leadership support perceptions, and barriers to reporting sexual assault as being the most pertinent issues to obtain more information about within their command. Additional quantitative and qualitative results, as well as, how this information will be used to develop a commander’s tool are discussed in detail.

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Multimedia Assessment of Cross-Cultural Competence

Chaunette Small

Cross-cultural competence (3C) represents a multi-dimensional construct that allows individuals to operate in an efficient and effective manner in cross-cultural environments. Research indicates that there are a variety of benefits to having 3C, including those related to social interactions, psychological well-being, and performance. In a military context, possessing 3C has implications for mission success and readiness. However, more research is needed regarding the most valid and reliable way to measure cross-cultural competence. The purpose of the current study is to propose the development of a video-based situational judgment test (SJT) of cross-cultural competence and validate it with a number of important factors. Utilizing the framework of cross-cultural competency that identifies six core competencies (cultural knowledge, organizational awareness, cultural perspective taking, communication, interpersonal skills and cultural adaptability; see Figure 1), the video-based SJT is proposed to provide a more valid measure of 3C than some traditional paper-and-pencil methods. Proposed hypotheses and methodology are discussed.

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Helping Service Members Succeed: The Critical Need for Education and Credentialing

Carol A. Berry and LTC Eurydice Stanley

The future for military programs is nebulous as the Defense Department navigates through $450 billion dollars worth of budget cuts in the next ten years, reported drawdowns and skyrocketing unbudgeted unemployment benefit expenses. It is critical that programs such as education and credentialing remain funded to support the future of our Service members. The United States Department of Labor reported Veteran unemployment at 8.7% for 2010 (with levels varying by age, race, disability and gender) with unemployment reaching a staggering 21.9% for Iraq and Afghanistan-era veterans aged 18-24. The pending military drawdown may cause unemployment levels to spike substantially, compounded due to current employer perception of Veterans. The purpose of this poster session is to outline the critical necessity of immediate Service member transition preparation, showing a direct correlation between higher education and lower unemployment. Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) training will be utilized to show the value of capitalizing on recommended credits awarded by the American Council on Education (ACE) for attending the Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA) course, and the relative ease with which an Associates or Bachelors degree could be obtained by leveraging military training obtained during the span of a military career. Recommendations will include leveraging educational programs and products to include DSST and CLEP, tuition assistance (TA), degree planning, virtual and institutional education centers, changes to the Post 9/11 GI Bill to include opportunities for non-college, non-degree courses to learn a skill and pursue post-military vocation and the importance of developing a personal transition plan with numerous contingencies.

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Psychological Bullying Climate: Measurement Development and Validation

Elizabeth Steinhauser

Bullying has recently received attention in the popular media with headlines reading “Bullied to death” (Franks, 2010) and “When bullying turns deadly” (Spencer, 2009). Both school age children and working adults have taken their own lives presumably due to school and workplace abuse, respectively. In addition to being associated with dire personal consequences, workplace bullying has been related to critical organizational outcomes such as turnover (Parris, 2007) and loss of productivity (Yildirim, 2009). Workplace bullying is frequently studied in terms of prevalence, target-bully characteristics, impacts, and intervention (Lutgen-Sandvik & McDermott, 2008) but theory and measurement regarding the perpetuation of bullying within organizations is lacking. The current study seeks to create and validate a measurement tool that can assess the ‘psychological bullying climate’ of an organization. Psychological bullying climate has been defined here as Psychological bullying climate has been defined here as employees’ perceptions of the degree to which an organization is perceived as tolerant of bullying behaviors. Tolerance of bullying behaviors refers to the extent to which bullying behaviors are ignored, rewarded, supported, and expected within an organization. This tool can potentially serve as a proactive strategy to assess the climate associated with bullying within organizations. This information, in conjunction with focus groups, may serve valuable to leadership as it may indicate needed policy change or policy enforcement within an organization.

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Examining the Underlying Motivational Processes to Enhance Understanding of the 3C Competencies

Mary Margaret Sudduth

The 3C model of cross-cultural competence identifies affective, cognitive, and behavioral knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities that are integral for success in cross-cultural settings (McCloskey, Behymer, Papautsky, Ross, & Abbe 2010). Although this model builds on the Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (Bennett, 1993), the General Stage Model of Cognitive Skill Acquisition (Ross, Phillips, Klein, & Cohn, 2005), and the General Framework for Cross-Cultural Competence (Abbe, Gulick, & Herman, 2007), the 3C model primarily relies on empirical data. While the model continues to gain support with content and criterion-related validity evidence, this paper seeks to examine theory related to the underlying motivational processes that may contribute to successful acquisition and performance of cross-cultural competence. In particular, self-regulatory theories in motivation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; Vancouver, 2000) are useful to consider when designing and implementing cross-cultural training. Self-regulatory skills along with the value and attention to feedback processes are proposed as integral components to developing cross-cultural competence. These processes will be discussed as a new lens in understanding the six core competencies, followed by a discussion of practical implications for training development and outcomes (Johnston, Paris, McCoy, Severe, & Hughes, 2010).

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Examining the Construct Validity of Cross-Cultural Competence in the Military

Bianca Trejo

As the U.S. Forces deploy in regions that require interaction with host nationals, there is a need for military members to be cross-culturally competent (McCloskey & Behymer, 2010). An individual who is cross-culturally competent interacts successfully with those from other cultures that are different from their own. The knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics that make up cross-cultural competence can result in clearer communication, build trust, and strengthen relationships (Selemski, 2009) in social contexts.

The most current, theoretical model of cross-cultural competence is by Johnston, Paris, McCoy, Severe, and Hughes (2010). They used extensive task analyses using military members with experience in cross-cultural environments. Trejo (2011) developed and began to validate a measure of cross-cultural competence based on the Johnston et al. (2010) model. Because this model was based on a thorough task analysis and the items were written using the task statements in the Johnston et al. (2010) report, the content validity of this measure is particularly strong.

Although there is some evidence for the content and criterion-related validity, there is still a need to evaluate the construct validity of the measure. This study will therefore examine the measure’s placement in a nomological network of similar and dissimilar constructs. Based on the information aforementioned, identifying and validating the specific abilities that can enhance cross-cultural competence, which is highly pertinent for deployed military personnel. Furthermore, validating this measure is an important step to have more confidence in this assessment tool. Once the measure is validated it can be used to assess training needs for military missions that require cross-cultural competence.

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An Application of Generalizability Theory to the DEOCS

Stephen A. Truhon and Lisa M. Casey

Cronbach’s alpha is commonly used to measure reliability. However, it measures just one aspect of reliability: internal consistency of a test through the examination of inter-item correlations. A high Cronbach’s alpha means that the results can be generalized to a population of items that might be used to measure the construct, but not about the extent to which they can be generalized to other testing aspects (e.g., participants, situations). Generalizability theory was developed to provide this kind of information in order to understand the causes of measurement error. It uses an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model to decompose variability to different sources from which generalizability coefficients can be calculated.

In the current study generalizability theory was applied to the Religious Discrimination, Age Discrimination, and Disability Discrimination subscales within the DEOCS. These subscales all deal with aspects of discrimination; their items are written in similar ways; and the number of items (three) is the same. Based on content, items were matched with their counterparts on the other subscales.

The scores of a random sample of 200 military personnel who had completed the DEOCS and had left no missing data for these items were analyzed in a 200 (Persons) x 3 (Categories) x 3 (Items) general linear model ANOVA. Generalizability coefficients ranged from .64, for absolute decisions regarding one item at a different time and place, to .92, for relative decisions regarding the average rating for nine other items from these scales.

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Results of 2010 Pregnancy and Parenthood Survey

Zannette Uriell and Paul Rosenfeld

Women account for about 15% of active component Navy personnel, and Navy leadership continues to be interested in the impact of pregnancy and parenthood issues, both on men and women as well as on the overall readiness of the Navy. Current databases may not accurately reflect or make readily available key statistics such as single parenthood, family planning attitudes, birth control practices, and pregnancy rates, so the Pregnancy and Parenthood Survey has been conducted biennially since 1988 to assess these issues. The most recent web-based administration occurred in fall 2010. A randomly selected, stratified sample of about 15,000 active component women and about 10,000 men were invited to participate. The weighted response rates were 27% (women) and 24% (men). Overall, there has been relatively little change in pregnancy rates and other key measures over the last several years. Key findings for this administration of the survey include: 1) Few women have orders to their next duty station when they become pregnant; 2) There continues to be a large difference in pregnancy planning between enlisted and officer women; 3) There are about 18,000 single parents in the Navy, 2/3 of which are single Navy fathers; 4) About half of enlisted women indicate that their sea/shore rotation is good for family planning; and 5) The most common methods of birth control continues to be the pill and the male condom.

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Double Jeopardy: The Influence of Age on a Model of Perceived Ageism and Sexism, Gender, and Organizational Trust

Charles Ritter, Shannon Pinegar, Justin Purl, and Rodger Griffeth

Using a sample of 1,153,880 military personnel and structural equation modeling, the current study investigates age and gender, and their relationships to perceived ageism, sexism, and organizational trust. Our findings show the relationship between ageism and organizational trust is stronger for the older group than the younger group (.40 and .20 respectively). Additionally, the relationship between sexism and organizational trust is weaker for the older group than the younger group (.16 and .28 respectively). Gender was unrelated to ageism and sexism. Research on other important organizational outcomes, like work unit performance and retention, is needed.

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Panel Sessions

The panel sessions were designed to bring researchers together to discuss a common topic. A Presider was employed to the discussion and assisted in defining various viewpoints. Three separate panels were conducted with fourteen esteemed panel members.
Diversity and Inclusion in the 21st Century

George Jones, Vice Admiral Scott R. Van Buskirk, Major General Marcia Anderson, Major General Sharon K.G. Dunbar, Major General Juan G. Ayala, Brigadier General James R. Gorham, and Adis M. Vila

While people of similar beliefs, attitudes, and backgrounds tend to gravitate toward one another, this behavior can actually be more detrimental than beneficial in some situations. In today’s increasingly global workplace environment, the ability to effectively communicate with people of different cultures and backgrounds is an essential skill. In a diverse workplace, people learn these skills naturally as a result of normal day-to-day interaction and corporate teamwork. The challenge is “how to promote diversity” in today’s climate of “Deficit Reductions” related to the U.S. economy. The expected outcome must always be a “competent, well-trained, diverse” workforce that can function efficiently and effectively to accomplish the mission.

DRRI/DEOMI History

William T. Yates II, Richard O. Hope, Frankie T. Jones Sr., Dottie Manny-Kellum, and Theodore Paynther

The History Panel will feature six participants, all of whom had significant roles in DRRI/DEOMI’s history from its founding in 1971 to the present. The participants have a combined history of more than 100 years in the business of equity and in the history of the Institute. We can expect some revelations and stories that will put DEOMI’s history in a different perspective for participants, because the panelists have “lived and breathed” DEOMI’s challenges, accomplishments, and contributions.

Achieving Benefits of Diversity

Marinus van Driel, Rodger Griffith, Neil Hauenstein, L. A. Witt, and Belle Ragins

Realizing the benefits of diversity requires moving beyond the paradigm of categorizing diversity as a positive or a negative organizational attribute. Rather, there are a variety of factors that can affect the impact of diversity on organizational functioning. Members of this panel will indicate that community diversity and organizational factors such as positive diversity climate, fair evaluation procedures, and the alignment of organizational goals with diversity related initiatives are all critical to facilitate positive diversity outcomes such as job satisfactions, reduced stress of organizational members, as well as improved retention and recruitment.

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Embedded Diversity: Understanding the Role of Diversity Within and Outside the Workplace (Abstract)

Dr. Belle Rose Ragins

Increasingly, researchers are recognizing that employees do not leave their community experiences at the workplace door, but rather carry their experiences with them into the workplace. This presentation offered insights into the role of community diversity on the workplace using a holistic perspective (Ragins, 2008). A holistic perspective recognizes that organizations are embedded within local and global communities, and that a complete understanding of life within organizations requires an understanding and appreciation of life outside of it. A holistic approach to diversity holds that the diverse identities, relationships and experiences people have outside of the workplace spillover to affect their behaviors, attitudes and experiences within the workplace.

A conceptual analysis of the evolution of holistic diversity was first presented. This was followed by preliminary results from a new study that examines the spillover of community diversity to the workplace. The ultimate goal of the presentation was to stimulate dialogue and evoke new ideas and perspectives on the embedded nature of diversity.

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Achieving Benefits of Diversity

Rodger W. Griffeth, Marius van Driel and Allison Tenbrink
• Racial harassment and racially biased performance evaluations conceived as shocks;

• Shock - an event that jars organizational members toward thinking about leaving jobs (Lee and Mitchell's (1994) “unfolding model”).

• Racial harassment and racially biased performance evaluations have yet to be considered as shocks (Hom, Roberson, & Ellis, 2008).

• Our study investigates how discrimination shocks increase turnover intentions (TI), which are the most direct turnover antecedents (Dalessio, Silverman, & Shuck, 1986; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979).

• New criterion: organization endorsement - willingness of individuals to recommend/refer friends/family members join their organization.

Theoretical Model

• Diversity climate and appraisal bias shape job satisfaction, which in turn drives both TI (Griffeth & Hom, 2001; Hom & Griffeth, 1995) and organizational endorsement.

• Diversity climate a key indicator of hostile work environments (Gonzalez & DeNisi, 2009, p. 24).

• Research shows that those experiencing race discrimination have lower levels of satisfaction with the organization as well as increased intentions to quit (Antecol & Cobb-Clark, 2007; Rosenfeld et al., 1998).
Methods

Sample
5,218 junior enlisted reserve duty or National Guard personnel.

Measures
- Harassment climate (8 items; $a = .89$),
- Absence of evaluation discrimination (4 items; $a = .77$),
- Job satisfaction (5 items, $a = .93$),
- Organizational endorsement (6 items, $a = .97$), and
- Intent to remain (1 item)

Analysis
Structural equation modeling (SEM)
Results

- The model exhibited excellent fit with the data (CFI = .97, TLI=.99, RMSEA = .04).
- All relationships were significant (p < .05).
- All relationships were in the expected directions.
Discussion

- Results of the study indicate that workplace shocks, such as having a negative diversity climate can in fact play an indirect role in the turnover process, through job satisfaction.
- Moreover, diversity climate via the same path, is associated with a negative willingness of organizational members to recommend their organization.
- Thus, diversity has benefits, but more is needed.

Future Research

- In-depth exploration of diversity climate, evaluation discrimination & job sat relationships;
- Need for controls;
- Need for alternative models;
- Need for causal research.
Temporal effects of diversity faultlines and social categories in training groups

Marinus van Driel, Van Driel Consulting, Inc.
Bertolt Meyer, University of Zürich
Daniel P. McDonald, DEOMI

Diversity

• Is diversity good or bad for organizations?

  – “Diversity refers to differences between individuals on any attribute that may lead to the perception that another person is different from self” (van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004, p. 1011).

  – Diversity becomes more important as more organisations employ more heterogeneous individuals, e.g.:
    • Demographic change (age)
    • International mobility (ethnicity)
    • Gender equality
A test case for the impact of diversity

• **Background**
  – DEOMI’s flagship course entails weeks spent in highly diverse small groups exploring diversity and discrimination.
  – This experience is taxing both affectively and cognitively.
  – The groups are geared toward achieving behavioral change in students.

• **Research Question**
  – We were interested in finding out whether diversity within training groups as well as perceived similarities between trainers and group members affected students’ behavioral change.

Faultlines over time: Can stronger faultlines lead to more positive outcomes over time than weaker ones?

• Diversity faultlines could lead to problematic effects at the beginning, but could foster team learning over time (e.g., Brodbeck & Greitemeyer, 2000).

• Test of this assumption in 84 diverse military training groups (N = 1133, 13.1 trainees per group) where learning was measured over time.

• Sample was diverse with regard to race (32 Asian, 578 Black, 114 Hispanic, 13 Native American, 345 White), gender (721 male, 368 female), and other attributes.

• Focal area of training: Behavioral change associated with challenging interactions brought about by group diversity – Assessments of students’ behaviors associated with course objectives: Ratings (0-100) at three equally spaced time points by three raters (the two trainers and one outside assessor) on five scales.

• Faultline strength *Fau* (Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003) computed over available social categories.
A three-level growth model of the impact of faultlines on training performance over time

Hypothesis: Strong faultlines are associated with a lower intercept and a higher slope in test performance than weak faultlines

ICC(1) of test scores in classes = .09, $p < 0.001$, ICC(2) = 0.79: Multilevel modeling warranted

The proposed effect

- **Analysis**
  - Random Coefficient Growth Modeling in R (Bliese, 2009) shows that...
    - Students’ similarity to trainers only impacted students’ learning initially
    - Faultlines (i.e., group diversity) has a positive impact on student learning over time
Implications

• Salient team diversity (faultlines) can have negative short-term effects but positive long-term effects.

• Diverse teams may require time to attain their optimal level of functioning.
Effects of Diversity Climate on Stress and Stress-Handling Self-Efficacy

Marinus van Driel and L.A. Witt

The Model

Diversity Climate → Harassment & Discrimination → Problem-Solving Coping → Stress Self-Efficacy

- Emotional Exhaustion
Diversity Climate

• Hostile work environment or low-diversity climate (McKay, Avery, & Morris, 2009).
• Cues indicate that personal harassment and discrimination are unlikely to be sanctioned and may even be expected.

Diversity Climate Measure

• Diversity climate: 8 items (e.g., “How frequently during the past 12 months have you been in circumstances where you thought military personnel made unwelcome attempts to draw you into an offensive discussion of racial/ethnic matters?”). Response options ranged from 1 = “never” to 5 = “at least once.”
Incidents of discrimination: 7 items (e.g., “Which of the following best describe the situation that during the past 12 months has bothered you most: Offensive encounters with military personnel (for example, your exposure to offensive race/ethnic-related speech, pictures/printed material, non-verbal looks, or dress”). Response options ranged from 1 = “No” to 2 = “Yes.”

Problem-focused coping: 4 items (e.g., “As a result of the situation, did you tell the person to stop?”). Response options ranged from 1 = “No” to 2 = “Yes.”
**Emotional Exhaustion**

**Emotional exhaustion:** 6 six items (e.g., “In the past month, how often have you been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly?”). Response options were arranged on a scale ranging from 1 = “Never” to 5 = “Very often.” We recoded the items so that high scores reflect low levels of emotional exhaustion.

**Stress Self-Efficacy**

**Stress self-efficacy:** 4 items (e.g., “In the past month, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal problems?”). Response options were arranged on a scale ranging from 1 = “Never” to 5 = “Very often.”
The Model

Diversity Climate → .79 Harassment & Discrimination → .85 Problem-Solving Coping

Emotional Exhaustion → .47
Stress Self-Efficacy → .56

CFI = .92, TLI=.96, RMSEA = .04
Study Participants: DEOCs, 2009.

Relevant Research Articles

Technology Demonstration

These exhibits provided a view of the state of the art for technology. A private company, Vcom3D, Inc., and DEOMI’s Dr. Richard Oliver Hope Human Relations Research Center provided demonstrations of developing technology to include gaming systems, avatars, and web- and mobile-based instruction systems.
Vcom3D, Inc.

Vcom3D, Inc. Technology Demonstrations

Vcom3d, Inc. has developed Vcommunicator Digital Virtual Humans that serve as mentors, coaches, and role-playing actors in a wide variety of instructional applications. These interactive 3D characters are being used by several organizations to create game-, Web-, and mobile-based instruction in interpersonal and cross-cultural communications.

The Vcommunicator system includes:
- A library of highly articulated civilian and military characters of both genders and all ages, representing several races and cultures.
- Hundreds of research-based, culturally differentiated gestures and other non-verbal behaviors.
- Vcommunicator Studio: An authoring tool for composing animations that include lip-sync to any language, facial expression, gesture, focus of attention, and body language.
- An interface to Artificial Intelligence (AI) models of cognitive and emotive behaviors.
- Import and export capabilities to intergrate with games and virtual world platforms; with SCORM-conformant Interactive Multimedia Instruction (IMI) and with mobile platforms, including the Apple and Android tablets and smartphones.

At the DEOMI Research Symposium, we demonstrated both the authoring tools and several scenarios developed using the tools with application to training and assessing cross-cultural rapport building, interviewing, negotiation, and related socio-cultural encounters.

www.vcom3d.com
DEOMI has worked with a wide variety of DoD agencies, organizations and in-house to create and use up-to-date training through simulation and avatars. These interactive simulations provide training through the Web and mobile-based devices.

The following demonstrations were showcased.

- **Non-verbal behavior training** created by eCrossCulture.
  - This program has six modules
    1. Introduction
    2. Facial Expressions of Emotion
    3. Gestures
    4. Change Detection
    5. Aggression Detection
    6. Credibility Assessment
  - This program takes 140 minutes to complete

- **EOA demonstration** created specifically for DEOMI by Vcom3D
  - This demonstration was created for EOA, in order for them to refresh after they leave DEOMI
  - This avatar based demonstrations has the EOA introduce himself/herself to the Commander. The overall goal is to show the EOA how important it is to demonstrate what he/she can provide the Command.
  - This tool provides feedback throughout

- **Cultural Bayou** demonstration created for Hispanic culture by Vcom3D, specifically for DEOMI training
  - This interactive avatar simulation provides participants the opportunity to learn differences between hyphenated American cultures
  - This tool provides feedback throughout and also has branching techniques incorporated, allowing for different outcomes of the scenario
  - This is currently hosted on our culture website: defenseculture.org